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Globally the debate on the most effective pathway for development has reached 
somewhat of an impasse, with the two dominant approaches of market-led (neoliberal) 
development and developmental state approaches still at loggerheads. In the rapidly 
developing country of Vietnam, scholars have debated which of these two approaches is 
now most influential. Elizabeth Thurbon’s (2016) concept of the ‘developmental 
mindset’ offers an effective way to evaluate Vietnam’s directions because it allows 
scholarship to move beyond debating the meaning of particular policies, and to consider 
the mindset of leaders and policy-makers regarding development directions. Thus, this 
thesis evaluates the perceptions of the developmental state mindset in Vietnam but it 
focuses on the influence of international actors who have played a key role in shifting 
thinking about development in Vietnam. The international actors studied are: foreign 
economic actors, International Organisations (IOs), and international Non-
Governmental Organisations (INGOs). 
The thesis begins with a review of the research literature on the impact of globalisation 
on the nation-state and understandings of the developmental state, before introducing 
the concept of the developmental mindset. Next, the context in Vietnam is reviewed, 
along with key policy directions and documents. Based on this broad view, the thesis 
uses a case study approach to analyse the influence of international actors on the 
developmental state mindset in Vietnam.  
Vietnam began diving into development and globalisation from a big reform or 
renovation called Doi Moi, which commenced in 1986.  Yet, despite its developing 
country status, Vietnam has been regarded as a relatively strong state. As a consequence, 
the thesis seeks evidence around the impact of globalisation on the state and the shifting 
developmental mindset. The Vietnamese state has actively engaged with a range of 
international actors.  The three actors studied in this thesis have been particularly 
influential in Vietnam. Thus, the central focus of the thesis is to analyse the role of 
foreign economic actors, IOs and INGOs to show the relation between the realities of 
Vietnam, the research literature, and the perceptions of their influence on the 




Overall, the thesis demonstrates the depth of engagement of international actors with 
Vietnam’s developmental mindset at the national, provincial and local levels. All 
these international actors, in different ways, contribute to creating views around the 
role of the state in economic management, the direction of reform of political -
economic institutions and directions for social development. The Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) sector most directly influences views about economic 
management, promoting a market-led view and challenging developmental state 
capacity in sustainable economic development. But it has not undermined local 
government’s developmental mindset and capacity, rather local government have 
responded proactively to the challenges created by FDI.  
IOs have concentrated on institutional reform mostly at the federal level and have 
brought international rules and Western norms to Vietnam, albeit mostly those which 
have a neoliberal direction. Still, IOs have effectively contributed to national 
developmental strategy and institutional capacity enhancement, and are regarded 
relatively positively in Vietnam. However, the effectiveness and extent of the IOs’ 
influence depends on whether their directions align with the strategy and plans of the 
government. Where there is less fit, they are less likely to have influence. IOs have 
certainly contributed to the promotion of a more market-led approach to development in 
Vietnam.   However, while they have altered the developmental mindset, the influence 
of developmental state ideas has not completely disappeared. As is apparent in the study 
of INGOs in Vietnam, these organisations mainly focus on grassroots activities with 
vulnerable and poor people in undeveloped rural and remote areas. As a result, the 
INGOs have influenced local and national government through introducing new models, 
methods, and approaches to social development, as well as their training programs. 
Their influence enhances the focus on social development within the overall 
developmental approach, a variation of the traditional developmental state approach but 
generally a positive one.  
In brief, the conclusion is that Vietnam is still more of a developmental state than it is a 
liberal or neoliberal one, but the influence of international actors has spread the 
influence of market-led developmental ideas. If these ideas become hegemonic, the 
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1.1. The project 
Power and the state are not constant objects and change frequently in different 
periods. In the ancient state, power was located at the centre, and overwhelmingly 
concentrated around the king and his household; in the feudal system, this power 
concentrated on princes and mandarins; and in capitalism or the modern state, the 
power belongs to the bourgeois, or in another approach, power is held by the 
representatives of the people selected in elections (Gill 2003). Although the 
composition of states change, the nature of the state is to impose itself upon, or 
intervene in, communities. This intervention can be strong or weak and direct or 
indirect, depending on the type of state or political regime functioning and the 
different historical context. In modern society, many states can be roughly grouped 
into one of two broad types of state: state-controlled systems meaning socialist states 
and dictatorial states some of which emphasise a centrally planned economy and 
bureaucratic subsidy; and regulatory state systems, meaning (more or less) democratic 
states and emphasising the supposed passivity of the state in the context of laissez-
faire capitalism. Standing between the two is the model of the ‘developmental state’, 
which features states taking a proactive leading role in driving economic development 
in a market economy (Johnson 1982; Bagchi 2003; Chang 2003). 
Prior to 1986, the Vietnamese state was, at least in theory, structured following the 
socialist model of a planned economy. The state intervened directly in all aspects of 
communities and there was an extensive bureaucracy. Doi moi, Vietnamese for reform 
or renovation, is a nodal point marking a transition of the Vietnamese state. Doi moi 
started around 1986 and saw Vietnam transformed from relatively centralised rule 
towards commodity-based economic development and, in more recent years, towards a 
market-based, but socialist-oriented economy. Vietnam undertook structural economic 
reform first and then step-by-step political and structural reform in a range of areas 
(Communist Party of Vietnam 1986; Dang Phong 2012). These reform efforts are 




implementation. The aims of these reforms have been broadly to meet new external and 
internal challenges in order to developed in a globalised world (Thayer 2010).  
Vietnam’s transition process has been influenced by laissez faire and even neoliberal ideas 
one the one hand, and developmental state ideals on the other hand (Painter 2003; Beresford 
2008; Gainsborough 2010; Masina 2012; Pham 2012; Bui 2015). It is still not clear which 
of these two approaches has been most influential, nor which will direct the country’s future 
development trajectory. Elizabeth Thurbon recently advanced the idea of a ‘developmental 
mindset’ to explain why in South Korea, despite the liberalisation since late 1990s, the key 
role of the state in development has not disappeared (Thurbon 2016). Thurbon argued that 
the continuation of a development mindset by South Korean political leaders and policy 
elites is the key to understanding why the state has taken a renewed developmental activism 
through finance policy. The importance of a developmentally focused elite has long been 
part of the developmental state literature (Johnson 1982), however Thurbon (2016: 17) 
argues this ideational aspect has not been given adequate emphasis and her approach is 
useful for understanding it in the context of contemporary globalisation. This thesis aims to 
apply this concept of the developmental state mindset to Vietnam focusing on the influence 
of international actors. 
The meaning of development in the context of globalisation is as complex as 
globalisation itself, and both of them are now associated with increased interaction and 
integration among different countries. Globalisation is seen by scholars to be powered 
primarily by international trade, transferable investments and the development of 
improved transport and information technology (Giddens 2001: 152; see also Mann 
2013:1-10; Piketty 2014: 23). Through a long period of operation, globalisation is often 
seen as an irreversible process, which has affected almost all countries and regions and 
influenced changes across the world. One of the key debates about globalisation has 
been its impact on state capacity. While a range of scholars, particularly those from the 
liberal tradition, have argued that globalisation has undermined state capacity, other 
scholars have argued that globalisation has contributed to, reinforced and augmented 
many components of state capacity. Critical international political economy scholars 
argue that state capacity is certainly changed or pressured by globalisation, but each state 
will be affected in different ways, sometimes in ways that reinforce state capacity (Cox 




In this context, the influence of emerging actors associated with globalisation can be 
seen clearly in a developing state like Vietnam, for example, with its growth of foreign 
economic actors, expansion of International Organisations (IOs) and the blossoming of 
International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs). These emerging actors are, to 
a greater or lesser extent, a notable influence on development trajectories in Vietnam. It 
is important to understand how they have interacted with the developmental state in 
Vietnam and what perceptions of development those actors have and equally how the 
Vietnamese policy makers working with them view their role, hence the focus of this 
thesis on them. 
 
1.2. Purpose and Significance of the Study  
In exploring the idea of a developmental state, most scholars focus on the leading role of the 
state in driving development, examining whether and how the state has a proactive, 
autonomous role and its level of control over the economy. However, as noted above, 
Elizabeth Thurbon (2016) has argued that the idea of a developmental mindset needs to be 
given more prominence in the debate about developmental states. She argues that a 
developmental mindset as much as institutions or policies is a central element in 
distinguishing a developmental state from other state types (Thurbon 2016: 17). 
Further, internal or domestic factors of state-led development are often emphasised in 
developmental state literature. However, in the context of globalisation, developmental 
states are actively influenced by a range of international actors, which combine with the 
state’s own strategic development policies to affect development ideas and trajectories. 
Therefore, the central question this thesis explores is how the interaction with 
international actors have impacted on the development mindset in Vietnam and whether 
these international actors work to promote or negate a mindset focused on improving 
the country’s growth and development. In this sense then, the approach to a 
developmental mindset is broader than Thurbon’s (2016) as it examines not just 
economic activity but broader socioeconomic activity too though in both cases the 
activities aim at ‘protecting and cultivating the nation’ (Thurbon 2016: 16). 
Specifically, this thesis evaluates the developmental mindset of three crucial emerging 




and international Non-Governmental Organisations in Vietnam. For each of these 
actors, the thesis: 
 analyses the mindset of these actors around development and the perceptions of 
them and their influence in the context of Vietnam’s socialist market economy; 
and 
 explores the mindset and perceptions of these actors against the literature on the 
developmental state in general and in Vietnam specifically. 
Thus, the research aims to explore the influences of newly emerging international 
economic, political and social actors in Vietnam in the context of integration. This 
provides the context to analyse the mindset and perceptions of these actors’ influences 
on aspects of Vietnam’s development. Finally, I focus on the fit between the realities of 
Vietnam, the research literature, and perceptions of their roles on developmental state in 
Vietnam. 
The thesis seeks to contribute to the academic and policy literature by offering: 
 a systematic overview of the emergence of these new international actors in 
Vietnam through different periods and significant changes; 
 a better understanding of newly emerging actors in the context of integration and 
issues related to developmental state in Vietnam; and 
 a contribution to current research on contemporary developmental states and 
globalisation through a case study of Vietnam. 
There has been controversy in the research literature about the independence and 
autonomy of the state in the context of globalisation. With the dramatic spread of 
democracy and globalisation, some scholars have argued that the national state is 
declining due to the increasing influence of international actors, while others argue that 
claims about the death of state capacity are overstated to say the least. This thesis also 
aims to contribute to the state capacity literature by reviewing the key critically-minded 
theorists of those relations and the role of international actors in the developmental state 
by undertaking a case study of Vietnam. However, its main contribution is an analysis 
of the mindset and influence of international actors on the developmental state in 




three case areas. This is complemented by academic literature, policy debates and 
current affairs literature. Studying these perceptions in the context of academic literature 
provides specific evidence from Vietnam and reveals the contemporary fault lines 
around developmental state and globalisation. 
Most previous studies by both Vietnamese scholars and foreign scholars have been 
about the changing state of Vietnam or the impact of globalisation on social and 
economic development or cultural change in Vietnam. These studies have not analysed 
the linkages between international integration and the developmental state in Vietnam. 
Thus, this research fills in this gap. This is also the first research on the Vietnamese 
developmental state funded by Vietnam’s government in general and the Institute of 
Political Science- Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics in particular, written in 
English about the development mindset in Vietnam. 
In order to set the context for this study, this chapter next analyses the literature on 
globalisation and then on the developmental state. This covers issues of state capacity, state 
form and changes caused by global flows and international institutions. These two reviews 
provide the context for the thesis methodology, which follows. This introduction chapter 
concludes with an outline of the chapter structure of this dissertation. 
 
1.3. Literature Review 
1.3.1. Globalisation and the National State 
Globalisation is a process associated with increased constraints on states and 
interdependence among them. It features a growing influence for international 
organisations and non-governmental organisations as demonstrated by the increasing 
number of agreements, contracts and charters among states as well as the blossoming of 
huge of network of global commercial interests. It is also strongly linked to the 
increased speed of communications across the globe, through changes in both transport 
and information technology. In this context, one of the key debates is the impact of 
globalisation on national states.  
David Held, Anthony McGrew and Jonathan Perraton (2000) outline the three dominant 




globalisation, or ‘hyperglobalists’, were influenced by the liberal tradition and argued 
that globalisation has undermined state capacity. Hyperglobalists argue that we live in 
an increasingly global world in which states are being subjected to large-scale economic 
and political processes of change. These political-economic processes are eroding and 
fragmenting nation-states and diminishing the power of politicians. In these 
circumstances, states are increasingly the 'decision takers' and not the 'decision makers' 
(Held, McGrew et al. 2000: 15). The second wave of globalisation scholars, or sceptics, 
strongly resist the hyperglobalist view on the erosion and fragmentation of nation-states 
under the impact of globalisation and believe that the contemporary global 
circumstances are not unprecedented. In their account, while there has been an 
intensification of international and social activity in recent times, this has reinforced and 
enhanced state powers in many domains.  
Finally, Held et al., saw a third wave called ‘transformationalists’, who argue that 
globalisation is creating new economic, political and social circumstances that 
transform state powers unevenly as well as the context in which states operate. They do 
not predict the outcome of this transformation - indeed they believe it is uncertain - but 
argue that politics is no longer, and can no longer simply be, based on nation-states 
(Held, McGrew et al. 2000: 15). Equally, Martell (2007: 195) notes that this wave 
defined that, in the context of global capital flows, ‘states are retaining sovereignty but 
this is being reshaped and shifting because of things like the rise of regional 
institutions’. Held et al. are widely seen as representatives of the third waves for their 
conclusion that contemporary globalisation is creating ‘a new regime of government 
and governance’ that is emerging as ‘a more activist state’ and that it makes most sense 
to ‘speak of the transformation of state power’(Held, McGrew et al. 2000: 28). 
The central concern of this literature has been to answer questions such as: has the form 
of state changed with new types of world order? What is the fate of nation states in the 
era of globalisation? Will the nation state survive globalisation? Is it the case that the 
more globalisation accelerates, the less space there is for the nation state? Is 
globalisation undermining state sovereignty? As international integration advances, are 
national governments are becoming less relevant? Questions like these abound. 
Different scholars have come up with a range of different answers to these questions. In 




Robert W. Cox, Michael Mann, and Linda Weiss as key critically-minded theorists of 
the nation-state and globalisation. Cox is a critical theorist,
1
 while Mann and Weiss are 
institutionalists.
2
 I utilise Cox’s approach to world order as the theoretical basis for the 
thesis, however, Mann and Weiss’s positions are useful additions to better understand 
globalisation and, in particular, the case study of Vietnam. 
Cox’s approach to world order provides the overarching theoretical inspiration for the 
project. Cox (1986) examined the ideologies behind different approaches to world order 
grouping them broadly into problem-solving theories (e.g. realism, neorealism) and 
critical theories (e.g. neo-Marxism and poststructuralism). He generalised three 
fundamental levels of action that are, ‘the nature of man’, ‘the nature of states’, and ‘the 
nature of the state system’ (Cox 1986: 211-212). From this generalisation, Cox’s 
methodology for thinking about historical structures uses three levels - social forces, 
forms of state and world orders, as illustrated in the diagram below. 





Source: (Cox 1986: 221) 
Regarding the reciprocal relationships between social forces and forms of state, Cox 
investigated these relations base on analyses of production relations. He noted that 
production is the premise of all his arguments and that it is considered as the material 
basis ‘for all forms of social existence’ and as the starting point for thinking about 
                                                 
1
 Following the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Critical Theory has a narrow and a broad meaning 
in the philosophy and history of the social sciences. “Critical Theory” in the narrow sense designates 
several generations of German philosophers and social theorists in the Western European Marxist 
tradition known as the Frankfurt School. In the broad sense it refers to scholars who take a critical 
approach to understanding and interrogating power and contemporary social relations and not taking them 
for granted. See more in https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/ 
2
 Institutionalism in the social sciences is an approach that emphasises the role of institutions. Its’s study 
has a long pedigree and draws insights from previous work in a wide array of disciplines, including 
economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, and psychology.  Accordingly, institutionalism is 
frequently characterised by the attention it gives to history. The institutionalism that emerged in the 1980s 










historical structures (Cox 1987: 1). According to the author, the relationship between 
social forces and states penetrates from the social relations of production. He asserted 
that ‘new modes of social relations of production become established through the 
exercise of state power’ (Cox 1987: 105). Therefore, by analysing historical production 
relations, Cox showed the mutual connection between social forces and states. His view 
becomes clearer when he clarifies that the actions of the autonomous state are 
‘consistent with the economic project of the [dominant] class as a whole’ (Cox 1987: 
149). Cox showed that the development of social forces in the era of industrialisation 
and capitalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century was paralleled by a 
transformation from ‘the liberal form of state’ to ‘the welfare nationalist form of state’ 
(Cox 1986: 226). Thus, it can be seen that the changes of social relations of production 
or the development of social forces leads the transformation form of state.  
Cox also emphasised the role of international institutions in creating the contemporary 
world order and in influencing states. He took the cases of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) as evidence of internationalisation of the state. Cox emphasised 
that international institutions developed with the main function of reconciling ‘domestic 
social pressures with requirements of a world economy’ (Cox 1986: 230) and this 
system is ‘one in which central agencies of the U.S. government were in a dominant 
position’ (Cox 1986: 231). In the end, that system interacts with nation states and ‘it 
was a power structure seeking to maintain consensus through bargaining and one in 
which the bargaining units were fragments of states’ (Cox 1986: 231).  
Overall then on world order, as Engel (2010: 12) explained Cox argues that: ‘forms of 
state… can be influenced by the structure of the world order and can influence the 
structure’. Thus, Cox’s analysis of the importance of relationships between international 
institutions and states pave the way for the thesis to investigate international actors in 
Vietnam, finding the influence and contributions of these actors as centrally important 
to the Vietnamese state in driving economic development.  
Cox does not say as much about social forces; here it is useful to turn to Mann's 
analytical history of social power. Mann provided a depth analysis of four sources of 
social power, which are ideological, economic, military, and political power - the IEMP 




that states have ‘the centralised-territorial form, which makes their rule authoritative 
over persons residing in their territories’ (Mann 2013: 2). Thus, modern state power can 
be considered as the state’s capacity to impose its rules and penetrate society across its 
territory. Mann often analyses state relations as the process of ‘caging’ and creating a 
‘boundedness’ to social relations (Mann 1993: 61, 251, 505, 506). Globalisation, in 
contrast, is usually considered as a process that ‘uncages’ social relations and breaks 
through the territorial centrality. Therefore, Mann, himself raises the view that ‘what is 
generally called globalisation involved the extension of distinct relations of ideological, 
economic, military, and political power across the world’ (Mann 2013: 2). 
Globalisation occurred as an unreversed process and there is ‘more than one process of 
globalisation’, whereas many scholars see globalisation as a singular process (Mann 
2012: 1). These processes can be recognised as being complex forces with various 
networks of interaction. However, globalisation in itself ‘does not do anything’ and 
‘cannot be praised or blamed for the state of human society’ (Mann 2013: 3). Mann 
examined the ideologies underlying different approaches to globalisation such as 
hyperglobalisers, materialists, economists and sociologists and insisted that these 
scholars explain globalisation in term of a range of factors like international trade, the 
global integration of markets, ‘structural forces, capitalist production, and rationalist 
knowledge’ and the ‘global network society’ (Mann 2013: 3-8). Yet, in the end, he 
argues, they are alike in seeing ‘globalisation as a singular process’, which is why they 
usually argue ‘globalisation is undermining the nation-state’ (Mann 2013: 7). Unlike 
these ideologies, Mann argued that, depending on the level of interaction networks 
(local, national, inter-national, or global interaction networks), ‘either that the nation-
state and the nation-state system are strengthening or weakening’ (Mann 1997: 472).  
In Mann’s view, the relationship between globalisation and nation-states is not one of 
rivals ‘in a zero-sum game with one undermining the other’. On the contrary, they have 
gone hand in hand, surged together, indeed they ‘rose together’ (Mann 2013: 10). 
However, this relationship is a very complex one, ‘sometimes they reinforce each other, 
sometimes they contradict each other, mostly they are just orthogonal to each other’ 
(Mann 2013: 11). With a general understanding of a developmental state as the capacity 
of the state in making and implementing political decisions, globalisation contributes to 




(Mann 2012: 238). Thus, it can be seen that a ‘whole range of new functions’ are new 
features of developmental states and this is the key point of Mann’s view on the 
relations between globalisation and nation states. 
Weiss largely agrees with Mann’s assessment regarding the relationship between 
globalisation and the nation state. She critiques the argument that as ‘the integration of 
the world economy advances, national governments are becoming less relevant’ (Weiss 
1998: x). According to Weiss, national governments do lose some power in respect to 
dimensions of macroeconomic management, social programmes and industrial 
economic management. These losses are caused by external pressures rather than the 
strength or weakness of domestic institutions. In the development of globalisation, 
nation-states retain their importance role as a key political and economic factor in 
development, and building or augmenting state capacity is a ‘the lesson of dynamic 
integration’ (Weiss 1998: 212). 
Weiss developed and proved her point of view by analysing the case of the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98. As she noted, the crisis ‘re-opened the debate about the role 
of the state in the region's industrialisation’ and the main argument about state in Asia 
was ‘whether and in what way the state's transformative capacity is weak or robust - and 
how it relates to the impact of international markets’ (Weiss 1999: 317). Weiss analysed 
internal or domestic actors and reviewed the common argument that there has been too 
much state intervention and too little regulation in the Asian Tigers. According to 
Weiss, the reasons for the Asian crisis relate, in part, to issues of national institutions, 
which revealed ‘weak transformative capacity’ and ‘weak regulatory control’ (Weiss 
1999: 322). In addition, three external powerful actors - the US Treasury, Wall Street 
and the IMF - deepened the Asian crisis through their interventions. Weiss developed 
two main conclusions from this research, first weak capacity to transform domestic 
institutions ‘can increase vulnerability to international shocks like financial crises’. 
Second, the Asian crisis showed ‘how the “transformative” role of state applied 
externally can exploit vulnerability and deepen the effect of international shocks’ 
(Weiss 1999: 337). This is to say, international organisations influence national states 
and sometimes in negative ways. 
Weiss argues that ‘the juxtaposition of global and national is unfruitful’ (Weiss 




sovereignty and national policy autonomy’; globalisation is considered as a process, 
which influences national state as ‘erosion or transformation’; the domestic 
economic capacities of government are eroded by ‘transborder flows/economic 
integration’ and this integration is producing a new kind of (regulatory) state (Weiss 
1999: 60). She supports the argument that international cooperation is one part of 
state’s policy autonomy, and that it is, in fact, increasingly a basis of improved 
capacity (Weiss 1999: 60).  
Weiss contends that ‘global integration acts as a force that constrains states and 
reshapes institutions’ and this action orients and drives the standardisation of domestic 
institutions and the dispersal of decision-making power (Weiss 2005: 345). She 
suggests then that the state growth has, in fact, accompanied, the growth of 
multinational corporations and institutions, but ‘that these contemporary global 
networks remain intimately entwined with the domestic structures of nation-states’ 
(Weiss 2005: 346). These are key issues for this thesis as I explore the role of both 
corporations and international organisations on the Vietnamese state.  
In short, Weiss offers far-sighted analysis of the relations between globalisation and 
national states. However, her analysis emphasises the economic aspects more than 
cultural and political factors. Her argument about the relationship between globalisation 
and the nation state can be condensed into two main points: ‘first, globalisation is not 
just constraining but also state enabling, thus reinforcing infrastructural power; and 
second, it is the relationship of entwinement, not power displacement, that conditions 
the advancement of transnational power networks’ (Weiss 2006: 533).  
Cox, Mann and Weiss albeit in different ways emphasise the enmeshing of domestic 
and global actors through globalisation and they highlight the various ways that it 
transforms without necessarily eroding state power. This focuses on international 
actors highlights the importance of the case studies selected for this thesis, foreign 
direct investment, NGOs and IOs. These scholars, like many analysing the 
relationship between the nation state and globalisation, have focused predominately 
on advanced countries. This highlights the need to examine the experience of 
developing countries where the impacts of globalisation may be different and the 
reciprocal effects between nation-state and global actors may be more clearly 




of the more advanced industrial states, which, in turn, may make the former more 
vulnerable to the impacts of globalisation. At the same time, the dynamism of many 
developing countries has seen their centrality to globalisation increase. Further, in 
East and Southeast Asia, countries have continued to view states as key agents in 
development thus, they have not ceded the state’s traditional territory to non-state 
actors. This is even more the case in a socialist state like Vietnam. 
These characteristics in East and Southeast Asia countries featured as strong intervened 
state have been normally referred to as reciprocal relations between developmental 
states and globalisation.  Accordingly, some scholars have argued that developmental 
state are now limited and eroded in their power and leading role in development due to 
the competition from, and influence of, international actors (Cerny 1997; Soederberg, 
Menz et al. 2005; Fougner 2006). Fougner (2006), for example, asserted that the 
emergence of ‘international competitiveness’ has become defined as a governmental 
problem in both the context of business management and state governance as it bring 
pressure upon the dominant developmental roles of state authorities and limits 
autonomous national economies. However, as outlined earlier, many scholars have 
argued that there is a strategic relationship between developmental states and 
globalisation in which they evolved together and global factors fostered some state’s 
developmental functions (O Riain 2000; Wang 2002; Shin 2005; Beeson 2006; 
Gopinathan 2007). For example, Shin (2005) is convinced that state still has important 
roles in the context of globalisation and argued that ‘the state should maintain its 
functions as a mediator between homogenizing forces of globalisation and unique 
characteristics of local economies’ (Shin 2005: 380). Beeson (2006) sees that in the 
context of rapidly spreading globalisation, the international financial markets have 
shown to be unstable and need proactive involvement of government in managing them. 
He asserted that in the process of economic integration, ‘an effective, relatively 
independent and non-corrupt developmental state is still a potentially critical part of 
economic progress and mechanism for mediating global forces’ (Beeson 2006: 349-50). 
Thus, there has been a controversy around the compatibility between the developmental 
state and globalisation.  
For developing countries, the characteristics of a developmental state are often not fully 




factors in particular, are significant contributors to their developmental capacities. The 
institutional capacity of the state plays important role for development trajectories and it 
has been enhanced by interacting with global capitalism. For example, in a work by 
Walter and Zhang (2012), eight dynamic economic countries (China, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia) were chosen to measure 
the institutional domain of the state in global capitalism by examining three pillars – the 
business system, the financial system and the labour market. The authors showed all 
pillars, though influenced from global factors, were still maintained by the state, but that 
there has been a 'growing heterogeneity of internal institutional practices in East Asia’ 
(Walter and Zhang 2012: 271). In contrast Nolke argues that the features of the 
developmental state may change in the context of globalisation because of ‘the close 
collaboration between emerging market MNCs and their home governments’ and ‘that 
may be considered a new form of state capitalism’ (Nölke 2014: 196). In these type of 
states: ‘it is difficult to imagine a state that still has the capacity for coherent, centrally 
directed industrial planning during the current phase of global liberal capitalism’ (Nölke 
2014: 197). Vietnam is a good case study to evaluate such contesting claims and the 
central focus of this thesis is to contribute to clarifying the influences and contributions 
of international actors on national development strategies, by examining any changes in 
strategic thinking by Vietnamese policy makers and leaders. 
 
1.3.2. The Developmental State 
The concept of the developmental state was first posited by Chalmers Johnson in 1982 
through his investigation of the models behind Japan’s successful industrialisation. 
Unlike the neoclassical state that supposedly automatically adjusts to overcome market 
failures and adjusts for social justice, developmental states take the initiative not just to 
overcome market failures, but to focus on tectonic shifts in the market and to utilise the 
both the economic and political roles of the state for developmental purposes (Johnson 
1982; Woo-Cumings 1999; Chang 2003; 2010). Specifically, the state focuses on the 
design of specific guidelines, directions and policies to create priority mechanisms in 
key productive areas. For example, Japan concentrated on the automotive industry in the 
1970s, Malaysia focused on electronics and India now focuses on the software industry. 




When considering the economic development of Japan between 1925 and 1975, 
Johnson (1982) highlighted the important role of the Japanese Government, in 
particular the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), in ensuring a very 
high growth rate after World War II. Prior to Johnson, the prominent approaches to 
state development studies during the Cold War period was to differentiate between the 
‘state-controlled’ approach of the Soviet Union and socialist countries  (emphasising 
centralised planning) and capitalist or ‘regulatory states’ like the United Kingdom and 
the United States. However, Johnson (1982) pointed out that Japan, though 
fundamentally following Western model of capitalism and democracy, was 
nevertheless different. The state was not a marshal, as in the socialist countries, but it 
did not play the ‘passive’ role of capitalist states, rather it had a much larger role to 
play, particularly in orienting and concentrating resources on key economic areas over 
a long period. He used the term ‘developmental state’ to refer to that difference. Thus, 
the developmental state is a capitalist state that has some similarities with a socialist 
state in terms of development direction over the economy but is more focused on 
using market mechanisms.  
In recent decades, most countries have accepted private ownership of property and a 
competitive market economy as the main way to organise economic activity. But the 
debate about the relationship between the role of the state and the market in politics and 
economics continues. The main question is whether the state should actively lead and 
create, or should it prioritise market-driven signals (supply-demand), and therefore only 
function as a regulatory agency. The success of the Japanese state as well as the new 
industrialising countries (NICs) of East Asia, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, has led 
a range of scholars to suggest that this model warrants further attention. The 
developmental state model offers more possibilities for thinking about development 
trajectories than the current US-European free-market model for developing countries. 
Many scholars believe that the development state model is actually better than 
regulatory state and different scholars specify particular conditions as the key to 
successful developmental states (Johnson 1982; Woo-Cumings 1999; Chang 2003; 
Helleiner and Pickel 2005; Chang 2010). 
It is not easy to define what a developmental state is nor its characteristics, which could 




states. Indeed, each successful developmental state has featured its own particular 
characteristics. Johnson (1982), albeit using the term ‘Japanese model’, warned of 
overly generalising based solely on Japanese research. In other words, the idea that the 
way in which the Japanese Government oriented and guided economic development is a 
‘model’ needs to be used with caution as the generalisability of the approach is low and 
research of other similar cases in East Asia is required. In the case of South Korea, 
Bagchi (2003) outlines that the developmental state there featured: peasant land reform, 
a strong sense of nationalism, an export drive, a key for role for industrial 
conglomerates (chaebol), expenditures on research and development (R&D) and an 
effective collaboration between government and business (Bagchi 2003: Chapter four).  
What is equally important is that, as Bagchi (2000; 2003) demonstrated, the 
developmental state has existed for a long time and in many different countries. 
Developmental states were present in earlier times in a number of today’s developed 
countries, such as the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and the US. He also included the 
Soviet Union and China prior to the 1980s in his list of developmental state countries. 
Ha-Joon Chang (2003) equally finds this historical pattern. He argues that using the 
most common definition of a developmental state, it is possible to see three types of 
developmental state in different socio-political context and development conditions: 
East Asia (and France), Scandinavia and USA.  
East Asia is considered the ‘classic’ model, especially in Japan from the 1950s to 1980s. 
However, across East Asia, there are also differences. South Korea, for example, in the 
1960s to 1980s demonstrated initiatives to lead development through breakthrough 
policies (by selecting spearhead industries), operating a powerful super coordinating 
agency (the Economic Planning Commission) and state ownership of the entire banking 
sector. Japan does not have these characteristics. Compared with Japan and South 
Korea, Taiwan (China) did not have such a proactive and strong orientation, partly 
because the private sector in Taiwan is small and there are no large private companies 
as in Japan and South Korea. The active leadership in Taiwan was expressed primarily 
through the promotion of R&D and state owned enterprises (SOEs). Singapore is also a 
distinct developmental state model, combining both free trade and investment with the 
large state-owned sector. Chang (2003) argues that France used a similar development 




Général du plan) actively oriented and led investments and the country used the power 
of state-owned enterprises as a leading sector. 
The developmental state models in Scandinavia (except Finland), until the 1970s, all 
had developmental state characteristics, in particular they had active industrial 
development policies, though not as broad as East Asian ones. The Swedish state 
focused on such industries as metallurgy (mid-18th century), railways (1850), 
hydroelectric power (1890), etc. through cooperation with the private sector. In the early 
years of the twentieth century, the Swedish government also adopted policies to protect 
heavy industries (Chang 2003: 39). The Danish government has intervened and 
prioritised policies for the development of agricultural exports, and this was the main 
driver of growth in the 1930s. Thus, Scandinavian countries have invested in 
development, underpinning selected and prioritised industries. Major research and 
development institutions and centres in these countries remain largely state-owned. 
Chang (2003) also highlights the role of welfare policies in these societies and he argues 
they contribute to economic and structural change, thereby reducing the political 
pressure on state-led economic restructuring. Thus, the Scandinavian countries show 
that it is not necessary to overemphasise the role of state in techno-industrial 
development as is the case in East Asia, developmentalism can be done through a 
variety of tools, such as welfare, education, etc., depending on the socio-political 
context and development conditions.  
The US was also one source of developmental state ideas. One of the core ideas of the 
developmental state was the protection of infantry industries and strong protectionist 
trade policy (Chang 2003: 75; Weiss 2004: 248). Protection was a governmental policy 
in order to promote investment in a range of sector and the infrastructure to support it. 
In addition, the US also actively prioritises R&D. Even after World War II, when it held 
dominant positions and began calling for trade and investment liberalisation, the US 
retained the characteristics of the developmental state in a range of ways. For example, 
it created a network among experts in and outside the state to apply scientific and 
technological achievements to the economy in the fastest and most profitable way 
(Chang 2003: 86). Block and Keller (2011) defined this type of state as a developmental 
network state that differ from the developmental bureaucratic state in East Asian 




which is common in East Asian developmental states. The US government’s 
orientations are often hidden under R&D funding schemes in national defence or public 
health, with the results being commercialised and helping the US gain or retain market 
dominance globally.   
Thus, it is clear that the developmental state does involve a range of theories and 
practices and has been practiced in a range of successful industrialised states. It is a state 
governance model in which the state develops policies oriented to development, that is 
to creating the environment and conditions for all sectors of the economy and society to 
take full advantage of their assets. It involves a strong degree of state surveillance to 
detect possible imbalances and challenges, ensuring not just macroeconomic stability 
but broader social stability too. There are some similar characteristics among 
developmental states but many differences too as a key issue is adaptability to different 
circumstances and working with the strengths of the particular state. Further, as noted 
earlier, the ideational aspects of developmental states have not received the attention of 
its other aspects, in this case what following Thurbon (2016) is termed the 
developmental mindset. 
 
1.3.3. A ‘Developmental Mindset’ 
It cannot be denied that there are challenges in distinguishing developmental states from 
other state types in leading national development.
3
 However, in addition to the different 
characteristics and forms of intervention and orientation different states have in leading 
the course of national economic development, Thurbon (2016) argues that one of the 
most important elements that distinguishes developmental state from other types of state 
is a ‘developmental mindset’. The developmental mindset in Thurbon’s view is ‘a set of 
ideas about the primary purpose of economic activity, the central goals of the state, and 
the appropriate role of the state in achieving these goals’ (Thurbon 2016: 16). 
According to the author, most developmental state analysis, despite Johnson’s original 
conceptualisation, has focused on institutions and policies rather than ideational aspects. 
Giving central attention and responsibility to institutional or policy change, in her view, 
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 Other varieties of state discussed in the literature include: competitive states, neoliberal states, welfare 




is ‘problematic’, because of it leads erroneously implying that institutional and policy 
change can be clearly observed and measured by specific evidence and data (Thurbon 
2016: 18). However, the rootedness of such change is fundamentally influenced by the 
mindset of the policymaking elite. Therefore, Thurbon asserted that ‘mindset informs 
the institutions and policies’ and thus allows for ‘developmental state evolution’ and 
thus she concludes that ideas need to be returned ‘to the center of developmental state 
theorising’ (Thurbon 2016: 17). 
Thurbon explores what the central element of developmental mindset are and finds that 
it can be condensed to a focus on ‘developmentalism’ as the central element of 
developmental state (Thurbon 2016: 24). Taking the case of South Korea, Thurbon 
convincingly argues that the state’s financial activism embodies the key transformation 
of the developmental mindset after the Asian financial crisis. Korea was a typical 
developmental state in the 1960s and 1970s and undoubtable model for the concept. 
After the Asian financial crisis, some authors argued that Korea transformed into a 
‘neoliberal or regulatory state’ because of the liberalisation and the other reforms that 
followed during and after this crisis. However, by investigating and demonstrating the 
continuing, through transformed, central role of the state in the Korean financial system, 
Thurbon concludes that Korean state did not transform into neoliberal or regulatory 
state. What was key in this was that the developmental mindset of policy makers and 
‘the role of the president in shaping the direction of developmental state evolution’ 
(Thurbon 2016: 91).  
In short, Thurbon’s central argument is that developmentalism has a distinguishing 
ideational element (see table below) and her intention is to ‘highlight the significance 
of an often-overlooked aspect of developmentalism - the mindset of the governing 
elite’ (Thurbon 2016: 17). Her arguments are based on detailed investigations into the 
case of South Korea starting from 1960s and 1970s, which featured the influential 
developmental mindset of President Park Chung Hee. In the post-Asian financial crisis 
period, Thurbon shows how developmentally minded Korean policymakers helped 
solve the financial crisis. As a result, Thurbon has made a notable contribution to 
developmental state theorising by creating a framework and methodological approach 
to the study of the developmental state through ‘a mindset-strategy framework’ 




Table 1.1: Distinguishing developmental states from other state types: the role of 
the developmental mindset 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATES NON-DEVELOPMENTAL STATES NEOLIBERAL STATES 
IDEATIONAL LEVEL IDEATIONAL LEVEL IDEATIONAL LEVEL 
High level of consensus amongst 
policymaking elite around primacy of 
goal of national techno-industrial 
catch-up and export competitiveness 
AND the desirability of an active role 
for state in facilitating the creation, 
commercialisation, production & 
export of technologies/products by 
local firms in strategic industries. 
Long-term competitiveness concerns 
drive policy interventions in strategic 
industries. 
Low level of consensus amongst 
economic policymaking elite 
concerning state’s primary economic 
goals and the role state should play in 
governing the industrial economy. 
Battles may exist between 
developmentally and neo-liberally 
oriented actors as well as political 
pragmatists and opportunists. Short-
term political considerations often 
drive industry policy interventions. 
High degree of consensus 
amongst economic 
policymaking elite around 
idea of the allocative 
efficiency of the free 
market-targeted industry 
policy assumed to distort the 
allocative efficiency of the 
market and create perverse 
outcomes 
 Source: Thurbon (2016: 20) 
Thurbon’s mindset-strategy framework is clearly relevant to analysing the case of 
Vietnam. Vietnam implemented reform in 1986 to transform from a centrally planned 
economy to a socialist-oriented market economy. In this transformation, the Vietnamese 
party-state has maintained a notable role for a developmentalist-oriented state to guide 
and mind reform (Dao and Vu 2008; Dang Phong 2012). However, the extent to which 
Vietnam is a developmental state is not agreed amongst scholars, different scholars have 
brought different aspects of developmental states in Vietnam, thus examining the 
developmental mindset can shed new light on this debate. This debate is analysed in more 
detail in chapter two of the thesis. 
In examining the developmental mindset, however, this thesis examines not just the 
techo-industrial policy but also socio-economic policy. This follow’s Chang’s (2003) 
argument outlined earlier about the central role of welfare policies in Scandinavian 
societies in contributing to economic and social change. Thus, the Scandinavian 
countries show that it is not necessary to overemphasise the role of state in techno-
industrial development as is the case in East Asia, developmentalism can be done 




political context and development conditions. Vietnam’s developmental mindset has 
always had a strong social policy element and thus the approach adopted on the 
developmental mindset here is not just about economic, financial and industrial policy 
but rather a broader conception of a socio-economic developmental mindset. 
 
 1.4. Methodology 
The thesis uses a mixed methods approach, which includes document analysis, 
historical analysis, statistical analysis, case studies, contextual analysis, interviews and 
comparisons. To analyse and describe the context and background of Vietnam’s state 
structure and the activities of global actors in Vietnam, I used not only secondary 
sources but also primary sources such as annual reports and documents of Vietnam’s 
Government (including Ministries and Local Government) and the statistics, reports, 
project documents and policy documents of IOs and INGOs in Vietnam.  
Linking Cox’s (1986) levels of analysis of social forces, states and world orders to the 
broad concept of the developmental mindset examined here, three case studies were 
chosen: first the role of IOs in Vietnam, which links to world orders. Second, the 
impact of FDI is examined, as it is a key case study of developmental state 
trajectories. Third, the role of INGOs are examined as they show the role of social 
forces but, particularly in the case of Vietnam, this requires exploring their 
relationship to the state and to world orders as INGOs mostly come from Western 
nations and are controlled by the Vietnamese state. Furthermore, these case studies 
link to the literature on new forms of developmental state as well as the literature on 
the institutional capacity of the state for developing countries. These factors are 
significant in their development strategies. The institutional capacity of the state plays 
important role for development trajectories and the question is whether it has been 
enhanced or eroded by interacting with global capitalism.  
In all three case studies, the goal was to examine the different perceptions and 
understandings of these actors involved with these groups in order to explore the 
developmental mindset of the groups at work in Vietnam. Thus, interviews were 
conducted with a total of 21 people in the period March 2013 - June 2013 - see 
appendix 1 for a full list of interviewees, dates and locations, and appendix 2 for a list of 




questions. They were then transcribed and translated into English where necessary. The 
interviews were then analysed, using a simple content analysis approach, against the 
main themes relevant to the particular case study or topic.  
For FDI, the key questions focussed on the perceptions of strategic planning and 
activities in luring FDI and also challenges to the Vietnamese state in managing foreign 
economic actors and FDI in particular. Thus, the aim was to examine the broad 
developmental mindset around FDI of a range of actors. While examining IOs, the 
World Bank in particular, the focus was on the Bank’s mindset and whether this 
influenced ideology and institutions in Vietnam. For international NGOs in Vietnam, 
the concern was to explore how their projects and programmes were received and 
understood and how this influenced the socioeconomic developmental mindset of 
Vietnamese authorities. Thus, the overall focus was on the developmental mindset of 
the different actors. The interview material was used to complement analysis of existing 
secondary sources and policy documents in each area to form each case study.  
The case studies also show the impact of globalisation on the three different levels of 
the country, namely political, economic and civil society. IOs impact on all three 
sectors: economic, political and, to an extent, civil society. FDI’s main impacts are on 
the economy but also on political society and INGOs main impacts are on civil society 
but also on political society. 
With a view to investigating the activities and impacts of FDI flows, the case study is of 
Vinh Phuc province. It is an emergent area of foreign investment attraction in Vietnam. 
Vinh Phuc’s starting point was agriculture but, in recent years, the province has changed 
its economic structure toward industrial priorities and, as such, administrative reforms 
to have taken place attract foreign investment. A series of big industrial zones have been 
rising in parallel with the dramatically increasing provincial Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). However, next to the province’s industrial and FDI achievements, it is coping 
with several insoluble problems of governance. These include: finding effective ways to 
manage industrial zones; supporting local enterprises against the competitiveness of the 
foreign ones; providing employment for farmers whose lands have been lost to the 
industrial zones; controlling the villages surrounding the industrial zones where disputes 
and lawsuits related to land requisition arise; and managing environmental pollution 




developmental mindset is important to interpreting how and why they might address 
these issues. 
In Vinh Phuc, I interviewed three foreign-funded enterprise owners and six leaders from 
the Industrial Management Board and local government (Appendix 1). The interviews 
with foreign supported-business persons were about their perceptions of the 
developmental mindset of local government related to their company operations in 
terms of labour recruitment and management, use of land, and their overall priorities. 
The contents of interviews with local leaders were about their perceptions of strategic 
thinking and activities in luring FDI and the difficulties encountered in managing the 
sector of foreign investment and in governing inhabitants after foreign investment and 
industrial development.      
In terms of the activities of IOs in Vietnam, the thesis starts by providing an overview 
of the IOs that are most active in the country. This highlights the role of the United 
Nations and the WTO in changing Vietnam’s state mindset and policies. However, 
arguably the most dominant IO in Vietnam has been the World Bank. I investigate the 
Bank’s policies in recent years regarding aspects of co-ordination with the Vietnamese 
state and perceptions of its mindset by actors involved with its work. The Bank 
implements activities through projects and programmes and, to some extent, the 
investigation of these projects reveals the influence of the World Bank on aspects of 
Vietnam national state. Specifically, I examine three main arenas of Bank activity: 
Country Assistance or Partnership Strategies; leading donor coordination; and the 
Bank’s activities in advice and consultation. Through these investigations, I evaluate 
the Bank’s mindset about Vietnamese development and the perceptions of its 
influence and role. 
I interviewed three leaders of the World Bank (Appendix 1), with the interview 
questions focusing mainly on the impact of the interviewees’ role and position in 
Vietnam, the changes in their policies in different periods, their coordination with 
Vietnamese government and the achievements of their targets. In addition, I interviewed 
some prominent Vietnamese scholars about their perceptions of the Bank to have 
comparative views. From these, I sought to analyse the mindset of the Bank and the 
perception of that mindset in Vietnam.  




the context of the broader picture regarding INGOs in Vietnam and their growth. 
The two organisations selected as case studies were recommended by the head of 
the Vietnamese government organisation that manages relations with international 
NGOs. He said that Care International Vietnam and World Vision International 
Vietnam are the biggest international NGOs in the country working in poverty 
reduction, and care for children. Thus, it is clear from the outset that Vietnamese 
policymakers have a positive mindset about a range of INGOs. Because their basic 
activities are related to technical assistance, health care, support for vulnerable 
groups and poor people, environmental protection, human rights, rights to access 
information, and transparency as well as the accountability of government, these 
organisations have had close access to both the people and the government and they 
have gained a certain convincing prestige. Particularly, with free of charge support 
and expertise, they have achieved a significant role and position in comparison with 
the management of state in their fields of operations. Thus, this thesis investigates 
Care and World Vision’s work in Vietnam and explores both their impacts on the 
socioeconomic developmental mindset in Vietnam and the perceptions of their 
impacts. The leaders of Care and World Vision were interviewed (Appendix 1), and 
here the focus was about their views on key socioeconomic developmental issues in 
Vietnam, Vietnamese government policies; the goals of their projects and 
programs; and the outcomes of them.  
In the Vietnamese political system, the Central Party Board of Consultants operates 
as a council where experts on the economic, political and social fields gather. It can 
be called a ‘think tank’. The Board is the advisory body for the Central Communist 
Party on issues of political theory as a basis for planning, improving, developing 
guidelines and policies of the Party’s development orientation. The Board has 
played a pivotal role in advising party’s leaders and is an attractive place for 
gathering and organising experts to study problems of political theory directly 
related to the developmental planning guidelines and policy decisions of the Party 
and State. Hence, interviews with the Council’s experts were very meaningful and 
useful in their assessment of the historical contributions and potential roles of 
INGOs in co-ordinating with the role of Vietnamese party-state in socioeconomic 




 1.5. Chapter Outline 
In order to achieve the purposes of the thesis - analysing the influences of foreign 
economic actors, international organisations and international non-governmental 
organisations on the Vietnamese development state mindset and policy - excluding this 
introduction chapter and the conclusion chapter (chapter 7), the thesis is structured 
around five main chapters. 
Chapter 2 frames the thesis by providing a historical overview of the political changes 
in Vietnam before and after the process of liberalisation started in 1986. Chapter 3 is the 
first case study chapter. It is on FDI and it first reviews the literature and provides an 
overview of FDI and its contribution to Vietnamese economic growth. Continuing from 
that, Chapter 3 includes the case study of Vinh Phuc province to show how the fast 
economic growth and challenges facing local government arise, in part, from FDI. The 
chapter then analyses the same issues and activities, but at the national level. The 
developmental mindset of these actors around FDI is thus revealed. Chapters 4 and 5 
focus on the relationships between IOs and Vietnam, starting with a brief introduction 
to IOs in Vietnam and an overview of the relationship between the Vietnamese state and 
the UN and the WTO. An analysis of the influence of these organisations on the 
developmental mindset of the Vietnamese state is provided. In addition, an in-depth 
investigation of the case of the World Bank in Vietnam is undertaken in Chapter 5. It 
critically evaluates evidence of how IOs can influence the development mindset of 
policymakers in Vietnam. Chapter 6 explores the perceptions of the impacts of the 
blossoming of international NGOs in Vietnam, focusing on two major aid organisations. 
Through an overview of the literature and studying the operations of international NGOs 
in Vietnam, along with two specific case studies - CARE International and World Vision 
International in Vietnam - the chapter aims to identify how they have come to be viewed 
as working hand-in-hand with Vietnamese state in solving poverty as well as promoting 
economic development. The aim is to see how if this interaction has influenced the 
developmental mindset in the country. The final chapter offers concluding remarks and 
consideration of the contributions of the thesis and the possibilities for further research. 
Thus, before investigating the three main international actors and their influences on the 
Vietnamese developmental state mindset and policy, the next chapter provides an 





The Historical and Political Evolution of  
the Vietnamese State 
 
This chapter provides an historical overview of the changes in Vietnam focusing on the 
period after renovation or Doi Moi, though the chapter starts with a brief analysis of the 
pre-Doi Moi situation as vital context. The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the 
socio-political context and developmental conditions for Vietnamese state 
transformation. By analysing the political regime change resulting from the economic 
and social change in Vietnam, the chapter sets the context for the debate on how much 
Vietnamese state transformation has been influenced by developmental state ideas and it 
what key issues have influenced it’s directions.  
 
2.1. The Political Historical Context Before 1986 
In 1945, Vietnam gained its independence from the French colonists. Ho Chi Minh, a 
key leader, read the Declaration of Independence on 2
 
September 1945. According to 
Uncle Ho in the Declaration of Independence: 
We, the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
solemnly declare to the world that Vietnam has the right to be a free and 
independent country, and in fact, it is so already. The entire Vietnamese are 
determined to contribute all their physical and forces, lives and prosperity in 
order to safeguard our independence and freedom (cited in Hue Department of 
Culture Sport and Tourism 2012: 58). 
However, the French colonists returned to try to take control of Vietnam. This resulted in 
a war of independence, which lasted initially until 1954. With the famous Dien Bien Phu 
victory, the North gained its liberty moved towards to a socialist political model. In the 
South, a puppet regime of the US was established. Thus, the battle for independence 
continued until 30 April 1975 when Vietnam was liberated and reunited. 
After 30 April 1975, Vietnam was sovereign. Nevertheless, two governments existed: 




government of Southern Vietnam. From 15 to 21 November 1975, in Sai Gon-Gia Dinh 
(which was renamed Ho Chi Minh City a few months later), a Political Agreement 
Conference was organised to discuss uniting Vietnam’s governments. A decision was 
made to elect a Congress nationwide although the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) 
would retaining overarching power (see below). 
Even with the liberation of Vietnam, the country was still faced with many difficulties 
and challenges: in particular recovering from the heavy war damage and building a 
modern economy. The extent of the damage was extraordinary: 
7,850,000 tons of bombs and shells were dropped onto its land (three times as 
many as those used in World War II, equal to 640 nuclear bombs of the same 
kind as those dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima, Japan); leaving more than 20 
million craters, millions of unexploded bombs and landmines under the ground; 
451,260 tons of toxic chemicals were sprayed on the Southern forests, seriously 
destroying the Vietnamese ecology (50% of the 10-million-hectare forest was 
carpet-bombed by B52s) and people (2 million Vietnamese people intoxicated 
and 50,000 children deformed, the consequences are still felt today and will be 
so for many years to come); 9,000 out of 15,000 villages in South Vietnam were 
ruined. In the North, 4,000 out of 5,788 communes were stricken. All power 
plants and 5 million square meters of housing (excluding those in the 
countryside) were seriously destroyed. The entire railway network, 100% of the 
bridges, the whole system of ports, sea-routes, river-ways and warehouses were 
raided. American planes dropped bombs and fired rockets, causing damage to 
1,600 irrigation constructions (including dykes), most of the farms and hundreds 
of thousands of hectares of fields and gardens, killing 40,000 buffaloes and oxen 
(the main traction in agriculture), destroying 3,000 schools, 350 hospitals 
(VietnamNet 2010). 
In 1975, Vietnam was still a poor, backward agricultural country, with 80 per cent of 
the population and 70 per cent of the labour force living in rural areas and subsisting on 
agriculture (Vietnam Government Portal 2013). In the North, after 21 years of socialist 
construction, the economy was still based on small-scale production and there was poor 
technical infrastructure, weak management and inefficient models of administrative 




same situation, having been dependent on foreign capital, technology, material, and 
merchandise. Further, between May 1975 and 1989, Viet Nam had to fight two border 
wars, one in the southwest (Vietnamese soldiers went to Cambodia to fight against the 
Khmer Rouge regime) and one in the north of the country (the border war of Vietnam-
China 1979). These conflicts placed further strains on the country. 
Vietnam’s political-economic regime before Doi Moi (1986) 
On 25 April 1976, the Communist Party organised a general election nationwide to elect 
a National Assembly of United Vietnam. From 24 June to 3 July 1976, the National 
Assembly held the first meeting in Hanoi to discuss and approve a political report and 
make important resolutions about the name of the country, the national flag and the 
creation of a new constitution. A constitutional committee for the nation was set up. 
From 14 to 20 December 1976, the Party’s Fourth Congress meeting – the Congress 
Meeting of Liberation and National Unity – not surprisingly determined that Vietnam 
would have a socialist orientation. Many major issues were discussed and approved, 
including the socialist policies for the new period and the responsibilities and objectives 
for the next five year plan (1976-1980) (Dao and Vu 2008). In addition, Party 
leadership and capacity building was emphasised. The Vietnam Labour Party was 
renamed as Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and it remains as the constitutionally-
guaranteed supreme political entity (Dang Phong 2012; Marr 2013). The resolutions of 
this Party Congress set directions for the next decade. 
In 1980, the National Assembly decided to review the constitutional framework and 
state apparatus (National Assembly 1980). Between 1945 and 2017, Vietnam 
experienced four constitutions, 1946, 1959, 1980 and 1992. According to the 1980 
Constitution, the state apparatus was designed as a socialist state like the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), many Eastern European states and the Chinese state. 
By contrast, however, the role of the CPV - which parallels the state structure - is only 
mentioned in one clause even though this clause recognises the Party’s pre-eminent 
position.
4
 In that 1980 Constitution socialist principles were applied thoroughly. 
Diagram 1 shows the key elements of the structure.  
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 The state structure in this constitution was not very different in its design from the 1959 constitution, but 









The 1980 Constitution defined the nature of the state as a proletarian dictatorship and the 
historical mission of the state as implementing the ownership right of the people, 
encouraging and mobilising people towards successful socialist building, and moving 
forwards to a communist orientation (Article 2). According to this Constitution, the political 
regime of Vietnam is communist. While State power is formally concentrated in the 
National Assembly, in practice, it is controlled by the Party. The National Assembly ‘is the 
highest organ of state power’ (Article 82). The State Council ‘is the highest body in 
permanent operation of the National Assembly’ and it ‘is the collective chairman of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam’ (Article 98). The Ministerial Council
5
 ‘is the Government of 
Vietnam, is the executive body of the National Assembly’ (Article 104).  
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Note: The Supreme People’s Procuracy of Vietnam is responsible for prosecutions and legal 
matters. It functions like the prosecutor's office or attorney general’s office in Western 




Beyond all the regulations, the CPV is the highest body, having the real power to lead 
the state and society. For the first time in Vietnam’s constitutional history, this was 
included in Article 4 of the Constitution, indicating official recognition of the roles of 
the CPV. In institutionalising the leadership role of the CPV, all state agencies, social 
organisations and sectors at all levels were required to legally comply with the Party’s 
leadership. Therefore, this institutionalisation strengthened the leadership role of the 
Party in both state and society (Nguyen 2001; 2005; Marr 2004). 
An important part of the 1980 Constitution was the regulation of the economic regime. 
The 1980 Constitution defined that the state guided production relations and economic 
sectors, and it established and consolidated socialist ownership of production in order to 
implement a national economy with two elements: a state-owned element, as the whole 
people’s ownership, and a cooperative element. Being built as a central subsidiary 
regime, many regulations were dogmatic and not effective when adjusted to social 
relations; for example, the regulation that the state had the right to control foreign trade 
and other external economic relations (Article 21); the regulation of nationalisation of 
the feudal and capital economic sectors without compensation (Article 25); the regulation 
about improving socialism in the economic sectors in both urban and rural areas (Article 
26). These regulations produced negative reactions and resistance in practice, and were 
one of reasons that prompted Doi Moi in 1986. 
 
2.2. Opening up: 1986 
The 1986 VI Congress Party Session is regarded by both Vietnamese and international 
observers as the beginning of renovation or Doi Moi. In fact, in the years before, there 
were various challenges and creative breakthroughs that have been called ‘fence 
breaking’ (Dao and Vu 2008). ‘Fence breaking’ is a term to describe the way many 
Vietnamese avoided the barriers of backward economic regulations to solve difficulties 
they faced and which  paved the way for formal change. The ‘fences’ were regimes and 
principles from the centrally planned economic model from the USSR and applied in 
socialist countries including Vietnam. 
Fence breaking spread dramatically in the South of Vietnam. After it was liberated, the 




different. The economy of the South had a series of features that could not be simply 
adapted to the Northern model. Many issues could not be solved by orders or someone’s 
decision. Nevertheless, the model was applied and the consequent economic downturn in 
1978-1979 was difficult to explain without recognising the economic nature and 
impuissance of the old methods (Dang Phong 2012: 8). The combination of fence 
breaking and the desire to seek renovation by the Party produced, from the early 1980s, a 
new period of seeking for solutions (Vu 2014: 245-246). 
Many diversified ways of demolishing the fences happened in different localities, 
resulting in diversified results and sequences of reactions, which, in turn,  led to the 
adjustment of policies. A typical example of fence breaking can be found in examples 
such as when a fixed rate was paid in Vinh Phuc and Song Hau plantations for harvests 
rather than simply expecting farmers to contribute a specific quantity of their crop to the 
state (Dang Phong 2012). Similar systems, though on a smaller scale, happened in Hai 
Phong. These can be seen as the early examples of Doi Moi, which Gainsborough (2003: 
109) called system of ‘spontaneous change and reform.’ 
It is evident that the breaking of fences showed that the fences were problematic. 
Further, the methods of breaking them led to both positive and unavoidable negative 
consequences, which in turn, reduced the effectiveness of the economic rules and 
increased spontaneity and arbitrary habits. In some cases, seeking  solutions was right, 
but after that, when policies were changed, the habit of spontaneity did lead to some 
negative impacts, even illegal actions.  For example, Kim Ngoc, a Party Secretary in 
Vinh Phuc province, was reprimanded and lost all his power and his position after 
leading the fence breaking movement (Dang Phong 2012).  
The reality inside the country and the complex international socialist situation - the 
USSR’s transition to a market economy which turned into a crisis, the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe and the success of reform in China from 1978 – were 
further impulses for the VCP to start renovation. There were many meetings of the 
Politburo and Party Central Committee to discuss and approve the Political Report of 
the VI Congress Session (called the Congress of renovation). In the opening speech of 
the VI Congress Session (15 December 1986), Nguyen Van Linh, the General Secretary 




Only by the renovation, can we overview the reality, uphold the new factors and 
correct the mistakes… To reach these targets, we must struggle against 
backward self-opinion, dogmatism, hastiness and bad habits. This is a revolution 
in all the fields and in each individual… In order to make changes, this VI 
Congress Session marks the renovation of our Party in its thinking, 
characteristics, organisation and personnel. This is an urgent request of the 
nation. This is also a revolutionary characteristic, especially a characteristic of 
the socialist revolution, the basic nature of Marxism-Leninism, the necessary 
predisposition of the time (Dao and Vu 2008: 19). 
During the VI Congress Session: 
the economic thinking was renovated: recognising a multi-sector economy; 
abolishing the economic management regime based on central plans and 
subsidy, constructing a new mechanism compatible with the objective rules and 
the development level of the economy; fully and correctly applying the 
commodity-currency relationship; production must be connected with the 
market and must protect the legitimate interests of laborers (VietnamNet 2010). 
Thus, Doi Moi in Vietnam was also associated with the renovation of the VCP too. 
From this time on, new guidelines and policies were implemented for renovation. In 
terms of the state apparatus, it was changed through a new Constitution in 1992 
(National Assembly 1992). 
 
2.2.1. Vietnam’s Political-Economic Regime According to 1992 Constitution 
The 1992 Constitution has regulated the Vietnamese state regime until the time of 
writing. It reorganised the Vietnamese state structure based on the spirit of renovation. 
The principles of socialist centralism were reconsidered and applied more appropriately 
(Nguyen 2001; 2006). However, the 1992 Constitution continued to affirm that state 
power was united in the Assembly, not decentralised. Nevertheless, it is allocated duties 
among state agencies to implement legislative, executive and judicial power and did not 
focus only on the Assembly. The executive branch – the Government of Vietnam 




independent power from the Assembly (Article 109). The state apparatus was 
reorganised to ensure both united power and coherent allocation of responsibilities. 
 
Diagram 2. 1992 Vietnam’s State Apparatus 
 
Diagram 2 shows two key changes in the structure of state apparatus between the 
1980 Constitution and the 1992 Constitution compared. 
6
 First, the position of 
President was created, whereas in the 1980 Constitution this role was performed by 
the State Council. The 1980 Constitution had regulated the State Council as the 
presidium of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, which is the common model for 
the head of state in socialist countries where the principle of socialist centralisation 
is applied. With this latter type of organisation, the operations of state were operated 
by highest representative agency – the National Assembly. In the 1992 Constitution, 
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this Council was replaced by presidential regulation. This model had the advantages 
of the presidential model that was part of the 1946 and 1959 Constitutions and kept 
the close-ties between the National Assembly, the Standing Committee of National 
Assembly and the President to implement their functions as heads of the country. In 
addition, the country’s President now has the right to attend sessions of the Standing 
Committee of the National Assembly and ‘whenever he deems it necessary he can 
attend meetings of the Government’ (1992 Constitution, Article 105). The President 
has some additional important tasks such as: asking the Standing Committee of 
National Assembly to reconsider an ordinance, and ‘proposing the National 
Assembly to elect, release from duty, remove from office, the Vice-President of the 
country, the Prime Minister, the President of the Supreme People's Court, the Head 
of the Supreme People's Office of Supervision and Control’ (1992 Constitution, 
Article 103, point 3). 
Second, there is a fairly clear division and co-ordination among three branches of state 
apparatus: legislative, executive and judicial. Although the 1992 Constitution still 
regulates that ‘The National Assembly is the highest representative organ of the people 
and the highest organ of state power of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam’ (Article 83), 
Resolution 51/QH10 by the National Assembly adjusted and added some articles to 
define more clearly the organisational principles and operation of the state apparatus 
(National Assembly's Office 2001). Accordingly, the 1992 Constitution was adjusted as 
follows: ‘State power is unified with allotment and co-ordination among state agencies 
to implement legislative, executive and judicial responsibilities’ (Article 2). This 
judgement reflects an important change in the organisational principles and the 
operation of state apparatus from a focus on centralisation to a greater role for 
decentralisation. To some extent, the decentralisation focus has led to a decrease in state 
governance. By extension, this is the state ‘giving ground’ – the central state apparatus 
reduced its intervention, not working on sectors or sections that it cannot reach or cover, 
such as the civil sectors. 
Of course, beyond all the above regulations, the CPV remains the leading force in 
Vietnam’s politics and a mechanism in implementing political power (Goscha 2016). 
The Party takes the leading role and the state is said to undertake the management. This 




society by its guidance and resolutions, and that the State will institutionalise and 
manage these resolutions into laws and policies. This is a typical characteristic of 
Vietnam’s politics, but has been applied flexibly in reality. 
A crucial change in the 1992 Constitution was the new regulation of the economic 
regime. The economic regime, specified from Article 15 to Article 29, included 
some basic changes in comparison with 1959 and 1980 Constitutions. The most 
evident is the management mechanism for the national economy. While in the 1980 
Constitution, the economic regime was centrally planned with an extensive state 
monopoly, the 1992 Constitution ‘promotes a multi-component commodity 
economy, functioning in accordance with market mechanisms under the 
management of the state and following a socialist orientation’ (Article 15). It defines 
five economic components ‘the state sector, the collective sector, the private 
individual sector, the private capitalist sector, and the state capitalist sector’ (Article 
16). Further, according to Resolution 51/QH10 (Article 15 and 16), the national 
economic management mechanism should be adjusted as the state implements 
policies promoting a market economy following a socialist orientation. In addition to 
the five economic components, the foreign investment economic sector is 
recognised. Note that ‘under the management of the state’ and ‘following a socialist 
orientation’ have different meaning to terms such as a ‘market economy, as is 
discussed further in the section on the influence of developmental state ideas on 
Vietnam below. 
In brief, the changes to the economic mechanism in the 1992 Constitution and 
Resolution 51/NQ were implemented step-by-step and reduced the formal 
domination of the planned economy operating by targets and commands, which was, 
in practice, already very limited. This change reflected the new awareness of the 
Party and State about the roles of the market and private economic sectors for 
socialist development. This institutionalisation played an important role in 
improving the investment and business environment in Vietnam, turning Vietnam 
into an interesting destination for domestic and international private investors. The 
revival and strong development of private economic sectors, strong foreign 
investment and impressive renovations of institutions are said to be the key bases of 




2.2.2. Political and Socio-Economic Changes after Doi Moi 
This section starts with an overview of the economic impacts of Doi Moi on Vietnam. It 
then discusses the three key markers of the country’s international integration: the 
lifting of the embargo by the USA in 1994, joining ASEAN in 1997 and joining the 
WTO in 2007. 
After 25 years of Doi Moi, Vietnam has achieved substantial successes in its economic, 
political, and social transition. An evaluation by the World Bank (2015) showed that 
‘Vietnam’s shift from a centrally planned to a market economy has transformed the 
country from one of the poorest in the world into a lower middle-income country. 
Vietnam now is one of the most dynamic emerging countries in East Asia region’. Doi 
Moi can be roughly divided into four periods as below, where the main changes in each 
period are outlined. 
1986 – 1990: This was the first stage of Doi Moi and aimed to develop a multi-sector 
economy and then a socialist-oriented market economy. By the end of the five-year-plan 
1986-1990, Doi Moi’s initial important achievements included: GDP grew annually by 
4.4 per cent; gross agricultural exports increased annually from 3.8 to 4 per cent on 
average; and the rate of increase in industry and consumption production averaged 7.4 
per cent and 13-14 per cent, respectively (Vo 2006: 141). Thanks to the implementation 
of development programs in food, consumption goods and export goods, production and 
economic growth recovered and inflation was restrained. This was the first period of 
formally recognised transformation from the old management mechanisms to new ones, 
implementing a renovation of socio-economic systems.  It was also the first step in the 
liberation of production forces. 
1991 - 1995: this period saw achievements consolidated. High and sustained economic 
growth ensured that most of the targets for economic development were exceeded. GDP 
increased by 8.2 per cent per year; industrial production values rose by 13.3 per cent per 
year; the growth of the agriculture and services sectors went up by 4.5 per cent and 12 
per cent per year respectively; and total food production during 1991 to 1995 reached 
125.4 million tons, increasing by 27 per cent in comparison with period 1986–1990 (Vo 
2006: 143). Most economic sectors showed relatively good growth rates. The 8
th
 Party 
Congress found that ‘Vietnam stepped out from over 15 years of serious socio-




were established to transform into a new development period: pushing up 
industrialisation and modernisation’ (Communist Party of Vietnam 1996: 12). 
1996 - 2000: this period marked saw increasing industrialisation and modernisation but 
some turbulence. Despite a regional financial and economic crisis in 1997-1999 and 
natural disasters, resulting in severe economic challenges, Vietnam maintained a good 
growth rate. Annual GDP growth rate 1996-2000 was seven per cent - agriculture, 
forestry and fishery rose by 4.1 per cent; industry and construction went up 10.5 per 
cent; and the services sector grew by 5.2 per cent (Vo 2006: 144). An assessment by Ha 
Dang, found that ‘for the whole period 1991 – 2000, GDP growth rate was 7.5 per cent. 
Compared with 1990, GDP in 2000 was twofold’ (Vo 2006: 572). 
2001 - 2005: the implementation of the Socio-economic Development Strategy 2001 – 
2010 and Five Year Plan 2001–2005, which were approved by the 9
th
 Party’s Congress 
resulted in a range of changes to policy and administration. The GDP growth rate 
increased by 7.5 per cent per year and in 2005 it was 8.4 per cent. GDP in 2005 reached 
VND 837.8 thousand billion, which was twice as large as in 1995. GDP per capita was 
about VND 10 million (equivalent to $640), exceeding the average of developing 
countries with low income ($500) (Vo 2006: 146). Together with economic growth, the 
stability in the economy was maintained. These outcomes resulted from the institutional 
economic revolution, administrative systems reform and from improvements in human 
resource development. 
2006 - 2010: the country progressed from being a low-income country to being a lower 
middle-income country. The average GDP growth rate during the five years was seven 
per cent (Communist Party of Vietnam 2011: 53). Despite the global financial crisis and 
low global growth since the end of 2008, foreign investment into Vietnam was still 
high. The total FDI implemented capital was nearly US $45 billion, exceeding the 
planned target by 77 per cent (Do and Nguyen 2013). The total newly registered capital 
and an increased capital were estimated at US $150 billion, exceeding by 2.7 times the 
planned target. The total committed Official Development Assistance (ODA) was over 
US $31 billion, one and a half times more than the planned target; and disbursement 
was estimated at about US $13.8 billion (Do and Nguyen 2013). GDP in 2010 estimated 
by actual value was US $101.6 billion, 3.26 times larger than in 2000 (Communist Party 




In 2011, although the recovery from the global financial crisis was very slow, the economic 
growth rate was 7 per cent. Though this rate was lower than the planned target (7.5 per cent 
- 8 per cent), it was still higher than the average of the countries in the region (Vietnam 
Government Portal 2012). However, GDP in 2012 dropped to a new low of 5.3 per cent and 
then slowly increased to 5.4 in 2013, 6.0 in 2014, and 6.7 in 2015 respectively (World 
Bank). Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) accessed GDP growth in the 2011-2015 
period was the lowest increase since 2000 (average growth rate in 2006-2010 period 
reached 7 per cent, the period 2001-2005 was 7.51 per cent) (Haiquanonline 2015) 
From 1991 to 2011, Vietnamese GDP growth averaged 7.34 per cent, ranking it highly in 
terms of national economic growth in South East Asia, Asia and the world in general. The 
economic size in 2011 was 4.4 times larger than in 1990 and over 2.1 times larger than in 
2000 (Duong Ngoc 2012). According to the General Statistical Office, the poverty rate fell 
dramatically ‘from 58 per cent in 1993 to 37.4 per cent in 1998, 28.9 per cent in 2002, 16 
per cent in 2006 and 14.5 per cent in 2008’ (Cited in Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences 
2011: 1). But based on Government’s new regulations for poverty standards, the rate was 
20.7 per cent in 2010 (World Bank 2013) thus the country still faces many challenges.
7
 The 
2013 financial years was marked as having the lowest rate of Vietnamese GDP growth in 
since Doi Moi at 5.3 per cent. However, since the end of 2013, the Vietnamese economy 
has gradually improved and regained momentum. 
 
2.2.3. The Global Politico-Economic Environment after Doi Moi 
Beyond the above achievements after Doi Moi, the three key markers of the country’s 
international integration are: ending the embargo from the USA in 1994, joining 
ASEAN in 1997 and joining the WTO in 2007. 
Ending the embargo from the USA: 1994 
From 1975 to 1994, the US placed an embargo on Vietnam and used its own power to 
prevent international assistance to Vietnam. From 1976 to 1978, Vietnam and the US 
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were in negotiations to normalise relations but the negotiations were unsuccessful. On 7 
May 1976, President Gerald R. Ford asked the US Congress to stop temporarily the 
embargo on Vietnam for six months for bilateral talks and on 6
 
January 1977, the US 
Foreign Affairs Department presented a three-step-roadmap to normalise relations. They 
stated that the condition of normalisation was a full accounting of missing in action 
(MIA) soldiers and return of the remains of deceased US soldiers (Nguyen 2011). 
Vietnam asked for compensation for war damages, but the US claimed that Vietnam 
had violated the Paris Agreements so the compensation issue was ignored. On 3
 
May 
1977, the first negotiation took place in Paris. Vietnam insisted the US provide US 
$3.25 billion for war damages. The US insisted on the normalisation of relation first, 
putting off compensation. The negotiation was unsuccessful. In the 1980s, under 
President Reagan (1980-1988), normalisation was further delayed with the US 
demanding Vietnam withdraw troops from Cambodia and fully cooperate in solving 
MIA before negotiations take place (Nguyen 2011). 
In 1993, the US announced it would not prevent other countries lending to Vietnam 
after they paid their arrears to the international financial institutions, the World Bank 
and IMF, which was required to re-establish relations with them. In 1994, President Bill 
Clinton lifted the embargo completely and set up a communication body between two 
countries and on 11 July 1995, President Bill Clinton declared the normalisation of ties 
with Vietnam (Clinton 1995). This event marked a significant step on the way to 
Vietnam opening up relations with the non-communist world. Further, Vietnam found it 
easier to attract foreign investment sources, which was a very important factor in 
progress of economic reform of Vietnam. The changes and impacts of foreign 
investment on political economic aspects are analysed more specifically in next chapter. 
Joining ASEAN: 1997 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 as a 
political-security organisation by five initial members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. Before the 1990s, its activities were limited and 
often focused on political conflicts such as Cambodia.
8
 At that time, most ASEAN 
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member’s economic focus tended to be external, not inside the region, owing to limited 
economic development in the region. By the early 1990s, however, the economic power 
of ASEAN’s member states had increased remarkably and they were labelled as newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) or new Asian Tigers. Facing challenges and 
opportunities caused by the world economic restructuring linked to globalisation, as 
well as the trend of regionalisation, the ASEAN Summit of Ministerial Meeting held in 
Singapore in January 1992, delivered a breakthrough in ASEAN history. It moved 
toward greater economic cooperation through two important decisions: forming the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
9
 and signing a Framework Agreement for Enhancing 
ASEAN Economic Cooperation (Association of Southeast Asian Nations 2013). From 
this time, ASEAN also became more open to increasing its membership.  
Vietnamese Party-State had formerly regarded ASEAN as a US tool, but from 
around 1991 it recognised the potential of joining ASEAN which would at very least 
help develop open policies in Vietnam and encourage investment and development 
of markets abroad (Nguyen, Nguyen et al. 2011: 7). In addition, ASEAN countries 
have a range of skills and knowledge that could benefit Vietnam. For example, most 
countries used to be colonies of Western countries and they applied successful 
economic measures that Vietnam could learn from to help it catch up with the region 
and the world. Politically, the efforts by Vietnam to join ASEAN indicated the 
desire to become relatively independent of China, its giant neighbor (Nguyen, 
Nguyen et al. 2011: 8). Although in name, China and Vietnam are socialist allies, 
Vietnam’s history reminds it to be cautious, vigilant, cooperative but not too 
dependent. Moreover, the country sees it needs to show willingness ‘to be friends 
with countries across the world’ (Constitution 1992, Article 36). Joining ASEAN, a 
political association, was proof that Vietnam was over the barrier of ideology, and 
                                                                                                                                               
being perpetuated by the Pol Pot regime. However, for ASEAN’s then members, it was seen as an 
aggression and a threat to regional security. Moreover, Vietnam was supported by socialist countries such 
as the USSR and East European countries when entering Cambodia, thus ASEAN states saw it as a 
communist occupation. This was especially the case for Thailand and Singapore. 
9
 AFTA is a trade bloc agreement supporting local manufacturing in all ASEAN countries. It was signed 
on 28 January 1992 in Singapore. When it was originally signed, ASEAN had six members, namely, 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Vietnam joined in 1995, Laos and 
Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. AFTA now comprises the ten countries of ASEAN. All the 
four latecomers were required to sign the AFTA agreement in order to join ASEAN, but were given 





ready for cooperation and co-development. ASEAN was a bridge for Vietnam to 
broaden the road to world integration, and membership helped enhance its image, 
position and influence in the world (Nguyen, Nguyen et al. 2011: 8). 
Similarly, ASEAN saw that the strength of the Association would be enhanced in the 
security, politics and even economic arenas if Vietnam and other countries were 
admitted. In order to enhance opportunities and adddress challenges, both sides needed 
to be cooperative and move from confrontation to dialogue to construct an international 
relationship in the region for the sake of joint and mutual benefits especially peace and 
development. Thus, on 28 July 1995, at the ASEAN Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
Meeting, Vietnam officially became the seventh member of ASEAN. This event opened 
a new stage of cooperative relationships not only between Vietnam and ASEAN but 
also with other countries in the world.  
From 1986 to 1991, Vietnam had focused on domestic reform, but from 1991, Vietnam 
focused more on the outside world and the development of cooperative relationship 
with countries in the region. Joining ASEAN has positively impacted the foreign 
relations and international position of Vietnam to the present day. This was not only 
‘opening the door’ to political and economic cooperation with ASEAN members, but 
also a bridge for Vietnam to get out in the world and diversify its foreign relations. With 
this success, Vietnam changed its status from political isolation to being a dynamic 
player in Southeast Asia relations, one of the fastest growing and most politically 
diversified regions in the world. 
Joining the WTO: 2007 
The creation of the WTO is a key organisation and representative of the trend 
toward globalisation. Although Vietnam was faced with challenges from joining this 
‘playground’ with existing rules, joining the WTO was the aim of many countries 
because of the perceived economic benefits. For Vietnam, a country where 
international economic integration occurred only after the 1986, the negotiation to 
join the WTO was complicated. To become a WTO member, a nation must meet a 
range of requirements including having a market-oriented economy, and being ready 
and able to meet obligations as a WTO member. WTO obligations include trading 




1) Non-discrimination: members of the WTO do not allow discrimination on 
goods, services and intellectual property against any other WTO member.  
2) Reciprocity: trade barriers should aim to be removed via the negotiating process. 
However, the WTO allows its members, developing countries in particular, 
stepped change in regulations.  
3) Binding and enforceable commitments: WTO members are not allowed to have 
arbitrary policies of trade and other related polices, they have to follow binding 
and enforceable commitments to ensure the stability and predictability of the 
multilateral trading system. 
4) Transparency: WTO members are required to publish their trade regulations, to 
establish and maintain institutions allowing for the review of administrative 
decisions affecting trade, to respond to requests for information by other 
members, and to notify changes in trade policies to the WTO. 
5) Safety valves: ‘A final principle embodied in the WTO is that, in specific 
circumstances, governments should be able to restrict trade’ (Hoekman, Mattoo 
et al. 2002: 41-43).  
Any new application to join the WTO must be approved by two thirds of the existing 
members at a WTO Ministerial Meeting and each country must be evaluated first, as to 
whether it has met enough conditions to join (Parenti 2000: 154). 
Vietnam submitted its application to the WTO in January 1995, in other words just as 
the organisation was being established. Vietnam had to accept WTO requirements and 
undertake multilateral negotiations with concerned members about its commodity and 
services markets. Through a bilateral trade agreement with the USA, Vietnam had 
already accepted key WTO principles such as most favoured nation (MFN) status, 
which is ‘a method of establishing equality of trading opportunity among states by 
guaranteeing that if one country is given better trade terms by another, then all other 
states must get the same terms’(WTO 2014) and national treatment (NT), which is the 
principle of giving others the same treatment as one’s own nationals (WTO 2014). 
Regarding broader tax adjustments, Vietnam committed to the WTO agreements and 
treaties, which included systems of regulations of international trade, from commodity, 




The complexity of the process and the requirements that it imposed on Vietnam can 
be seen in the fact that it took over a decade for the country to be accepted into the 
WTO only on November 11, 2006 in Genève, Switzerland, when Vietnam became 
an official member of WTO. This offered a new chance for the country’s 
development as well as challenges. Matters around the influences on Vietnam in 
WTO accession are further discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis,  which examines 
international organisations in Vietnam.   
From this brief discussion of Vietnam’s political, social and economic evolution, it is 
clear that the country has made dramatic progress in all areas but that, in particular, it’s 
social and economic progress is highly regarded. Along with strong levels of economic 
growth, Vietnam has achieved high levels of poverty reduction and good health 
outcomes; indeed, it performs strongly on a range of social indicators relative to its 
economic development, though many challenges remain. One key question that remains 
is: what policies and mindset have underpinned Vietnam’s socio-economic 
development? Examining this issue is the focus on the next section. 
 
2.3. Vietnam, the Developmental State and Globalisation 
There are only a handful of scholars writing about Vietnamese developmental 
policies and the impact of globalisation. However, Vietnam has been diving into 
globalisation in the past decade and its impacts are being felt. This means the 
relationship between the nation state’s own strategic development policies and the 
influence of global actors is at a critical point. This section reviews the literature on 
the influences on Vietnam’s development strategy, which shows that both 
developmental state and neoclassical (and perhaps even neoliberal) developmental 
strategies are competing for influence.  
When Vietnam shifted to the goals of a market economy with socialist orientation, this 
was meant to be an economy based on the principles and rules of the market economy, 
but with the state-owned economic sector still playing a significant role in the national 
economy (Nguyen 2012; Le 2013; Vu 2013; Nguyen 2015). Further details of the 
special characteristics of socialist-oriented market economy in Vietnam are more fully 




First, the socialist-oriented market economy is a form of organising the economy 
in its transition to socialism from a backward agricultural, less developed 
economy. This form of organising the economy aims at enabling Vietnam to 
achieve the goal of a prosperous people, strong country, democracy, equity and 
civilisation. Second, the socialist-oriented market economy is a multi-sector 
economy with the state and collective economies serving as the foundation and 
the state economy playing the decisive role. All economic sectors operate in line 
with the common orientation and legal framework of the socialist state. Third, 
the socialist-oriented market economy, in fact, is a form of organising an 
economy based on the principles and rules of the market economy and on the 
principles and nature of socialism. Fourth, the socialist-oriented market 
economy is an economic model, which is “open” both internally and externally. 
The strong socioeconomic developmental mindset here is notable. Further, the 
organisation of the government and socialist-oriented market economy in Vietnam was 
influenced by, and many similar characteristics and contexts to, China. Another key 
influence was ‘the social and ecological market economy’ of the Northern Europe 
countries (Le 2008: 168). In China, the socialist market economy and then ‘socialism 
with Chinese characteristics’ was the terminology used to describe the reform process. 
This ‘can be interpreted as the gradual decline of the socialist plan in favour of the 
market’ but notably the most important economic sectors were still dominated by 
Chinese government (Sigley 2006: 501). In the context of China’s socialist market 
economy, the function of government was changed from central planning and 
administration to one that involves ‘management’ and ‘governance’ (Sigley 2006: 496). 
In Northern Europe countries, the model of the ‘social and ecological market economy’ 
was recognised as the one that includes ecological ingredients, market elements and 
social characteristics and these factors ‘chime with each other as equally essential 
elements in a melodious triad’ (Benecke 2008: 23). Thus, we can clearly see that 
developmental state ideas, in the broader form encompassing social and economic 
development, were a strong influence on Doi Moi. 
Pietro Masina (2006) was one of the first scholars to provide a historical overview of 
Vietnam's development strategies. The central focus of the book is to explain the 




planning economy to a market-oriented economy and whether Vietnam applied the 
developmental experiences of East Asian states in their reform. Ending the book with an 
open conclusion, the author put the question ‘Transition: where to?’ He found that the 
Vietnamese strategic development model was, in fact, ‘something very different’ from 
Asian developmental state, because these models had required ‘a different kind of 
political consensus’, ‘modern governance’, and that ‘alternative strategies should be 
more openly discussed’ (Masina 2006: 158).  
In Masina’s  (2012) later work, he argued that the international financial institutions 
(IFIs) repeatedly pushed the country to speed up reform of ‘state owned enterprises, the 
financial sector, the trade system, and the role of private sector’ but that Vietnam 
repeatedly slowed action. Yet, he notes that although these institutions ‘repeatedly 
voiced its disagreement but,’ they still consider ‘Hanoi as a key customer, continued to 
lend to it profusely’ (Masina 2012: 191). Therefore, Masina concluded that Vietnam 
followed a path between that of a developmental state and neoliberalism, it adopted ‘a 
gradualist approach in contrast with the shock therapies...’ that were promoted by the 
IFIs and that it ‘…did not apply key aspects of the Washington and Post-Washington 
Consensus’ (Masina 2012: 191). Vietnam strongly supported and used elements of the 
import substitution industrialisation, an early approach used by East Asian 
developmental states. Further, ‘the very notion of Western-style governance (which is 
the cornerstone of the revised Washington Consensus) remained totally extraneous to 
the national political system’ (Masina 2012: 191). 
Thus, the characteristics of a developmental state in Vietnam are often not fully or 
clearly expressed. Different scholars have brought different aspects of developmental 
states in Vietnam that they may review by themes – developmental leadership, 
industrial policy, management of other economic adjustment, and social and welfare 
policy.  The following section explores these themes.  
First, regarding issues of developmental leadership, Pham (2012) provided a 
comprehensive analysis on ‘committed leaders’ and ‘consensus and coherence in 
leadership’ in Vietnam (Pham 2012: 148-149). The author analysed separately the role 
and position of the party general secretary as well as the elite leadership such as 
Politburo and showed that the Vietnamese political system has operated on a basic 




issue’ and all political decisions were normally made ‘based on the consensus of the 
leadership’ (Pham 2012: 149). Specifically, the committed leaders and consensus of the 
Vietnamese leaderships are generally recognised by their strong and independent 
ideology. Regarding issues of ideological influences, Gainsborough (2010) has 
criticised scholars who ‘emphasise the very great power of neoliberal institutions in our 
world today’ seen in slogans such as ‘Neoliberalism-dominant ideology shaping our 
world today’, ‘an age of neo-liberalism’ and ‘neoliberalism as powerful’ (Gainsborough 
2010: 476). His main evidence for this argument was his analysis of the shift from the 
pre-reform to the post-reform Vietnamese state. According to Gainsborough, although 
the post-Washington Consensus era neoliberal policies were an influence on reform, the 
Vietnamese state still maintains much independence despite these influences.
10
 In the 
economic field, although Vietnam’s business sectors have expanded, state actors still 
have ‘led the way’ (Gainsborough 2010: 482). From specific evidence such as one 
ruling party or party-controlled mass organisation, combined with an analysis of the 
form of Vietnam’s regulatory state, Gainsborough provided a strong argument that ‘the 
influence of neoliberalism on the working of the Vietnamese state has been relatively 
small’ (Gainsborough 2010: 475). This is a vital debate for my thesis as it focuses on 
the topics I examine to express how the state has a proactive, autonomous role and then 
to recognise different perceptions of it. 
Second, in term of industrial policy, Pham (2012) also provided an overview of the 
strategic industries given by Vietnamese Party-State. Accordingly, selecting industrial 
sectors (heavy or light industries; handicraft, textile and garment (T&G), footwear, or 
energy industries, including petroleum, gas, coal and electricity, etc.) and degrees of those 
priority was different choice from different periods. He showed that: 
T&G and footwear industries have been considered as prioritised industries 
since 1996 (CPV, 1996), and will be so until 2020, while the plastic industry 
was prioritised before 2010, but has not been so since 2010. Or steel and bauxite 
industries have been prioritised since 2007, and will be so until 2015, but will no 
longer be prioritised after 2015 (Pham 2012: 297). 
                                                 
10
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Those features as Pham’s consideration is similarity with industrial strategy of ‘the 
archetypal developmental state’ by the way that ‘they also actively select to focus on a 
certain key industries and will phase them out when those industries have become 
mature or less strategic’ (Pham 2012: 297). However, the typical feature toward 
industrial policy in Vietnam is state leading key industries (including infrastructure - 
electricity, petrochemical, and high-tech industries) and those are important things to 
see how ‘the Vietnamese state has intervened in their development processes and its 
specific roles and contribution to their development’ (Pham 2012: 299). Starting with 
similarity arguments about the role of GoV as above, Fforde (2010) explained that this 
process (the development process and transition from centralisation to market-oriented 
policy) ‘may have effects upon static economic efficiency that are positive during 
transition but negative afterwards, so that the significance of ‘rents’ depends upon 
context’ (Fforde 2010: 126). In other words, that Vietnam has been able to benefit from 
its economic transition but that these benefits may not continue. Through investigating 
the changing economic structure, mainly focusing on changing economic policies, 
Fforde (2010: 130) realised ‘these policy measures were in fact conservative in intent, 
seeking to slow the process of transition rather than support it’. This demonstrates that 
the Vietnamese state has actively sought to manage economic globalisation. Fforde 
concluded that Vietnam has undergone ‘a conservative transition from central planning 
to a market economy followed by the emergence of a form of capitalism’ (Fforde 2010: 
141). This is vital the context for all three case studies. 
Third, regarding issues of the management of other economic adjustment, most scholars 
writing about Doi Moi in Vietnam have acknowledged that, although the Vietnamese 
Party-State leadership implemented the ‘opening up’ of the economy; prioritised 
industrialisation and modernisation policies; and called for FDI attraction; Vietnam's 
gradualist approach to reform was known as the dominant direction rather than applying 
'shock therapy’ (Gates 1995; Fahey 1997; Malesky and London 2014). A gradualist 
approach to reform is understood and applied in two basic respects, economic reform 
first followed by a gradual political reform and in economic renewal, the state and 
collective economies still play as ‘the decisive role’ in economic development. The 
private and foreign sectors play a dynamic role in the economy. All economic sectors 
are organised following two principles; the principles of the market economy and the 




Fourth, in terms of  the social and welfare policy, those are special characteristics in 
Vietnam’s developmental strategies. In the long-term vision, Vietnam has targeted  to 
build a dominant party political system but with a friendly relationship with the market 
and civil society (Dinh and Pham 2016: 78). The social and welfare policies would  be 
considered as a ‘key bridge’ for that strategy. However, in fact, the Vietnamese social 
organisations are  not completely independence with state agencies (Dinh and Pham 
2016: 78, 87, 91). These authors defined that the state administrative apparatus and the 
rule of law in Vietnam exposed optimistic indications of the developmental state. 
However, in the field of civil society separately, their points are similar with some other 
international scholars. For example, as Gainsborough (2010: 481) noted ‘the Party-
controlled mass organisation structure still persists’ or as Thayer raised a challenge for 
‘how Vietnam's one-party state manages the challenges posed by political civil society’ 
(Thayer 2009: 1). Thayer argued that there was an explosion of these groups in Vietnam 
from the early 1990s and that they often played a crucial role in community 
development such as ‘managing natural resources, combating environmental 
pollution, promoting development for a sustainable livelihood… ’ (Thayer 2009: 5). 
The role of these groups is likely more and more important in demonstrating the 
political efficacy of networking that espouses religious freedom, human rights and 
liberal democracy. From this context, Thayer concludes that ‘over the next few years 
Vietnam's one party state will face major challenges to performance as the basis of its 
legitimacy’, and challenges from ‘joint action by members of the ruling elite acting in 
concert with elements of political civil society in the long term’ (Thayer 2009: 23).  
Overall, despite some different interpretations of aspects of Vietnam’s developmental 
approach, it is clear from the literature that Vietnam’s developmental strategy has 
vacillated between developmental state policies and a more neoclassical or even 
neoliberal approach to development. In this latter case, Masina (2012) shows how this 
approach has been strongly promoted by IFIs (see also Engel: 2008). Masina (2012) and 
Bui (2015) most clearly shows the proactive, autonomous role of Vietnamese state in 
leading the country’s development and growth. However, they did not give much 
attention to the influence of international factors in Vietnam’s strategic development 
processes, other than the IFIs. These studies do explore issues around Vietnamese 
state’s developmental strategies, in terms of the state apparatus, the role of political 




not, as in Thurbon’s (2016) analysis of South Korea, give much attention at all to the 
developmental mindset of key actors. This is a key issue that can shed light on the 
debate about Vietnam’s vacillation between the developmental state and 
neoclassical/neoliberal development trajectories. The focus in this thesis is the 
developmental mindset in relation to key issues and actors linked to globalisation. Thus, 
the next section of this chapter outlines the impacts of the four key newly emerging 
international actors explored in this thesis. 
 
2.4. The Newly Emerging Actors 
The above interpretation showed Vietnam changed dramatically after Doi Moi. To some 
extent, it can be seen these changes resulted not only from internal changes but also from 
Vietnam diving into globalisation. The new actors that emerged Vietnam with globalisation 
have clearly influenced the developmental mindset and trajectory too. The selection of 
international actors was to give a sense of their impact across the social, political and 
economic realms in Vietnam: the rise of foreign economic actors, the expansion of 
international organisations, and the blossoming of non-governmental organisations.  
Regarding the rise of foreign economic actors, these were very new yet key elements in 
the progress of Vietnamese economic development after Doi Moi. If the focus is just on 
foreign direct investment (FDI), the numbers below describe clearly its rise: 
After 20 years of Doi Moi, the foreign investment sector increased sharply and 
became an important sector in the national economy, contributing to the success 
of Doi Moi. Up to the end of 2010, foreign investors invested in 18 of 21 
industries in the hierarchy of national economic sectors and the processing and 
manufacturing industries gained highest rate with 7,305 projects, the total capital 
registered of U.S. $93.97 billion, accounted for 59.8% of projects and 49% of 
capital registered in Vietnam… Up to now, there are 92 countries and territories 
with investments in Vietnam and Taiwan is the No. 1 investor with over 2,146 
valid projects and total capital register of US $22.8 billion. Korea ranked second 
with more than 2,650 valid projects, total capital register of U.S. $22.1 billion. 
This is followed by Singapore, Japan and Malaysia investors (Department of 




Thus, it can be seen that FDI in Vietnam increased dramatically both in terms of the 
capital investment and the number of invested countries. Compared with period before 
Doi Moi, when Vietnam had a closed-door policy and a centrally planned economy, 
FDI can be seen as a new wind that flowed through the national economy. FDI’s 
impact has been evaluated within Vietnam mostly by its positive contributions such as 
providing important supplementary capital for economic development; contributing to 
economic restructuring and enhancing capacity for industrial production; promoting 
technology transfer; contributing to the national budget; promoting reform of 
administrative procedures and increasing the transparency of the investment 
environment; contributing to strengthening foreign relationship with countries and 
international organisations in the world; and deepening the domestic sectors of the 
national economy (Department of Foreign Investment 2012: 4-7). This thesis 
examines some of the questions that arise from FDI in terms of the developmental 
mindset, such as how do foreign economic actors influence the proactive, autonomous 
role of the Vietnamese state in driving development? Or, is the government losing 
sovereignty or political independence when faced with the rise of foreign economic 
actors? What is the contributions of these actors to the Vietnamese state’s  strategic 
development policies? The mindset by actors involved with FDI in Vietnam are 
analysed and answered in more detail in the next chapter. 
Since Doi Moi there has been a significant expansion of international organisations in 
Vietnam. Prior to renovation, Vietnam was involved in a war of independence and then 
there was a period of building a socialist economic model. During this time, Vietnam 
mainly established relationships with socialist countries and there were limited 
operations by international organisation. The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) had a few advisers in the country and there were some small, intermittent 
programmes by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (Engel 2010: 
90). This all changed radically with the emergence of various international organisations 
after Doi Moi, and increasingly during the 1990s. These organisations can be divided 
into two systems, one is all of the organisations that are part of core UN system 
(including all the UN agencies, funds and programmes in Vietnam) and the other are the 
international financial institutions in particular the World Bank, the IMF and the Asia 




The UN organisations currently working in Vietnam include: United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
World health Organisation (WHO), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 
UNAIDS in Viet Nam, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO), UN Women, the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) and United Nations Volunteers (UNV) (UN in Vietnam 2011: 
2006-2013). 
From this list, it is clear that a range of international organisations is now working in 
Vietnam having expanded their operations. Beside the indubitable  benefits these 
organisations bring, their growth poses a range of questions regarding political 
independence. Has there been intervention into Vietnam’s government by these 
organisations? How will Vietnam have been bound by their regulations? What does the 
development mindset of these organisations affect Vietnamese state’s own strategic 
development policies? What is the influence of these organisations on the policy-maker 
of Vietnam? These questions and others will be developed and analysed with evidence 
from case studies in the next chapters. 
The final group of newly emerging actors explored in this thesis is international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs). INGOs have been working in Vietnam for 
many decades. In the early 1970s, most of the INGOs that came to work in Vietnam 
had religious (Christian) affiliations and were supporting people suffering from the 
war, or brining benefits including medicine and equipment. 1986 was a nodal point 
when Vietnam implemented Doi Moi and there was a breakdown in support from the 
socialist countries. Furthermore, the US attitudes started to soften. This created new 
possibilities for INGOs wishing to support Vietnam and renewed efforts to have 
representatives in the country (Nguyen 2001: 12-13). INGOs were actually 
blossoming in Vietnam by the 1990s.  
As Gainsborough (2010: 481) noted: ‘the Party-controlled mass organisation structure 
still persists’ in Vietnam. By contrast, Thayer notes, there has been an explosion in the 




crucial role in community development. Many of these groups become networks that 
espouse religious freedom, human rights and liberal democracy. From this context, 
Thayer concludes that ‘over the next few years Vietnam's one party state will face major 
challenges to performance as the basis of its legitimacy’, and challenges from ‘joint 
action by members of the ruling elite acting in concert with elements of political civil 
society in the long term’ (Thayer 2009: 23). Maintaining legitimacy is important for 
developmental states, which points not just to the thinking around internal civil society 
but to the role of INGOs, which is a concern of this thesis. 
INGOs work in the economic, political, social and cultural spheres and support diverse 
activities such as technical assistance, health care, mother and child health promotion, 
environmental protection, human rights, rights to access information, transparency, etc. 
These organisations are said to have closer access to the people and have gained a 
certain convincing prestige (Dang 2009; ISEE 2010). The free services and provision of 
experts have particularly helped their influence in society, whereas the belief in the state 
has declined because of corruption and bureaucracy (Nguyen and Nguyen 2014). 
Indeed, it is notable how positively INGOs have been regarded in Vietnam and thus the 
question arises as to how they have impacted the developmental mindset particularly in 
the social and welfare realms. Other questions raised include: How do the perceptions of 
their success influence perceptions of the Vietnamese state? Does participation of these 
organisations together with Vietnamese state promote the country’s growth and 
development? Is Vietnamese state capacity enhanced through the participation in these 




The period before Doi Moi was a dynamic one in Vietnam. North Vietnam gained 
independence while South Vietnam continued to face war. Up to 1975, Vietnam was 
totally sovereign and had built a socialist model based on that in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe across the whole country. As a result, the 1980s were considered typical 
of a centrally planned economic and bureaucratic political model in Vietnam, though 
the Vietnamese state was not quite as centrally planned as most other socialist states. 




was that it designed an exclusive national political system and a centrally subsidised 
economic system. That model met reactions in practice and that this was a key reason 
for the emergence of  Doi Moi or reform in 1986. 
Doi Moi was implemented following pressures from the actual practices in the country 
and also thanks to the change of international context, in particular the demise of most 
socialist states. At the same time, the USSR’s unsuccessful big bang transition to a 
market economy, which turned into a crisis, made leaders in Vietnam cautious about 
transition. This was the time Vietnam ended the ‘closed door’ policy – focused on 
limited relationship with socialist countries – and changed to an ‘open door’ policy 
where it established international relationships across the world. Yet, designing and 
implementing a new economic political model created many challenges. Vietnam came 
out of the war without much experience in market-based economic management and 
related social democratic welfare regimes. 
To some extent, the 1992 Constitution was a reaction to Doi Moi. This constitution 
provided a fairly clear division among three branches of state apparatus: legislative, 
executive and judicial, thus following the liberal idea of separation of powers to an 
extent, though the role of the CPV remained dominant. The state apparatus created new 
constraints on state organs and reduced the top-down nature of making and 
implementing policies. The 1992 Constitution also changed fundamentally the 
regulation of the national economic system. It marked an important change from a 
centrally planned economy to a multi-component commodity economy and then a 
market economy with a socialist orientation. It promoted all economic sectors such as 
private, foreign, collective or state sectors engaging in fair competition under a system 
of law. The gradual process of reform was undoubtedly influenced by the model of 
developmental states in East Asia as well as by China. 
With these important changes, difficulties in developing international relationships and 
integration were gradually reduced. Events such as ending the embargo from the USA, 
joining ASEAN and joining the WTO were key decisions in promoting the regional and 
international integration of Vietnam and the shift to a market-based economy. Over 
time, the extent to which Vietnam’s transition was predominantly informed by 
developmental state ideas versus more neoclassical or neoliberal ideas has become less 




developmental mindset of a range of actors in the country will shed light on which way 
Vietnam is likely to head the future. And to study this, the context of international 
integration is vital. There have been many factors for the state to address such as the rise 
of foreign economic actors, the expansion of international organisations or the 
blossoming of INGOs. These factors contribute to the changing picture of Vietnam and 
will influence the developmental trajectory. These factors also bring their development 
mindset to Vietnamese state’s own strategic development policies, contributing to 






Foreign Direct Investment and Its Influence on the 
Developmental Mindset in Vietnam 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Foreign direct investment and multinational corporations (MNCs) have long been an 
important component of strategy through which the original developmental states 
sought to achieve economic development. However, the impact of MNCs has 
become more fraught in the era of globalisation. This is because MNCs have 
emerged as key factor that underpin ‘not just national economies but the world 
economy’ (Mikler 2013: 160). As well as the widespread influence of MNCs in ‘a 
sea of global flows’ of national economies, the claim has also been made that ‘the 
sovereignty and autonomy of nation-states has been radically reduced’ (Goldblatt, 
Held et al. 1997: 269). In the competition among governments to attract FDI, 
political institutions and policies have been influenced by MNCs’ interests. For 
example, MNCs pressure governments for policy changes in order to gain greater 
benefits.  Indeed, they can even ‘threaten political leaders that harm multinational 
operations by refusing further investment in the country, or by pulling out exist ing 
investments’ (Jensen 2006: 3). Moreover, MNCs use international trade 
commitments - the WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) – to pursue their 
organisational interests. Here, developing countries that belong to the WTO and 
participate in more PTAs, make bargains and impose requirements on domestic 
policies. Consequently, domestic policies usually adapt to MNCs’ conditions in 
order to attract ‘more FDI and thus increase their economic growth’ (Büthe and 
Milner 2008: 741).  
Yet, developmental state theorists argue that the relationship is not wholly one sided. 
Rather, they argue, there are prominent factors that support a strategic alliance of MNCs 
and the state in many cases. In this strategic relationship, the nation state still works as ‘a 
pillar of so-called policy autonomy’, while MNCs –‘as the dominant private actors’ 
promote the state, so increasing capacity enhancement (Weiss 1999: 60; Mikler 2013b: 2-
3) . Thus, measuring the influence of MNCs through FDI in national states is an important 




Vietnam is a developing country that is hastily luring FDI, and hence is likely to reveal 
interesting evidence around this issue. 
The emergence of foreign economic actors in Vietnam began after the implementation 
of the ‘open door’ policy in 1986 and then blossomed in 1990s. These actors have 
contributed to the political economic restructuring of Vietnam in recent years. This 
chapter aims to investigate the activities of foreign economic actors, especially FDI, in 
Vietnam and their impacts on Vietnam’s development mindset after Doi Moi. This 
chapter focuses on a case study of Vinh Phuc province. Besides providing a general 
picture and characteristics of FDI in Vinh Phuc, this chapter analyses the challenges to 
local governance resulting from FDI flows. Furthermore, by examining the sub-national 
level and looking back at the theoretical framework about linkages between FDI and 
national economy sovereignty and developmental capacity, this chapter demonstrates 
the mindset about economic development in Vietnam. 
This chapter starts by providing a brief overview of FDI and its contribution to 
Vietnamese economic growth, and then it reviews the literature on specific aspects 
of FDI inflows to Vietnam. The following section is a case study in Vinh Phuc 
province to show the challenges to local government resulting from FDI by focusing 
on a sub-national perspective. Finally, the chapter examines the impact on the 
developmental mindset that can be related to FDI by generalising from the case 
study to the national economy, drawing on interviews with experts and re-examining 
the theoretical framework. 
 
3.2. A brief overview of FDI in Vietnam 
According to a report from Vietnamese Government (Department of Foreign Investment 
2012), after 20 years of Doi Moi, the foreign investment sector has grown rapidly and 
has become an important sector in the national economy, contributing to the success of 
Doi Moi. Up to the end of 2010, foreign investors invested in 18 of 21 industry sectors 
in the hierarchy of national economic sectors. The processing and manufacturing 
industries gained the highest rate of investment with 7,305 projects and a total 
registered capital of $93.97 billion,
11
 which accounted for 59.8 per cent of projects and 
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49 per cent of capital registered in Vietnam. By 2011, ‘Vietnam was the third largest 
FDI recipient in South East Asia’ (Tran 2013: 3). 
Table 3.1 Foreign direct investment projects licensed in period 1988-2015 
Years  Number of 
projects                     






1988-1990 211 1,603.5  
1991 152 1,284.4 428.5 
1992 196 2,077.6 574.9 
1993 274 2,829.8 1,117.5 
1994 372 4,262.1 2,240.6 
1995 415 7,925.2 2,792.0 
1996   372 9,635.3 2,938.2 
1997 349 5,955.6 3,277.1 
1998 285 4,873.4 2,372.4 
1999 327 2,282.5 2,528.3 
2000 391 2,762.8 2,398.7 
2001 555 3,265.7 2,225.6 
2002 808 2,993.4 2,884.7 
2003 791 3,172.7 2,723.3 
2004 811 4,534.3 2,708.4 
2005 970 6,840.0 3,300.5 
2006 987 12,004.5 4,100.4 
2007 1544 21,348.8 8,034.1 
2008 1171 71,726.8 11,500.2 
2009 1208 23,107.5 10,000.5 
2010 1237 19,886.8 11,000.3 
2011 1191 15,618.7 11,000.1 
2012 1266 13,013.0 10,460.0 
2013 1275 21,628.0 11,500.0 
2014 1843 21,920.0 12,500.0 
2015 2013 22,757.0 14,500.0 
TOTAL         21014 307,705.9         139,106.9                                             
 
Source: (General Statistics Office 2016: 173) 
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FDI inflows to Vietnam over the last 25 years can be divided into four main periods, as 
set out in the reports of Vietnamese government, as is evident for example in a typical 
research by Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. (2006), which is the basis of the following section. 
1. 1988-1996: this period can be called a period of discovery and belief. Vietnam started 
to open up to foreign investment through the promulgation of the first law on foreign 
investment in 1987. This guideline paved the way for foreign investors to enter 
Vietnam, although Vietnam attracted very little inward FDI in the 1980s and the first 
years of the 1990s, with the total capital registered being just around $160 million in 
1990.  It increased sharply in later years and ‘reached a peak of nearly $9.6 billion in 1996’ 
(Nguyen, Vu et al. 2006). This increase resulted from foreign investors’ interest in the 
potentials of an economy in transition with an unexploited market, an abundant workforce 
with low wage rates and with FDI being a priority for local authorities. 
2. 1997 to 2000: this period saw a sharp decline in FDI inflows to Vietnam. Registered 
capital decreased by 49 per cent in 1997, 16 per cent in 1998, and 59 per cent in 1999 
(Foreign Investment Agency 2007). ‘Newly licensed capital decreased on average at 24 
percent per annum, while implemented capital went down more slowly, by 14 percent 
per annum on average’ (Nguyen, Vu et al. 2006: 6). This decline mainly resulted from 
the impact of the Asian financial crisis. The five biggest investor countries in Vietnam 
came from the Asian region and all of them faced difficulties with domestic production 
and circumstances. In order to keep stable production in their domestic businesses, the 
investors sometimes cancelled or delayed overseas expansion plans, especially in 
Southeast Asian countries. The devaluation of the currencies of Southeast Asian 
countries as a consequence of the Asian financial crisis also affected investment. 
Moreover, ‘the unattractiveness of Vietnam’s investment environment is related to other 
countries in the region, especially to China’ (Nguyen, Vu et al. 2006: 6). Vietnam could 
not compete with China on these aspects at this time. Thus, all these factors contributed 
to the poor FDI figures in this period. 
3. 2001 to 2008: this period was one of recovery and development. Although the world 
economy coped with some difficulties and challenges, such as the dotcom crash in the 
early 2000s, the annual FDI inflows to Vietnam increased rapidly. The period 2001-
2005 saw an added increase of invested capital by $7,08 billion - over 18 per cent 




years before (Foreign Investment Agency 2008). In the year 2006-07, FDI inflows to 
Vietnam grew sharply and reached a peak of over $71 billion for total registered capital 
in 2008 (Table 3.1). With these results, 2008 was a top year of FDI inflows to Vietnam 
and it was a top destination for foreign investors globally. 
4. 2009 to 2015: this was another period of reduced FDI inflows to Vietnam. The 
amount of registered capital decreased to approximately $23 billion in 2009, $20 billion 
in 2010, and $16 billion in 2011 (see Table 3.1). While this downturn was clearly partly 
due to the Global Financial Crisis there were also country specific reasons for it. 
According to the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), the decrease of 
FDI inflows to Vietnam in this period resulted from the weakness of the supporting 
industries
13
, the poor quality of infrastructure and the complex administrative 
procedures in Vietnam for investment. In 2011, Vietnam experienced the highest rate of 
inflation in the region at 23 per cent, which further strongly influenced competitive 
prices (VCCI 2013). However, other assessments still ranked Vietnam as an attractive 
destination for future investments and it ‘remains one of the most popular destinations 
for expansion within the ASEAN region according to ASEAN Business Outlook Survey 
by AmCham and Singapore Business Federation’ (World Bank 2013). This 
attractiveness was apparent as FDI inflows to Vietnam recovered from 2013 so that the 
amount of registered capital again reached over $20 billion in 2015. 
Some characteristics of FDI in Vietnam 
Project scale: FDI projects in Vietnam are generally of a small or medium scale. The 
average capital size grew gradually through the different periods. The average capital 
size per project in the period 1988-1990 was $7.5 million. This increased to $11.6 
million in 1991-1995 and $12.3 million in 1996-2000. The scale of registered capital 
per project was reduced to an average of $3.4 million in the period 2001-2005. 
However, this number rose back to $14.4 million in 2006 and 2007 (Foreign Investment 
Agency 2008). The scale of FDI projects expanded when MNCs were present in the 
period 2008-2011, including organisations such as Intel, Compel, Piaggio and Samsung. 
However, these scales only slightly increased after that until 2015. 
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Investment division by sector: FDI inflows were mainly invested in the industrial sector, 
which is prioritised by the Vietnamese government demonstrating its developmental 
mindset and strategy. As depicted in Table 3.2, FDI in manufacturing occupied more than 
a half of total number of projects and registered capital. This is usually considered to 
mean that FDI contributes more effectively to economic growth by increasing industrial 
production, but it also tends to suggest increased damage to the environment.  Such FDI is 
seen to be  more easily affected by economic crisis or downturn, as it tends to focus on 
export activities (Nguyen, Vu et al. 2006: 8). Meanwhile, the other sectors such as 
tourism, service, or education, which are often regarded as bringing long term value and 
more stable investment, did not have many projects or much registered capital. 
Table 3.2 Foreign direct investment projects licensed by kinds of economic activity. 
(Accumulation of projects having effect as of 31/12/2015) 
 Number of 
projects 
Total registered 
capital (Mill. USD) 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 493 3,263.0 
Mining and quarrying 78 3,182.0 
Manufacturing 8,072 105,938.7 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 87 7,488.9 
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities 
28 1,234.2 
Construction 936 10,052.0 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
902 2,898.3 
Transportation and storage 350 3,492.8 
Accommodation and Food service activities 331 10,605.8 
Information and communication 828 3,941.7 
Financial, banking and insurance activities 76 1,321.7 
Real estate activities 388 49,760.5 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 1,336 1,101.5 
Administrative and support service activities 114 193.3 
Education and training 163 462.9 
Human health and social work activities 82 1,222.2 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 137 3,629.2 
Other service activities 121 732.9 
TOTAL 14,522 210,521.6 




FDI inflow by country: as depicted in Table 3.3 below, by the end of 2015, most of the 
biggest investors in Vietnam came from the Asian region. South Korea was the number one 
investor with over 5,500 valid projects and total registered capital of over $50 billion. Japan 
ranked second with 3,242 valid projects and more than $40 billion registered capital. This 
was followed by Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Thus, Asian countries were dominant 
in term of FDI projects and registered capital, while European and North American 
investors were very modest and fractional. 
Table 3.3 Foreign direct investment projects licensed by main counterparts 
(Accumulation of projects having effect as of 31/12/2015) 
                              Number of projects Total registered 
capital(MILLION)  (*) 
(Mill. USD) 
Of which: 
Korea Rep. of  5,500 50,000.0 
Japan 3,242 42,000.0 
Singapore 1,600 36,280.0 
Taiwan 3,197 24,816.0 
British Virgin Islands 510 15,386.4 
Hong Kong SAR (China) 705 14,966.7 
Malaysia 523 13,400.0 
……… …… ….. 
TOTAL 14522 210521.6 
Source:(General Statistics Office 2016: 175) 
Investment division by location: FDI projects are allocated unequally across the 
provinces of Vietnam. Most projects are in either the central regions of the North and 
South of the country. Within each region, FDI was focused in some main provinces. For 
instance, as illustrated in Table 3.4, for the North, in Hanoi and Vinh Phuc province the 
total projects were higher than total of all other provinces in the Red River Delta, 
northern midlands and mountain areas, central and central coastal areas, and central 
highlands. In addition, registered capital is also allocated unevenly in different areas. 
The southeast area around Ho Chi Minh City is the largest beneficiary as the total 
registered capital was more than $99 billion in 2012, occupying a half of total registered 




Table 3.4 Foreign direct investment projects licensed by province  
(Accumulation of projects having effect as of 31/12/2015) 
                                      Number of projects Total registered capital (*) 
(Mill. USD) 
Red River Delta 4,034 48,753.7 
Hà Nội 2,456 21,205.6 
Vĩnh Phúc 148 2,466.9 
-------------------- ------- ------ 
Northern midlands and 
mountain areas 
375 4,106.5 
Bắc Gi ng 101 1,668.8 
Phú Thọ 79 454.9 
---------- ---- ------ 
Central and central coastal areas 879 44,386.0 
Đà nẵng 239 3,684.0 
Quảng Nam 79 4,984.2 
------------ ------------- --------- 
Central Highlands 137 811.2 
Lâm Đồng 112 487.5 
Gia Lai 12 85.7 
---------------- ----------- -------------- 
South East 8,273 99,002.7 
TP. Hồ Chí Minh 4,337 32,403.2 
Bình Dương 2,246 17,969.3 
---------- ------------ ----------- 
Mekong River Delta 775 10,707.9 
Long An 464 3,520.3 
Tiền Giang 51 1,072.7 
------------- -------- ------------ 
TOTAL 14522 210521.6 






Contributions of Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam 
The presence of FDI in Vietnam demonstrates the change toward an ‘open door’ policy. 
FDI has spread into a range of economic sectors including domestic invested sources, 
which has created competitive pressures and promoted renovation and technology 
transformation. It has contributed to Vietnam joining in global value chain production. 
Vietnam has become a destination of top international corporations such as British Petroleum 
(BP), Total, Toyota, Canon, Samsung, Intel and Unilever. The positive view of the 
government about the contributions of FDI to the country was clear in a speech by the 
Minister of Planning and Investment at a national meeting on 25 years of FDI in Vietnam: 
In the first stages of implementing the ‘open door’ policy, foreign investment 
contributed effectively to Vietnam’s economic growth, bringing Vietnam out of 
the difficult embargo status… In the next period, foreign investment will 
continually play an important supported capital source; contributing to structural 
change in the Vietnamese economy; enhancing productivity; transforming 
technology; connecting to global markets; increasing export turn-over; 
improving foreign balance; and so on (Bui 2013: 5). 
FDI is strongly perceived to have contributed significantly to economic growth. The 
contribution rate of this sector to GDP has increased from 2 per cent in 1992, to 12.7 per 
cent in 2000, 16.98 per cent in 2006, and 18.97 per cent in 2011 (Dao 2013: 9). Further, 
foreign investment is seen to have promoted structural economic changes promoting 
industrialisation in the country. Foreign investment focused mainly on the industrial and 
construction sectors, and it has contributed to increasing the growth rate of this sector 
by 18 per cent per year (while the GDP annual growth rate was about 7-8 per cent). 
Indeed foreign investment has created nearly 45 per cent of total industrial production. 
It contributed to establishing some major industrial branches such as 
telecommunications, natural resource exploitation, oil processing, electronics, 
information technology, steel, and cement (Dao 2013: 10). Foreign investment has also 
been important ‘bridge’ to technology transformation and it helped to enhance the 
technological level of the national economy. FDI sped up competitive capacity at three 
levels: national, company and production. Finally, foreign investment is perceived to 
have contributed to enhancing the nation’s capacity for economic management, 




3.3. Literature review on FDI inflows to Vietnam 
Although the issue of foreign direct investment in Vietnam has only emerged in recent 
decades, this issue has attracted the interest, not only of politicians and business 
persons, but also of researchers. This section examines research related to the role that 
FDI has played in developing areas like human capital and trade, knowledge transfer 
and technology spillovers. Next, it reviews research about the impacts of the 
liberalisation of trade, investment regimes, and market-based decisions in reaping 
developmental gains in Vietnam in the context of ‘an economy in transition’ (Delaunay 
and Torrisi 2012). Then, it reviews research about the linkages between corruption and 
FDI, and the relationship between the quality of governance and number of licensed 
FDI projects in Vietnam (Gueorguiev and Malesky 2012; Pereira 2013). These reviews 
provide a fruitful picture of literature on FDI inflows to Vietnam in general.  
There has been debate about the contribution of FDI to the Vietnamese developmental 
mindset and policy as well as to economic development. Scholars generally agree that it 
has played a very positive role in Vietnamese economic development (Athukorala, 
Prema-Chandra and Tran, Quang Tien 2012; Bui 2013; Do 2016). For example, 
research by Do (2016) analysed FDI’s contribution to Vietnam’s development. 
According to the author, the FDI sector contributes significantly to the value of export 
turnover. The export share of the FDI sector to the total export turnover has averaged 
30.7 per cent annually and in the period from 2007 to 2015 it contributed 42.1 per cent.  
The FDI sector also contributes to the process of economic restructuring, 
industrialisation and modernisation. The FDI sector occupies 100 per cent of production 
of industrial products such as petroleum, automobiles, washing machines, air 
conditioners, refrigerators, and electronics, as well as 60 per cent of steel rolling; 28 per 
cent of cement; 33 per cent of electric and electronic machinery and equipment and 25 
per cent of food and beverages (Do 2016). Thus, it is clear that the FDI sector has really 
become a part of the Vietnam’s developmental economic strategy. FDI has contributed 
to the success of economic reform and played an indispensable role in creating the 
present face of Vietnam’s economy today. Specifically, the benefits of attracting FDI 
have included: reducing the impacts of the domestic capital shortage; acquiring 
technology and management know-how; increasing the number of jobs and providing 
workforce training; increasing revenue for the budget; facilitating joining in global 




The limitations of attracting FDI are also identified and analysed in the literature. The 
engine of FDI is to seek maximum profit and firms will leave if they do not find 
favourable conditions in the host country. Furthermore, some of the reasons for luring 
FDI are not, in fact, easy to acquire such as technology transfer, workforce training, and 
management know-how (Do 2016). Therefore, achieving inclusive and sustainable 
growth in line with Vietnam’s developmental strategies (Pham 2014), can be difficult in 
the context of high levels of FDI. 
There has been a lively debate about the spillover impacts of FDI on domestic exports. 
Vo Tri Thanh and Nguyen Anh Duong (2011) provided an in-depth analysis of the 
spillover effects of FDI on Vietnam’s exports. They showed that exports were increased 
and stimulated by FDI inflows. They emphasised the role of FDI inflows in stimulating 
export growth, and found that ‘the benefits of FDI to exports prevail long after such 
inflows take place in Vietnam’, as well as noting that there have been positive spillover 
effects from FDI on the exports of domestic enterprises (Vo and Nguyen 2011: 128-
129). According to these authors, domestic enterprises acquired ‘more advanced 
technology’, ‘management skills’, and skilled labour that had previously worked with 
enterprises with foreign investment. They saw this as contributing to improving their 
competitiveness in general and exports in particular (Vo and Nguyen 2011: 127; Tran 
2011: 132). Vo and Nguyen (2011) are also persuaded that FDI has positive spillover 
effects on the exports of domestic enterprises, yet Tho considered these assessment 
‘optimistic’ and he showed that ‘the linkage effects of FDI on local firms have been 
weak’ (Tran 2011: 133). Agreeing with Tho, Kenichi Ohno (2011: 135) argued that 
Thanh and Duong had ‘no convincing evidence’ in term of ‘the positive effects of FDI 
on the exports of local firms.’ Ohno found that although the local firms could learn and 
were impacted by pressures from FDI firms, unfortunately the fact is that ‘both channels 
appear thin in Vietnam as many industrial surveys and testimonies by local and foreign 
businesses indicate’ (Ohno 2011: 135). This debate highlights the complexity of 
understanding the impact of FDI on the domestic sector’s dynamics and exports.  
Thu Thi Hoang et al. (2010) found that the limited ‘level of human capital’ was a 
weakness, limiting the take up of advanced technology. In other words, they found that 
the advanced technology was not yet applicable to Vietnam. According to Hoang et al. 




positive effect of FDI on economic growth.’ They concluded that ‘the additional capital 
from FDI inflows is the only channel that helps increase economic growth in Vietnam’ 
(Hoang, Wiboonchutikula et al. 2010: 308). The key goals of attracting FDI to Vietnam 
are technology and knowledge transfer, but to an extent, these seem to be not fully 
reached, even spillover impacts appear weak. Hence, this raises a question about the 
state’s developmental strategy around luring foreign direct investment. 
Research by Delaunay and Torrisi (2012) and Athukorala and Tran (2012) explored the 
impact of FDI on Vietnam emphasising  an economy in transition. After describing and 
analysing different features of FDI development in Vietnam, these studies concluded 
that FDI had strong impacts not only on promoting the liberalisation of trade and the 
liberalisation of the investment regime but also on promoting market-based decisions, 
which they saw as reaping developmental gains in Vietnam (Athukorala and Tran 2012: 
461). Athukorala and Tran also emphasised the special role of FDI in revitalising the private 
sector, and in so doing, it contributed to a process of transformation in Vietnam from ‘the 
plan to market’ or from ‘central planning to market orientation’ (Athukorala and Tran 2012: 
447). Therefore, this analysis indicates that FDI facilitates a move to market-based 
economic management and hints that a strong FDI sector might start to have its own 
priorities, of which the state may not be in control. 
A study of the impact on state governments of FDI in Vietnam found that there was ‘a 
positive significant relationship’ between the ‘quality of governance and number of 
licensed FDI projects’ in the short term but there was ‘no significant relationship’ in the 
long-term (Pereira 2013: 292). The research investigated a 20 year period from 1991 to 
2011 and asserted that the good Vietnamese state governance in  the decade from 2001 
to 2011) was ‘a positive influence’ on increasing the number of FDI projects (Pereira 
2013: 297-298). Good governance here was judged through largely neoliberal indicators 
of state management such as: ‘reduced import tariffs;… liberalising the foreign 
investment regulations; lifting of the ownership cap with international joint ventures and 
the ability for MNCs to create 100% foreign owned companies within the country’ 
(Pereira 2013: 294). In contrast, indicators of weak state management were listed as 
‘inflation, corruption, lengthy administrative and contradictory procedures, poor 
infrastructure, real estate, weak banking system, and SOE preference.’ These are treated 




294-295). These considerations are analysed through a specific case study in the next 
section. Most existing studies discuss the role of FDI in Vietnamese economic growth and 
there is very little analysis of the linkage between Vietnamese developmental state strategies 
and FDI.  
 
3.4. The Case of Vinh Phuc Province 




Map of Vinh Phuc province separately and its location in the map of Vietnam 
Vinh Phuc was re-established as a province in 1997. It is a relatively small province in 
terms of its area, which is 1,236 square kilometres and the population estimate in 2016 was 
1.066.021 (Vinh Phuc Statistics Office 2016: 37). However, despite its small size, Vinh 
Phuc is one of the main centres of economic development in the North of Vietnam. It is 
located beside Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam, and is treated as a bridge between the 
Northwest provinces and Hanoi and Red River Delta provinces. Vinh Phuc plays an 
important role in the economic development of the northern region and the nation. 
With advantages from economics and geography, Vinh Phuc has achieved rapid 
development. Economic growth has increased rapidly and the average increase in GDP 




over the 15 years 1997 to 2011 was an extraordinary 17 per cent per year (Vinh Phuc 
Government Portal 2013).  Concomitantly, it economic structure changed, increasing 
the density of the industrial and service sectors and reducing agricultural density. Vinh 
Phuc has long been in the top ten provinces of industrial production in terms of the 
actual value, budget inputs, and provincial competitiveness index (Vinh Phuc 
Government Portal 2013). 
In a letter of reference, Mr Phung Quang Hung, Deputy Provincial Party Committee 
cum Chairman of Vinh Phuc People’s Committee demonstrates the role that FDI 
plays in the province’s and Vietnam’s developmental mindset. He stated that the 
province’s successes: 
…have been contributed to by investors and enterprises in the provincial area. 
Vinh Phuc always seeks to improve the invested environment such as enhancing 
the provincial competitive capacity; marking the boundaries of industrial zones 
and land clearance; developing infrastructure; and training human resources. 
Further, Vinh Phuc focused on administrative procedural innovations by 
implementing a one stop shop mechanism and improving the time taken for 
difficult procedures for enterprises, in order to make the best conditions for 
investors and business in the provincial area (Phung 2013).  
The Amount and Level of FDI in Vinh Phuc Province 
The brief depiction below highlights the major features of FDI in Vinh Phuc in specific 
time periods.  
1997-2000: the Law on Investment was implemented in Vietnam in this period. Because 
the province was only just re-established, provincial social-economic foundations were 
weak and experience in investment promotion was limited. In addition, the Asian 
financial crisis (1997-1998) negatively influenced FDI. Therefore, the province 
attracted only 11 projects in this period and a total registered capital of $270.8 million. 
However, some big projects were licensed such as Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Japfa 
Comfeed and Inoue and these projects set the foundation for provincial development 
(Vinh Phuc Industrial Zones Management Board 2012: 2). 
2001-2005: Vinh Phuc established an industrial zone management board in December 




and procedural innovation. At the same time, Vinh Phuc improved the investment 
environment and infrastructure and implemented priority policies for FDI areas. As a 
result, the number of FDI projects and registered capital increased dramatically. In 
2005, Vinh Phuc ranked fifth for provincial competitive capacity and the eighth in 
investment attraction. This period attracted 63 projects with the total capital registered 
of $713.6 million (Vinh Phuc Industrial Zones Management Board 2012: 2-3). 
2006-2010: a new investment law and the Law on Enterprises were implemented in 
2005, accompanied by government decrees which created a judicial framework for 
foreign invested operations. At this time, the provincial infrastructure and the 
environment for investment were further improved. As a result, in the period 2006-2010 
Vinh Phuc reached a peak of foreign investment attraction, with an average of 20 
projects a year being approved. The total number of FDI projects in this period was 106 
and the total registered capital was $2,055.8 million (Vinh Phuc Industrial Zones 
Management Board 2012: 3-4). Some big projects invested in Vinh Phuc at that time 
were Compal Corporation, Piagio and Samsung Corporation. 
In 2011, the international and domestic economy stagnated, increasing market prices 
and the price of input materials. Further, high interest rate from domestic banks had an 
impact on provincial FDI attraction. Therefore, the province attracted only ten projects 
with the total registered capital of $151.44 million (Vinh Phuc Industrial Zones 
Management Board 2012: 4). The implemented capital in this period was mainly 
focused on the expansion of old projects such as Honda, HJC, Piagio, Jahwa and Micro 
Shine. By November 2015, 26 new foreign investment projects were licensed with total 
of $264.37 million, and the province permitted 23 existing projects to add $155.13 
million to their capital. The province has so far attracted a total of 202 FDI projects with 
a combined registered capital of some $3.2 billion (VLLF 2015). 
 
Characteristics of FDI in Vinh Phuc Province 
Investment division by sector: FDI projects focus mainly on the industrial sector with 
116 projects  or 97 per cent of projects and 96.5 per cent of invested capital focused on 
this sector by the end of 2011. There were only three projects in the agricultural-forestry 
sectors with an invested capital of $79 million (Vinh Phuc Industrial Zones 




Investment by forms of investment: Most FDI projects in the province were 100 per cent 
foreign capital ones. Among 119 projects, 104 were 100 per cent foreign invested 
projects with the total capital of $1,668.83 million by the end of 2011. There were some 
joint venture companies including 12 projects with a capital of $558.12 million. The 
remaining investments were in the form of joint stock companies (Vinh Phuc Industrial 
Zones Management Board 2012: 5) 
Investment division by location: Vinh Yen city is the site of 60 of the 109 projects with 
a total registered capital of $399.7 million. The second location is Binh Xuyen District 
with 46 projects and a total registered capital of $1,378 million (Vinh Phuc Industrial 
Zones Management Board 2012). These two sites are a magnet for many projects 
because large industrial zones (Khai Quang, Binh Xuyen, Ba Thien, Binh Xuyen II, Ba 
Thien II) have been built in these locations. Further, these sites have a favourable 
investment environment in comparison with other sites thanks to the concentrated 
labour supply, ability to provide services for production, and the capacity to meet 
business and personal demands through services such as postal telecommunication, 
finance, banking, infrastructure, electricity, drainage system. Thus, it can be seen that 
the locations for investment were not evenly spread across the province, but rather there 
has been a concentration in the centre of it. 
Investment division by investors: up to 2011, Vinh Phuc attracted projects from 12 
countries and territories from Asia, Europe, America and Africa. Most partners were 
from Asian countries.  For example, Taiwan had 42 projects (registered capital $1,211 
million), Korea with 41 projects ($241.18 million), and next was Japan with 18 projects 
($660.7 million). Investment from other countries was minor, though in 2012 Vinh Phuc 
lured one project from Italy worth $45.0 million and one French project valued at $14.0 
million (Vinh Phuc Industrial Zones Management Board 2012).  
 
Views on the Challenges for Local Government 
Looking at the general picture of FDI in Vinh Phuc, FDI has been a major contributor to 
a change in the face of the province in recent decades. As noted above, the province’s 
GDP increased an average 17 per cent per year over 15 years (1997-2011) a clear 




achievements have also brought several insoluble problems of governance.  These have 
included (1) the provincial budget’s dependence on FDI; (2) challenges to provincial 
governance regulations; (3) cadre’s capacity; (4) environmental pollution; (5) land 
clearing; and (6) managing the impact on local social and economic security. This 
section explores perceptions about these challenges and about the overall role of FDI in 
development as reflections of local developmental mindset based on data collected from 
a series of interviews with key Vinh Phuc officials. 
Interviews were conducted with six people in Vinh Phuc. The interviewees were: 
 Mr Nguyen Binh Khuong, Head of Division, the Foreign-Economic Office, 
Planning and Investment Department, Vinh Phuc People’s Committee; 
 Mr Khong Thanh Cong, Vice Director of the Industrial Zones Management 
Board, Vinh Phuc People’s Committee; 
 Mr Nguyen Manh Doan, expert of the Foreign-Economic Office, Planning and 
Investment Department, Vinh Phuc People’s Committee; 
 Mr Phan Tien Dung, official of Foreign Economic Division, Planning and 
Investment Department Vinh Phuc  People’s Committee; 
 Mr Nguyen Duy Hieu, Head of Division, the Labour, Employment and Social 
Insurance Office, Department of Labour, Invalids and Social affairs, Vinh Phuc 
People’s Committee; and 
 Mr Do Minh Duc, Senior Officer of Vinh Phuc Committee’s Office, and 
consultant for the Chair and Vice-Chair of Vinh Phuc People Committee. 
Respondents were asked about the difficulties that Vinh Phuc faced with the impact of 
FDI on provincial governance. These areas are each discussed in turn below. 
1. Developmental role of FDI 
The local leaders recognised that the province’s economy in general, and the province’s 
budget, in particular, had been strongly reinforced by the FDI sector. Yet Cong -Vice 
Director of the Industrial Zones Management Board, equally explained that, over the 
years, if Vinh Phuc was not the recipient of FDI, it would not have developed like it 
has. Further, given low domestic investment, the choice for foreign investment has been 
seen as necessary. Foreign investment and private investment have been regarded as 




sensitive to the policies of the central government, such as the policies on taxes, imports 
and exports, tariffs, regulation of the localisation rates of production and luxury goods 
consumption. He said; 
We all know that foreign investment is very sensitive and Vinh Phuc’s economy 
depends much on these factors, on Toyota and Honda. When these two 
enterprises did not reach planned targets of car and motorbike sales, the 
provincial growth was at its lowest level. I remembered that in 2008-2009, the 
beginning of the crisis, the growth rate was minus, because the foreign 
investment was deficient in production. 
2. The dependence of provincial economy on FDI 
The Vinh Phuc economy and the provincial budget are now reliant on FDI which 
contributed 39.9 per cent of the province’s GDP in 2011 (Vinh Phuc Industrial Zones 
Management Board 2012: 9). Mr Khuong, head of Foreign-Economic Division - 
Planning and Investment Department, was interviewed for his insights on this issue. 
This office is responsible for monitoring and managing foreign investment in Vinh 
Phuc, so not surprisingly, there was a strong awareness of the issue: 
Frankly, the statistics which I have mentioned indicate FDI’s immense 
effectiveness but everything has two sides for us to consider. It means that Vinh 
Phuc province’s economy depends too much on FDI, in detail, FDI accounts for 
80 per cent of provincial industrial production values, 85 per cent of export turn-
over. Toyota and Honda contribute 80 per cent of FDI. 
Looking at the above rates, Khuong judged that the economy has not been sustainable. 
For example, in 2011, Vinh Phuc expected to receive $700 to $800 million to the 
provincial budget. But, policies for car registration, traffic fees and so on, were changed 
and the sales of Toyota and Honda reduced and the province did not gain as much 
enterprise income tax. As a result, the province’s budget attained just 70 per cent of the 
target income. That is why it is humorously said that ‘If Toyota and Honda were 
infected with a runny nose or a headache, Vinh Phuc would suffer a major disease.’ 
Mr Khong Thanh Cong was interviewed because his agency’s functions are governance 
of the investment in industrial zones in the province, and solving problems during the 
implementation of investment projects in the zones. When asked about the challenges 




It can be said that Vinh Phuc’s economy depends a lot on foreign investment. 
The increase in foreign investment decides the development of Vinh Phuc. In 
Vinh Phuc, there are two periods which were strongly affected by FDI; it was 
1999 and 2012, due to the economic deficiency and macro policy, and so on. 
From these interviews, it can be seen that the provincial leaders perceive that the 
provincial economy’s on FDI posed some dangers. Both these interviewees confirmed 
that provincial growth was still highly dependent on the outcomes of the foreign 
investment sector. Further, they saw that it may lead to problems in the future.  For 
example, Cong noted that: 
There is competitiveness among national localities, among nations in the region 
in luring foreign investment because investors only invest in what is favourable 
for them, if not, they leave. When the provincial economy depends much on 
them, what can we face if they leave us? This is the question which needs to be 
answered in the future. 
Khuong also noted that the province had long identified the need to develop its 
economy more sustainably and there have been a range of research projects looking at 
restructuring investment.  The conclusions and recommendations  of these projects have 
been that the province should not depend as much on industrial projects, because these 
can be more  easily affected by economic crisis or changes in the market. This indicates 
a clear developmental mindset beyond FDI. In the early 2010s, the province focused on 
big, standard industrial projects, and then projects in the areas of services especially 
tourism and healthcare, in order to increase the presence of the services and tourism 
sectors in economic system. Khuong asserted that industrial FDI would promote initial 
accumulation of capital and that thereafter, the province must aim to ‘stand on our own 
two feet’, that it is necessary to develop local companies. Developing internal forces is 
perceived to keep the provincial economy more sustainable, because foreign companies 
only invest in relation to the overall investment environment and their commercial 
strategy. If there is a benefit they come, such as the low price of labour and easy access 
to land, but if these prices increase they will say good bye. Thus, these two 
interviewees, who are provincial leaders, perceive that there is a greater danger of losing 
independence from the FDI sector than from domestic investment and that this sector 




the provincial level. They consider, with some grounds, that the province’s economy 
will face major challenges if an economic crisis occurs or investors pull out.   
3. Challenges to provincial governance regulation 
The local government’s regulation system is connected to local state power. If the 
policy system is weak and confused due to external factors, local state power would be 
weakened. In Vinh Phuc province, Mr Nguyen Manh Doan, expert of the Foreign-
Economic Office, said in an interview that Vinh Phuc’s principal policies in FDI 
management must comply with, and implement the state’s decrees, laws and regulations 
such as investment law and the Law on Enterprises. Implementing these laws brings 
challenges. For example, a foreign investor must have an investment project, then the 
investment licence is issued, but, at the same time, the business licence must be issued, 
except in the case that enterprise already has legal status in Vietnam. Further, it is 
regulated that if a foreign organisation or individual wants to invest in Vietnam by 
buying the stock of a firm or contributing capital to a domestic enterprise, it is 
compulsory to have a bank account in a Vietnamese bank and that all payments be made 
through this bank. This makes it difficult for enterprises, because there are two kinds of 
investment. The first kind is real, long-term investment, whereas the second is 
speculative investment, when the shares are bought at a cheap prices and sold when 
prices are high on the stock market. Experience has shown that with this kind of 
speculative investment, investors will not have the full amount of money. Indeed, in 
some cases, investment projects are fictional. Yet, the assessment capacity of the 
localities can be weak, so that, although the investment money have not reached to 
province, the licences are still issued. The result is projects that are just on paper, which 
in turn creates difficulty in FDI management. 
Again, it is clear that local authorities recognise these developmental challenges. Mr 
Phan Tien Dung, official of Foreign Economic Division, talked about shortcomings in 
foreign investment management: 
…similar to the common difficulties nationwide, FDI in Vinh Phuc encounters 
some challenges. First of all, some of the investment law systems and policies 
are not comprehensive or clear. For example, the procedure of issuing licences 
for reinvestment is not regulated with details about the sequence of land 




inspection of projects, enterprise liquidation, project termination, withholding 
the licence. Some problems arise out of the regulations, for example, the case of 
foreign investors who flee the province, leaving unpaid debts.  
Dung provided more details about the shortcomings of regulation, where for instance, 
the policies for FDI enterprises are not stable. Enterprise’s income tax, import taxes, 
export taxes and land use tax are not synchronous among different periods. Such 
asynchrony can create difficulties related to the investment incentives for enterprises. 
Further, sanctions are not strong enough to deal with the projects that are delayed, make 
slow progress, or arbitrarily cease investment. Many sanctions for cases where laws are 
broken are not transparent and legislation is not strict, leading to a series of problems 
without solutions such as transfer pricing and false losses, resulting in the loss of 
revenue for the state. 
Foreign enterprises usually use professional legal assistance, and they try to take 
advantage of the local law’s gaps and loopholes. Such activity challenges local 
governance. For example, Mr Do Minh Duc, who is involved in issues of social 
economic security claimed: 
Since Vinh Phuc has expanded its relationship with the foreign partners and 
besides the dynamic stimulation for economic growth, signs of losing security 
appeared. The provincial economic police forces have to have the enforcement 
capacity to meet the new requirements. As you know, the foreign corporations 
invested here, they own judicial consultation divisions and they have a good 
comprehension of Viet Nam’s laws, they find the ways to evade taxation or 
other various forms, they take advantage of the loophole in the law in order to 
take profits. 
Thus, promulgating a comprehensive and transparent policy and implementing it, in 
order to ensure there is effective management of the foreign investment sector, is an 
essential requirement for local government and one that is still creating challenges 
for the national state in general and local government in particular. What is clear 
here is not only that the provincial officials have a strong grasp of, and concern with, 





4. Cadres’ capacity 
This plays an important role in managing the FDI sector and low capacity can limit 
the ability of provinces to effectively promote and manage FDI. While almost all 
foreign enterprises come from developed countries and have professional 
management and skills in strategic thinking, the management capacity of provincial 
cadres is considered not adequate for sectoral management. The lack of capacity 
limits their ability to effectively regulate the foreign investment sector. As Mr 
Nguyen Manh Doan claimed: 
As you know, the foreign enterprises are more professional than the provincial 
management departments. In order to manage these enterprises, in my opinion, it 
is very difficult, for instance, to audit their finance reports and contracts, and 
investors take advantage of our law’s gaps and they use loopholes in the law. 
Adding more detail about the provincial cadres’ lack of capacity in managing the FDI 
sector, Cong explained that the staff in this field are not only weak in foreign languages, 
and in their knowledge of the law but also they have little understanding of international 
integration knowledge, international regulations (such as the WTO), international 
commitment and international conventions. Cong asserted that: ‘there is a lack of a 
workforce of cadres who work only at the provincial level, mainly in the industrial 
zone, not in district level. Consequently, the force is weak and unprofessional’.  
Furthermore, Cong also affirmed that the qualifications of these cadres were not 
adequate, resulting in some problems such as losing benefits by not understanding about 
transfer pricing.
14
 It remains difficult for cadres to judge the adequacy of transfer prices, 
which many enterprises use to claim losses. Cong stated: 
In the province, no enterprises have been detected or proved as using transfer 
pricing. The reason is that the information about foreign markets and the input 
information in order to evaluate a project correctly are still inadequate. The 
cadres are incapable of evaluating the investor’s capacity. Consequently, there 
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are problems in management after these enterprises come into operation, 
affecting the budget inputs negatively. 
Thus, the weakness and lack of provincial cadres’ capacity is a challenge for provincial 
government in managing the FDI sector but it is an issue that is recognised. Thus 
building capacity in managing the foreign investment sector through provincial cadre 
programmes will be key to promoting the developmental mindset into the future.  
5. Managing environmental pollution in and near industrial zones 
The land for Vinh Phuc’s industrial zones was established by clearing agricultural land, 
so, there are many villages and fields in the vicinity of industrial zones. Once the 
factories and companies in industrial zones were up and running, the effects of 
environmental pollution could not be avoided. This thesis takes a broad perspective on 
the developmental state incorporating social and environmental concerns, thus the 
response to this challenge is yet another way to view developmentalism. As Nguyen 
Kien Dung et al. (2013) explained, the whole of Vinh Phuc is like a big construction site 
resulting from industrialisation and urbanisation. In terms of pollution, the management 
of industrial zones did not address solid waste or wastewater production in their 
establishment phase and most of the companies have released wastewater directly into 
the environment. The environment in Vinh Phuc has meet ‘serious challenges’ and 
environmental pollution is a concern (Nguyen, Cao et al. 2013). This is a challenge that 
is axiomatic in the processes of  industrialisation, but large scale FDI, as is the situation 
in Vinh Phuc, adds greatly to the timeframe and scale of the challenge for the province. 
It can lead to challenges to state governance when local citizens become disaffected 
with  poor environmental standards. That is reason why Vinhphuc’s People Council 
promulgated the resolution 57/2016/NQ-HDND
15
 that  ignored big industrial and 
pollution projects and only gives supports and priorities for FDI projects in the field of 
education, health, and culture (Vinhphuc Poeple Council 2016)  
6. Land clearing: designing and undertaking land clearance in order to fit with a plan 
for luring investment are big challenges for provincial governance. Mr Nguyen Manh 
Doan explained: 
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We created favourable investment environment for investors like large land 
sizes, favourable mechanism, etc. but what we got from them is not as much as 
our efforts, and whether we can lure enough investors in the zone, or the plan of 
investment attraction is not approved but the land is cleared away already (when 
the land is cleared away, we cannot do anything there, just waiting for 
investment, but nobody invests, what can we do then?). Therefore, the 
consequences after the land clearance relating to the issue of accommodation, 
employment for the relocated residents, etc. are pressing. 
Thus, land clearing is recognised as a challenge to state power and development plans in 
part because of the need to achieve a balance between attracting investment and 
effectively solving demands for relocated residents. For example, in Ba Thien Industrial 
Zone, one of largest zones in Vinh Phuc province, 327 hectares were cleared from 2007. 
By the end of 2014, there was only one factory, that of the Compal Corporation with an 
area of nearly 100 hectares. The rest was wasteland with people tending to dump 
construction waste there (Tan and Tuan Dung 2015). Tan and Dung interviewed Mrs 
Vu Thi Tram, who lost some of the land that went to the industrial zone. She said with 
despair: ‘in the past, this is the field of "fat land", since the province recovered land for 
the industrial park and the lands were levelled and deserted, our farmers still ache!’ 
According to Tram, because they lost their livelihoods with the creation of the industrial 
zone, her family as well as many other families had expected the industrial zone to be 
operating at a high capacity in order to create jobs for rural youths around it. Tram had 
also said that she hoped this would promote the development of services in the region 
too, (Tan and Tuan Dung 2015). Yet this has not occurred. The combination of land 
acquisition and the failure to produce jobs is likely to undermine confidence in the state. 
7. The impact on social-economic security 
Regarding the social order and security, assembling a large numbers of workers from 
other locations into industrial zones and groups has created challenges to social order 
and security. Most workers get rental accommodation from local households around the 
industrial zones and that, along with the large number of people from different 
localities, often creates challenges to aspects of everyday life such as social ills and 
social conflicts. Many issues of social ills that occurred around industrial zones such as 




for the local government. Mr Nguyen Duy Hieu – Head of division – Vinhphuc’s 
Labour, War Invalids and Social Affair Department, explained that the department was 
often working cooperatively with the Security Department in solving many social issues 
that occurred around industrial zones 
In conclusion, a range of challenges to the capacity and vision of provincial 
governance have grown with FDI.  These included economic dependence, 
difficulties for policy approaches, and limits to cadres’ capacity. The above analysis 
showed that there were many pressures for local government in enticing and 
successfully managing FDI, such as managing environmental pollution, planning 
and filling up the industrial zones, and ensuring social-economic security in the face 
of foreign investment. These pressures were important not only in relation to policy 
making for local governance, but also raised challenges for local government in 
implementation. Nevertheless, what was also clear was that provincial officials took 
a somewhat developmental state approach to these challenges with active 
governance across a range of areas. Thus, promulgating effective strategic directions 
and policies in order to ensure there is effective management of the foreign 
investment sector is an essential requirement for local government.  
 
3.5. FDI and the Developmental State in Vietnam 
In examining the Vietnamese developmental state mindset and FDI, a comprehensive 
view is needed. Applying a sub-national approach and then extending to a nation-wide 
approach has been used in this study. Building on the interviews with regional and 
provincial officeholders, interviews about the overall impact of FDI on Vietnamese 
developmental state mindset and policy were also undertaken with three experts in 
2013.  Interviewees were: 
 Dr Ngo Huy Duc, Director of the Institute of Political Science, Ho Chi Minh 
National Political Academy. 
 Associate Professor, Dr Nguyen Viet Thong, a Secretary General of the Central 
Theoretical Council, Vietnamese Communist Party. 
 Prof. Dr Phan Xuan Son, member of the Central Theoretical Council, 




According to Dr Ngo Huy Duc, foreign actors affect the Vietnamese state through many 
channels. Consequently, Vietnam has had to adjust behaviours, laws, even regular 
customs and practices. Duc discussed some examples of these impacts, including 
consideration of the huge companies that have come to Vietnam. When entering 
Vietnam, those companies create certain pressures, which force changes on the host 
nation, such as issuing the law on foreign investment. When the state had to widen its 
external relationships, it also had to change practices, for example, social 
administration, administrative mechanisms, visa issuance, border inspection, travel 
inspection and so on. In these changes, we see some of the key influences on the 
developmental state mindset and policy, because, as Duc emphasised, the strongest 
factor in terms of policy is the legal framework, and changes to it are significant. 
Regarding foreign economic organisations in Vietnam, Dr Duc considered that these 
organisations had reduced state autonomy of the host country. As Duc explained, they 
are big organisations, which contribute to national income, create jobs and most 
importantly add to the state budget. However, with their strength, they also engage in 
policy advocacy, creating pressure for the state to issue policies favourable to the 
mobilising group. There is much evidence of this, such as the policies of lengthening 
the time for localisation of production
16
 and changing import tax rates. Even if these are 
legal, the state loses part of its independence. Duc concluded that: 
Losing a part of autonomy is a matter of fact as accepting foreign investment is 
followed by international rules that we must obey, if not we will get a penalty. 
We should understand that this binding/constraint is indispensable. The decline 
of state autonomy is inevitable. Following international rules, obeying the 
existing rules is surely dependence. 
This perception reflects a common view of host country in terms of the impact of 
investment from foreign institutions. The autonomy of the Vietnamese state is 
expressed in its regulations and rules within national territory, but the foreign investors 
and enterprises also have their own provisions and principles, and sometimes those 
provisions conflict with the state’s regulations and laws. As a result, bargaining between 
the two entities to come to a common consensus is indispensable and each side must 
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compromise. Thus, the Vietnamese state has given concessions increasing its capacity 
to attract more foreign investment, even though it means the loss of some independence. 
In terms of controlling the market and managing the economy, Dr Duc said that 
when entering Vietnam, even relatively small MNCs can occupy all the sectors of 
the economy from retail, to industry and services. As a corollary, Vietnamese 
companies have disappeared, gone bankrupt, or become the suppliers for these larger 
corporations. These consequences are serious. Dr Duc also noted that Vietnam had 
joined the WTO and was preparing to sign the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP), but Vietnamese companies are not always prepared to have to maintain their 
market shares and it seemed likely they would lose.
17
  Such outcomes are evident 
because Vietnamese companies are rarely able to compete because they are not 
proactive. Yet, Duc noted that: 
if we are separated from these multi-national companies, we will be poor 
forever. If we join, we will be only part of their chain values, at the lowest step, 
if we do not strive, we will die. Every country faces the same case, if these 
countries do not rise up in the integration, they may only be domesticated craft 
economies forever.  
Thus, there are two key perceptions from Dr Duc about challenges to Vietnamese 
developmental thinking, the first is in terms of the legal framework and the state’s 
capacity in managing the economy, and the second is the importance of promoting the 
competitive capacity of domestic companies and moving up the value chain in 
production. The clear focus on strategical developmental concerns stands out. 
The interview with Dr Nguyen Viet Thong brought out different considerations about 
relations between Vietnam’s developmental approach and the foreign economic sector. 
Professor Thong asserted that the foreign economic sector has become more and more 
developed in Vietnam and gaining a clearer role. The Vietnamese state has created 
favourable conditions for this sector to develop. Indeed, it is recognised in the 
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others see that the TPP trade deal is not all good for Vietnam’s factories (Chu 2015). This trade 




Communist Party’s documents and law. However, such commitment does not mean that 
this sector does not create any pressure on the state. Thong noted that, when entering 
Vietnam, foreign investors want high benefits. Consequently, they often invest in 
financial and banking services and assembly industries, and they choose the regions 
with the most favourable conditions and very advantageous locations such as Hai 
Phong, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, Vinh Phuc, Bac Ninh, Dong Nai and Binh Duong. As a 
result, the pressure of the differences between the rich and the poor regions in the 
country is increasing, leading to social issues. In turn, these create pressure for leaders 
and raise questions about how leaders could ease the conflicting tensions and solve 
these problems. 
The second concern in Thong’s interview was the issue of dependence. While Dr Duc 
noted the dependence of host countries on foreign economic sectors in term of the legal 
framework or policy, Dr Thong also suggested that another aspect is dependency on FDI 
in term of budget inputs. In the interview, Thong provided a long argument, which can be 
summarised as follows: Vietnam wants to continue building the state-owned economic 
sector combined with the co-operative economic sector as the key basis for the national 
economy. However, only some localities appeal to foreign investors, which results in a 
changing economic structure and the chosen locality becoming dependent on FDI’s 
contribution to the local budget. Thong argued that Vietnam’s economic stability until 
now was based on 70 per cent of the population living in rural areas producing stable 
agricultural crops. Therefore, he argued, the country should not forget a permanent lesson, 
namely, internal strength is the major force for countries. While Thong recognised that 
external strength is also important, he also argued that depending on it too much is 
dangerous. Thong noted that once a crisis happened, such as a financial crisis, provinces 
that depended mainly on foreign investment would face difficulties. The Asian financial 
crisis did not affect Vietnam because, at that time, it had not integrated widely into the 
world economy. Thong pointed out that it is humorously said that, at that time when 
Vietnam had light at night by oil lamp, the world used electric bulbs. When there was an 
electric power cut, Vietnam was not impacted. Now, Vietnam is also using electric bulbs, 
when the electric power cut, there will be no light. 
In terms of the gap between regions, this concern is shared at the highest level.  For 




assigned selected priorities to foreign enterprises, giving only priorities to those foreign 
enterprises which invested in the poor or difficult conditional localities’ (Nguyen Thi 
Phuong Hoa 2014). However, this problem is not only about FDI but there are also 
other tensions.  On the one hand, it is noteworthy that the gap between rich and poor 
regions existed before FDI became widespread, although FDI may have widened that 
gap, but on the other hand, the government is able to use FDI’s contributions through 
taxation to support re-distribution to poorer regions. 
Another expert interviewee who also provided useful views on this topic was Prof. Dr 
Phan Xuan Son who has spent many years studying the issue of nation-state authority in 
the globalisation of civilisation. According to Prof. Son, in order to evaluate the FDI 
sector, the goals of attracting FDI to Vietnam needed to be clarified. These can be 
generalised into three goals related to the development of human capital. The first goal 
would be attracting modern technology as seen in the context of world and regional 
developments. The second should be to learn professional modern management skills 
with the target to turn Vietnam into an industrial country by 2020, while the 
concomitant third goal should be to train skilled workers in modern technology. Based 
on these targets, after 25 years of implementing the policy of luring foreign investment, 
Professor Son assessed that Vietnam had not attracted appropriate and sufficient modern 
technology. Most of the technology used in FDI enterprises was only average or even 
old technology by one or two generations (around 15-20 years) in comparison with the 
dominant technologies in advanced countries.  
In terms of learning modern management skills, Professor Son asserted that this goal 
had not been reached because FDI enterprises did not use Vietnamese employees for 
important management positions. Rather, Vietnamese staff have been used in 
unimportant positions such as task managers or human resource managers. Management 
posts with responsibility for decisions about productivity, quality and effectiveness were 
filled by foreigners only. He also concluded that the goal of training skilled workers had 
not been achieved because most FDI workers were youths and farmers who had only 
received preliminary training to fill in the posts in assembly lines. Their jobs were 
marginal jobs that were not stable. The FDI employers hired employees on contracts 
that were usually signed on a six-month-basis, with low wages and no social insurance. 




The three basic goals are not achieved. In addition, the harmful consequence has 
been environmental pollution and environmental violation. Although FDI 
enterprises are on the ‘red carpet’ for investment attraction and obtain many 
favourable conditions, in response, they do not implement terms as was 
committed in the bilateral agreement and as per the initial expectation of Vietnam. 
Regarding the issue of dependence on FDI, Son claimed that when Vietnam has appealed 
to foreign investors to come, it must also accept that they control the decision making, and 
sovereignty on certain matters.  As Son said ‘we cannot implement things in our own 
way. Surely then, there is a dependency on the FDI sector, because in globalisation, 
countries are interdependent.’ However, Professor Son notes that this does not mean 
Vietnam ‘depends too much or depends completely’ on FDI.  Rather, he said, it just 
‘depends’. In other words, it is not as serious as losing sovereignty or controlling the 
policies. Nevertheless, Son believed that FDI matters should be carefully considered for 
the future. He said that the Argentinian and Brazilian cases provided important lessons for 
what happens when FDI leaves, because in both cases the gap could not be filled. 
Currently, China might be seeing some withdrawal of FDI and the Chinese economy is 
starting to decline. Therefore, we should anticipate these consequences. 
In relation to technology transfer, Son argued that this needed to be looked at in terms of 
both the benefit and costs. When FDI enterprises do not see a net benefit from technology 
transfer, they will not support it. FDI enterprises that come to Vietnam are seeking some 
major advantage, such as exploring static comparative advantage; low wage workers; 
priority policies about taxation; access to land; the protection of industrial policy; or to get 
the advantage of lower environmental standards. In fact, Son noted, that in order to attract 
foreign investment, many localities are ready to give priority policies without constraints. 
Thus, many FDI enterprises come to Vietnam to get these priorities but it is almost 
impossible to obtain any commitments from them. Accumulating all reasons above helps 
explain why foreign enterprises have not implemented technology transfer. All this 
indicates that Vietnamese policy makers may not be taking a sufficiently strong 
developmental state approach to FDI in a range of areas.  
The above discussion focused on the case of Vietnam in terms of expert perceptions. All 
three agreed that FDI has significantly contributed to economic growth and improved 




emphasised different aspects of challenges to Vietnamese autonomy and developmental 
capacity resulting from FDI. Duc was mainly concerned about the legal framework, the 
state capacity in managing the economy, and the competitive capacity of domestic 
companies resulting from impact of foreign economic actors. Thong emphasised 
challenges to developmental state strategies from FDI management in terms of the gap 
between the rich and the poor regions in the country, and the dependence on budget 
inputs. Son drew upon the broader human capital goals to evaluate FDI contribution, as 
well as to demonstrate challenges to state developmental capacity. Thus, these 
perceptions align with the provincial case study of Vinh Phuc above, most notably the 
views about the challenges to state autonomy in term of the legal framework, the 
dependence on budget inputs and the competitive capacity of domestic companies 
resulting from foreign economic actors. 
 
3.6. Conclusion: Vietnamese Perceptions of FDI and the Idea of ‘Developmental Mindset’ 
This section reviews the case study against the overall framework of the thesis. The 
developmental state theorists argue that there are prominent factors that support a strategic 
alliance of MNCs (especially through FDI) and the state in many cases. Such 
considerations return to both Mann’s (1997) and Weiss’s (1999) arguments about the 
impact of globalisation on the nation-state in general, and then connects to the idea of 
the developmental mindset.  
In order to answer the question of whether globalisation has ended the rise and rise of 
the nation state, Mann analysed a range of supposed threats to them, the relevant one 
here being global capitalism (Mann 1997: 472). He investigated different nation states 
in different regions and showed that capitalist transformation was slightly weakening 
‘the nation-states of the north (most clearly so within the EU)’, and strengthening 
nation-states of the South including in East Asia, and Africa, where he said 
globalisation would likely ‘prop them up, not… fragment them’ (Mann 1997: 472, 487). 
These countries featured stable states and strong civil society, therefore, Mann (1997: 
487) considered these states would  be strengthened by globalisation. He found that the 
key issue for states was the level of development as shown by two preconditions: ‘the 




488). Regarding capitalist transformation, he noted that ‘it will occur in those countries 
which most resemble nation-states and it will in turn enhance them’ (Mann 1997: 488).  
Mann’s point was that the effects of global flows are different across different states, 
but it is mostly enhancing the infrastructural capacity of states that have a strong 
capacity. Vietnam has many characteristics of a strong developmental state, yet as the 
above interviews highlighted, it has many weaknesses too. Interviews highlighted 
concerns about cadres’ abilities, macroeconomic management and policy-making 
capacities, environmental pollution and social economic security. Thus, in Vietnam, 
with the development of FDI, the government has to focus on enhancing their capacities 
in these areas to ensure it obtains the maximum benefits from FDI.  
To an extent, Weiss does not agree with the claims that globalisation marks the death or 
erosion of sovereignty and national policy autonomy. She supports the arguments that 
international cooperation can help policy autonomy and enhance capacity, and that 
‘economic integration has increased hand-in-hand with the strengthening of nationally 
distinct forms of economic management’ (Weiss 1999b: 60; 87). Weiss does not support 
the globalists’ opinions that state power has met serious challenges from globalisation.  
Indeed, in contrast, she pursued the issue of ‘whether states can act to enhance wealth 
creation and social protection within their territorial domain’ in the context of 
globalisation (Weiss 1999b: 74). This has certainly been the case to a large extent in 
Vietnam with foreign economic actors being a major driving force behind the country’s 
economic development. The interviews demonstrated that the perceptions of the level of 
development of the country in general, and Vinh Phuc province in particular, are still 
very much dependent on the outcomes of the foreign investment sector.  
Looking at the case of Vietnam, Weiss’s arguments and sample cases do not quite fit 
with the circumstance of Vietnam. Indeed, Vietnam has not reached many of the 
expected targets in attracting and using foreign investment effectively in such areas as 
achieving modern technology transfer, learning professional modern management skills, 
and training skilful workers in modern technology. These demonstrate the limits of the 
impacts of FDI for Vietnam in the age of globalisation. In addition, Vietnamese national 
technology networks and manufacturing have not been strong enough or had enough 
prominence in policy in order to develop competition with the foreign branches of 




technology strategy for industry, which can produce competition with MNCs, has not 
held in the case of Vietnam in recent years.  
Challenges to Vietnamese state capacities thus arise when faced with the rise of foreign 
firms. However, addressing challenges in order to identify positive preconditions and 
human capital growth can be encouraged. In Vinh Phuc for instance, the interviews with the 
provincial leaders and others revealed that there were some successful company directors 
who were former workers in the foreign sector. After several years working there, they had 
learned the know-how, the tricks of the trade and forms of management and 
entrepreneurship from the foreign managers so they felt they could leave the employment in 
foreign firms and establish their own companies. These companies were successful because 
of the time those owners had spent working and learning from the foreign enterprises.  
Despite these ideal-type examples, there were only a few patterns like this.  Moreover, 
many of these companies were often small scale and were in supporting industries. 
The traditional theory of developmental state, as reviewed in chapter one, was 
empirically generalised from some industrial East Asian countries. This chapter has 
provided an overview picture of FDI inflows in Vietnam from 1986 to 2015. It can be 
seen that although the number of FDI projects has gone up and down, Vietnam is still 
ranked as an attractive destination for future investments. The main characteristics of 
FDI in Vietnam were recognised as mainly invested in the industrial sector and mostly 
contributing to GDP growth. Thus, these characteristics seem to be an excellent fit with 
the traditional developmental state theory regarding the state using industrial policies to 
encourage development.  
A significant characteristic of FDI in Vietnam has been that the presence of FDI-
initiated important, broad changes. FDI has spread into other economic sectors and 
helped to activate domestic capital, as well as creating competitive pressures, and 
promoting renovation and technology transformation. It has contributed to economic 
growth and other changes. Accordingly, Thurbon’s suggestion about the importance of 
the developmental mindset and in particular the concept of ‘developmentalism’ is of 
major relevance to explain Vietnam’s circumstances. 
Drawing on developmental state theory, this chapter focused on the influences of FDI 
flows on Vietnamese developmental state mindset and policy. In Vinh Phuc province,  




was also related to the advantage of its location as well as the policies developed to 
promote investment. FDI has changed the face of the province in recent years.  
However, as was shown, the province has also faced difficulties in provincial 
governance. Many of these resulted from the rise of this economic sector, which 
generated challenges to the provincial economy in general, and also led to the 
vulnerability of the province’s budget because it was quite dependent on the FDI 
sector. The wealth and growth of the province seemed to be mainly based on external 
factors rather than internal ones. That means, the province could face the situation of a 
‘bubble’ economy, especially given openness to effects from economic crisis or the 
changing choices of investors. Promulgating comprehensive and transparent policies 
in order to have effective management of the foreign invested sector is challenging to 
provincial governance. This was shown to be the case particularly since the legislative 
system was open to loopholes for enterprises to take advantage of. Additionally, the 
case study in Vinh Phuc showed how the management capacity of provincial cadres 
has not met the requirement of the sector.  Other challenges discussed include 
environmental pollution and social order and security.  
All of the above difficulties created pressures on local governance. These pressures were 
important in not only pressing changes in the mechanism of local governance (policy-
making), but they also raised challenges to local government in policy implementation. 
Turning to a national view, it can be seen that the difficulties, which the province has 
experienced, reflect the general circumstances nation-wide. Other key nation-wide 
challenges were seen in the need to promote domestic enterprises so that they could 
compete with foreign ones; the need to enhance the capacity for economic management; 
and building capacity to deal with policy advocacy from foreign enterprises. Other 
challenges were found in areas of identifying and achieving appropriate targets for luring 
FDI and how to balance uneven foreign investment across Vietnam and in so doing, narrow 
the gap between the rich and poor regions in the country. Such challenges may narrow the 
capacity for developmental state approaches in the future. 
Overall, this chapter has demonstrated the depth of engagement of international 
economic actors on Vietnam’s developmental mindset at the national, provincial and 
local levels. The next chapter on international organisations will show the influence of 
these organisations on the Vietnamese developmental mindset and policies at the 





The Expansion of International Organisations and Their Influence 
on Vietnam’s Developmental Mindset 
 
4.1. Introduction 
International organisations (IOs), especially economic and social-cultural 
organisations, generally owe their specific developmental mindsets and influence to 
key nation-states, as well as to global ideas and belief systems. Not surprisingly, the 
relationship between these organisations and nation-states is debated passionately. 
Some analysts support the contribution of IOs as effective instruments to help improve 
nation state capacity. Others claim IOs are a cause of declining state autonomy. 
Regardless, it is widely accepted that although IOs have been created by states, they 
also  have independent power in their ‘policies and juridical bodies’ (Barkin 2013: 23) 
to exercise power autonomously in ways that are often ‘unintended and unanticipated’ 
by states upon their creation (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). IOs influence nation 
states by ‘transforming relations among states or sharing certain interests and 
objectives across national boundaries’ and also by solving international issues, 
especially those that nation states do not cover or reach (Iriye 2002: 9). These 
arguments highlight the roles and functions of IOs as independent actors. The 
influences of the IOs and their influence on Vietnam’s developmental mindset are the 
target of investigation in this chapter. 
In Vietnam, the expansion of IOs occurred after Doi Moi in 1986. Prior to renovation, 
Vietnam was involved in a war of independence, following which there was a period of 
building a socialist economic model. During this time, Vietnam established 
relationships mainly with socialist countries and had only limited relations with IOs. 
This all changed radically with Doi Moi, so that the role of IOs in Vietnam particularly 
grew during the 1990s. Now a range of IOs work in Vietnam and many are still 
expanding their operations. Beside the benefits these organisations bring, their growth 
and increasing influence poses a range of questions regarding economic and political 
independence, and also about how they have influenced thinking about what 
development is, and how should it occur. Questions include: will Vietnam be bound by 




By evaluating perceptions of the relationship between, in turn, the UN, the WTO and 
the World Bank and the Vietnamese government, new insights are provided on the 
above questions in this and the following chapter. 
This chapter starts with a literature review on IOs and their relations with nation states 
in particular regarding development mindsets. Following this a brief overview of IOs in 
Vietnam is provided, and then the chapter examines the relationship between Vietnam 
and the UN and the WTO, as these two major IOs that have been very active in the 
country and are two key IOs in terms of their global influence. An analysis of the 
perceptions of the impacts of these organisations on the Vietnamese developmental 
mindset and strategy is provided. This analysis is continued in chapter five, which 
investigates the case of the World Bank in Vietnam in more depth, evaluating how 
different actors perceive the impact of IOs on policy development and the 
developmental mindset in Vietnam.  
 
4.2. Literature review 
International organisations: definition, classification, roles and functions 
The term ‘international organisation’ was used in international relations theory as early 
as in 1970 by Michael Wallace and David Singer (1970: 245) who claimed that for an 
organisation to be called an IO, it ‘must consist of at least two qualified members of the 
international system’. Further, it must be ‘created by a formal instrument of agreement 
between the governments of national states’; ‘must hold more or less regular plenary 
sessions at intervals not greater than once a decade’; and it must have ‘a permanent 
secretariat and some sort of permanent headquarters arrangement’ (Wallace and Singer 
1970: 245-247). Different theories of IOs have offered different definitions, but the 
above broad definition is widely accepted (Archer 2001: 33; Pevehouse et al. 2005: 9; 
Klabbers 2013: 4; Klabbers 2013: 4).  
In another way of thinking, IOs have been understood as sets of rules in global 
governance. One of the best known contributors to this school is the work of Katharina 
Coleman who outlined that ‘in contemporary international relations theory, IOs are 
often viewed as creations of international law, instruments of hegemonic power, or 




brings us to the question of the distinction between ‘international organisations’ and 
‘international institutions’. The term ‘international institutions’ is discussed by John 
Duffield ‘as relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural 
norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system 
(including states as well as non-state entities), and their activities’ (Duffield 2007: 7-8). 
Continuing this genre, it is useful to look at the definition of Carlsnaes et al. (2002) who 
clarify the distinctions between ‘international organization’, ‘international regime’ and 
‘international institution’ as follows: The term ‘international organizations’ almost 
always referred to formal IOs, usually to organs or branches of the United Nations 
System… ‘International regimes’ often referred as rules, norms, principles and 
procedures that focus expectations regarding international behaviour…  ‘International 
institutions’ are commonly understood as sets of rules meant to govern international 
behaviour. Rules, in turn, are often conceived as statements that forbid, require or 
permit particular kinds of actions (Carlsnaes, Risse et al. 2002: 257 - 260). 
Coleman viewed IOs as sets of rules in global governance and emphasises that ‘these 
rules create a role for international organisations as gatekeepers to international 
legitimacy, and delineate the scope for strategic state behaviour within this framework’ 
(Coleman 2007: 41). In a related but general consideration about ‘the development of a 
stable world order’, Iriye (2002: viii) found that IOs play a key role creating a stable 
world order, ‘for many of them express the aspirations of people everywhere for peace, 
justice, and interdependence’. 
Regarding the classification of IOs, there are ranges of theoretical approaches to this 
issue.  Archer (2001) provides a standard starting point for classifications as he has 
investigated ‘three of the most common classifications of international organisations: by 
membership, by aims and activities, and by structure’(Archer 2001: 35). He finds: 
When considering type of membership, a distinction was made between 
organizations made up of governmental representatives (IGOs) and those with 
non-governmental members (INGOs), though there are a number of 
international organisations with mixed membership (for example, ILO). 
The aims and activities of international organizations show what they are meant to do 




An examination of the structure of international organizations can examine how 
institutions differentiate between one member and another; whether they are 
more or less egalitarian in their treatment of members; the degree of 
independence the institutions have from the member governments; and the 
balance between the governmental and non-governmental elements in the 
institutions (Archer 2001: 63-64). 
On the other hand, Samuel Barkin (2013) drew an arguably artificial distinction 
between ‘inclusive intergovernmental organizations’ and ‘exclusive’ ones. According to 
the author, inclusive ones are those created by states agreements and ‘that all interested 
parties can join’, such as ‘The United Nations (UN), the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization (NAFO), and the World Bank’ (Barkin 2006: 1). Exclusive 
intergovernmental organisation are ones that are created by ‘private individuals’ such as 
NGOs, transnational corporations and organisations and are ‘designed specifically to 
exclude some countries’ with the most common example being military alliances. In 
this author’s point of view, IOs are understood to be ‘inclusive intergovernmental 
organizations’ (Barkin 2006: 1-2). 
Thus, there are different classifications of IOs. This thesis uses the standard 
classification of IOs being organisations such as the United Nation’s system, the World 
Bank, the IMF, and WTO which are separate them from NGOs, TNCs and regional 
organisations. The particular focus is what Barkin (2013) calls inclusive IOs but as is 
discussed in detail later in this chapter, these organisations do differ in terms of 
Archer’s (2001) distinctions around aims and activities and structures. 
There have also been many vigorous discussions of the roles and functions of IOs, they 
have often been defined based on the focus of researchers. For example, in focusing on 
‘the politics, power and pathologies of international organization’, Michael Barnett and 
Martha Finnemore (1999: 699) followed the theories that explain ‘IO creation as a 
response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, and other barriers to 
Pareto efficiency and welfare improvement for their members’. Yet, they continued, that 
‘many IOs stray from the efficiency goals these theories impute and that many IOs 
exercise power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated by states at their 
creation’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). This argument of IOs autonomous power 




arguments provide the logic for why the thesis seeks to investigate the relationship 
between state autonomy and IOs’ influences through a focus on their impact on the 
developmental mindset.  
In this respect, Archer’s (2001) analysis of the international role and functions of IOs is 
important. First, on the roles of IOs, he suggests that IOs have taken their place in the 
‘global market place’ and they play a role ‘jostling in transactions with other groups, 
with political leaders and states’ representatives’. The result is that questions are raised 
about whether they are ‘mere instruments of the other players, being used as tools to 
gain advantages or as means of communication between interlocutors? Or are they part 
of the scenery itself, plinths for speeches, forums for meetings, common grounds for 
gatherings?’ (Archer 2001: 65). Archer then identified three major roles for IOs: they 
can be instruments, arenas and actors. In term of instrument, Archer (2001: 68) see IOs’ 
role as ‘that of an instrument being used by its members for particular ends’. On arena, 
he notes that IOs are ‘arenas or forums within which actions take place’ (Archer 
2001:69). As actors, Archer emphasises that the independence of IOs (Archer 2001:79). 
Overall, he concludes that: 
It can be seen that international organizations can indeed play the role of 
instruments by those who bargain in this place – as servants carrying messages; 
changing money to order; or acting as bodyguards. They can also be likened to 
that part of the marketplace where the occupants meet to discuss trade and settle 
disputes – the forum. Finally, they may also be given the likeness of a 
participant in the marketplace, perhaps as powerful and as able to mould events 
as some of the other traders and customers. All these demonstrate possible roles 
of international organizations in international relations (Archer 2001: 92). 
 In terms of the functions of IOs, Archer divided the main functions of IOs into:  
1. instruments of articulation and aggregation in international affairs;  
2. instruments, forums and actors in the normative activities of the international 
political system (norms);  
3. …the recruitment of participants in the international political system;  
4. a central formal rule-making equivalent to institution such as a government or a 




5. Rule application - In domestic political system, rule application is undertaken 
mostly by government agencies and, in extremis, by the police, militia or armed 
forces. In the international political system, rule application is left mainly to 
sovereign states, as there is no central world authority with agents to undertake 
the task.  
6. Under certain circumstances, IOs take on aspects of applying generally accepted 
rules or rule adjudication. The process of rule adjudication at the international 
level lacks the extensive institutions and compulsory nature of that at nation-
state level. However, IOs have a more important function is played by certain 
institutions whose task it is to adjudicate between the competing claims of states 
such as International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) in the interwar period and the Permanent Court of Arbitration  
(Archer 2001: 94-107).  
These functions of IOs, as Archer (2001: 94) explains, respond to ‘their various roles as 
instruments, forums and actors’ in the international political system. It is difficult to find 
a complete consensus about the role and function of IOs in the theory of international 
organisation. Thus while definitions of the roles and functions often depend on the 
research approach taken to IOs, it  is clear is that IOs are increasingly their influence 
and, together with national states, responding to global problems, contributing to the 
common prosperity and development of humanity. 
 
International organisations as independent actors in global governance 
In theories of global governance, there have been fundamental questions of why states 
chase their interests via IOs and why do states often use IOs as vehicles of cooperation? 
Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal (2005) provide a persuasive answer. They identify 
'two functional characteristics that lead states, in appropriate circumstance, to prefer IOs 
to alternate forms of institutionalization. These are centralisation and independence’ 
(Abbott and Snidal 2005: 26). The centralisation of IOs is presented as collective 
activities through ‘a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive 
administrative apparatus’ such as support for state interactions, managing substantive 
operations, and norm elaboration and coordination (Abbott and Snidal 2005: 26). This 




organisation’s capacity to impact states (Abbott and Snidal 2005: 26). This is important 
for my study as it indicates why IOs are influential and need to be studied in relation to 
development mindsets.  
Regarding the characteristic of independence, Abbott and Snidal (2005) provide an in-
depth analysis of the functional operations of IOs (support for direct state interaction, 
managing substantive operations) and conclude that ‘the participation of an IO as an 
independent, neutral actor can transform relations among states, enhancing the 
efficiency and legitimacy of collective and individual actions’. They note that: 
‘Powerful states will not enter an organization they cannot influence...’ (Abbott and 
Snidal 2005: 39). Continuing this genre, research about the role of IOs in global 
community by Akira Iriye emphasises the importance of interdependence in solving 
‘many issues by sharing ‘resources and effecting transnational cooperation, rather than 
through individual countries’ unilateral efforts’ (Iriye 2002: 9). This focus shows the 
influence of IOs on the mindset of nation state and the perceptions of it by key actors, 
which are key research foci for this thesis. 
Samuel Barkin (2013) acknowledges that IOs do not have the essential traditional 
power of military force, but some IOs nevertheless have power by their policies, 
programs and juridical bodies. They can implement judicial activities despite the lack of 
the independent enforcement forces (military force). It is not because of their 
independent power, ‘but because they are backed by the power of states’ (Barkin 2006: 
23). Specifically, according to Barkin (2013), two primary sources of independent 
power for IOs are moral authority and information. Moral authority is defined as the 
source of IO’s capacity ‘to legitimately speak as the official international voice with 
respect to its issue-area in order to get both people and states to pay attention to it, even 
when it does not have material resources’ (Barkin 2006: 23-24). The second source of 
independent IO power is explained as ‘control over, and ability to create, information’ 
and here Barkin highlights that IOs can exercise this ‘through the agency of what some 
scholars call “epistemic communities”’ (Barkin 2006: 24).
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 These indicators 
demonstrate a clear developmental mindset of IOs. 
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 An epistemic community can be defined as ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 




In the constructivist approach to the power of IOs, Barnett and Finnemore show that IOs 
have power independent from states. Starting from Weberian bureaucracy and 
sociological institutionalist approaches to organisational behaviour, these authors 
concluded that ‘the rational-legal authority that IOs embody gives them power 
independent of the states that created them and channels that power in particular 
directions’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). The authors expounded that IOs can get 
their power, autonomy and independence from the state, ‘because of power owing from 
at least two sources: (1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody, and 
(2) control over technical expertise and information’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 
707). These features demonstrate that IOs can have their own their particular mindset, 
including on development, though it originates from the existing order and they can 
influence nation states by their operation. 
Cox’s view has some parallels with that of the constructivists but includes a material 
focus. In Cox’s view, IOs have their own ‘ideology, strategy and institutions’ that gives 
them independent and penetrates countries ‘through the process of internationalisation 
of the state’ (Cox 1986: 234). In parallel with the expansion of international production 
and the prerequisite demands of a world economy, the independence of IOs put them in 
a prime position to help in reconciling ‘domestic social pressures’ (Cox 1986: 230). In 
other words, Cox’s view of IOs emphasises not so much their independence as their 
ideological power stemming from their emergence from a particular world order. 
Although different approaches to IOs exist with regard to their approach to social 
communication (global communication), economic relations (trading and financing), global 
politics (political power and political actor), etc., the independent characteristic of IOs in 
global governance is widely accepted. For this thesis, this is not as ‘neutral actor’ in the 
international political economy but rather, because of their rational-legal, ideological and 
institutional authority, IOs have independent power in global politics, in spite of being 
created by states. Demonstrating the independence of IOs is important for this thesis as it 
shows the can influence the developmental mindset and strategy of national state. 
 
International organisations and their relationship with developing states 
Following from debate on IOs independence, it is not surprising that discussion about 




IOs are effective instruments to help improve nation-state capacity, while others claim 
IOs are a cause of declining state autonomy. In analysing the impacts of IOs on nation 
state, I focus on reviewing the work of two prominent scholars, Joseph E. Stiglitz and 
Walden Bello, as they focus on IOs in developing countries. Their general ideas are 
outlined here and are specifically in relation to the role of the IMF. Their analysis on the 
WTO and World Bank in developing countries is analysed in the discussions of these 
specific organisations later in this chapter.  
Stiglitz is well known as one of the institutionalist, a recipient of the Nobel Prize in 
Economic Sciences, a former chief economist of the World Bank, and an author of 
numerous publications in the fields of trade, development, equality and international 
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. Stiglitz’s (2002) Globalization and its 
Discontents argues from the first page to the end page that globalisation has brought 
much good by ‘openning up to international trade’, ‘providing free access to 
knowledge’ and from the ‘benefits of foreign aid’(Stiglitz 2002: 4-5). He notes that if 
developing countries want to grow and to fight poverty effectively they must accept the 
globalisation. However, Stiglitz also finds that for too many in the developing world, 
‘globalization has not brought the promised economic benefits’ (Stiglitz 2002: 5). 
Specifically, on the dark side of globalisation, he notes: 
A growing divide between the haves and the have-nots has left increasing numbers 
in the Third World in dire poverty, living on less than a dollar a day. Despite 
repeated promises of poverty reduction made over the last decade of the twentieth 
century, the actual number of people living in poverty has actually increased by 
almost 100 million. This occurred at the same time that total world income actually 
increased by an average of 2.5 per cent annually (Stiglitz 2002: 5). 
According to Stiglitz, ‘market fundamentalism’ was the main causes of these tragic 
consequences and this was often simply imposed on developing countries through IOs, 
particularly those with financial clout such as the IMF and World Bank. He criticised 
the rigidity of the so-called Washington Consensus- the set of economic policies 
developed in Washington by the World Bank, the IMF and the US Treasury in the early 
1980s that were to be applied to developing countries needing assistance. Stiglitz (2002) 
provides a brief analysis of fundamental issues such as: privatisation, liberalisation, the 




down economics. Stiglitz also  argued that the policies of the IMF, WTO (and the 
Washington Consensus in general) lacked sophistication, and were overly simple and 
superficial (Stiglitz 2002: 54-80). An organisation has received particular criticism from 
Stiglitz has been the IMF - as one critic wrote, the book title could have been ‘My 
Discontent with the IMF’(Perales 2004: 418).  
Stiglitz argues that as a result of IMF intervention: 
The result for many people has been poverty and for many countries social and 
political chaos. The IMF has made mistakes in all the areas it has been involved 
in: development, crisis management, and in countries making the transition from 
communism to capitalism. Structural adjustment programs did not bring 
sustained growth even to those, like Bolivia, that adhered to its strictures; in 
many countries, excessive austerity stifled growth; successful economic 
programs require extreme care in sequencing - the order in which reforms occur 
- and pacing… In many countries, mistakes in sequencing and pacing led to 
rising unemployment and increased poverty… The collapse in Argentina in 
2001 is one of the most recent of a series of failures over the past few years 
(Stiglitz 2002: 18). 
Stiglitz’s indictment of the IMF focuses on three main points; first, the IMF officials 
have a haughty arrogant style borne of almost neo-colonial attitudes; for example, they 
do not set up permanent representation in recipient countries and frequently make 
ultimatums to countries in trouble. Secondly, the reports and proposals of the IMF are 
often based on the solely on neoliberal economic theory regardless of its shortcomings 
or limitations. Thirdly, the purposes of IMF assistance are often not appropriate for 
local circumstances; in particular, Stiglitz argues,  the Washington Consensus policies 
were designed specifically for Latin America yet they have been applied in all 
developing countries seeking assistance. Stiglitz claimed that the IMF’s Structural 
Adjustment Policy (SAP) has caused widespread poverty because of its policies; free 
trade brings benefits to only rich countries and privatisation has caused disasters in 
many countries. Under the pen of Stiglitz, the IMF is portrayed as a clumsy 
organisation, but one which undertakes strict programs in member states under its 




The IMF has insisted on the policy of austerity (balancing budgets, increasing interest 
rates, and the like). Believing in the unique perfection of the ‘market’, it has held on to 
this model like a fanatic. And yet, ‘the IMF had spread the disease rather than contained 
it’ (Stiglitz 2002: 200). 
Stiglitz provides an in-depth analysis of the Asia financial crisis of 1997-98, the case of 
Russia and China, and other areas. According to Stiglitz, the case of East Asia countries 
is quite easy to understand; first, the countries in the region had grown tremendously in 
the two decades prior to the crisis, mainly thanks to the wise guidance of the state and 
contrary to IMF policy and therefore, until 1997, the IMF pretended they did not see 
this. Second, the cause of Asian Financial Crisis was ‘excessively rapid financial and 
capital market liberalisation’; third, the ‘bailout package’ of the IMF made the crisis 
more serious rather than combatting it; and fourth, the countries that did not follow the 
dictates of the IMF recovered sooner than the followers (Stiglitz 2002: 89). Stiglitz’s 
arguments about the IMF and the WTO provide a key view of the potential direction of 
their influences on a mindset about economic development strategy in Vietnam. 
The second prominent scholar, in this review, is Walden Bello, who is a leading critic of 
the current model of economic globalisation, combining the roles of intellectual and 
activist. Bello is interested in wide range of topics around ‘deglobalization’, but here, I 
focus on reviewing Bello’s views of the IMF, his work on the WTO and World Bank is 
included in subsequent sections. 
Bello highlights three main criticisms of IMF using the Asian Financial Crisis as a case 
study. The first two criticisms are similar to Stiglitz with the IMF’s promotion of capital 
account liberalisation the Fund’s problematic bailout package though here he highlights 
the guarantee for the international private banks that the borrowing countries had to pay 
pack. Bello argued that supporting investors and banks from market failure in IMF 
rescue programs encouraged a ‘moral hazard’ which was likely to lead to ‘continued 
irresponsible lending in the future’ (Bello, Cunningham et al. 1999: 121). His third 
critic of the Fund focused on ‘its principal and strongest stockholder, the United States 
and the way it pushes ‘trade and investment reforms that would benefit principally US 
economic interests’ (Bello, Cunningham et al. 1999: 121).  
Bello investigated the three pillars - the WTO, IMF, and World Bank – of the so-called 




system represented the interests of Western corporations. These institutions, in the point of 
view of Bello, controlled globalisation and spread the political hegemony of the developed 
states, the US in particular. He designed a proposal for reform of global governance and 
provided an ‘alternative system - so-called deglobalization’ (Bello 2004: 115).
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Thus, summarising this literature on IOs, the main points can be unified as follows: an 
organisation can be defined an IO when it was created by an official agreement between 
nation states,  with its own agreed sets of rules and its own secretariat and headquarters 
arrangements spread across its member countries. This thesis uses this standard 
classification of IOs to separate them from international NGOs, TNCs and regional 
organisations. As per Archer, they are best understood by: the type of membership (in the 
case of the UN near universal membership of nation-states), their aims/activities and by 
structure (voting rights, elections, etc). Although IOs are created from states, they still 
have independent power in through ideology, policies and structures and exercise power 
autonomously in ways that are often ‘unintended and unanticipated’ by states upon their 
creation (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). This independent power was demonstrated 
in the analysis of Stiglitz and Bello which highlighted the IOs’ negative influences on 
developing states and their developmental strategies. Both Stiglitz and Bello argued that 
the IOs discussed here - the IMF, WTO, and World Bank in particular – have an unfair set 
of rules and operations which operate in developing countries, but which work against 
them. Indeed as these analysts demonstrate, this system often brings benefits only to rich 
countries and only represents Western corporations’ power. In so doing these IOs are 
shown to control globalisation and spread the political hegemony of the developed states. 
On the other hand, not all scholars and analysts perceive IOs as critically as Stiglitz and 
Bello see these organisation. The UN system in particular is often seen as more 
progressive, and as providing support for critical needs, while having a less dogmatic or 
ideological approach. The next section looks at the influence of and perceptions of IOs in 
Vietnam beginning with a history of their operations in the country since Vietnam joined 
the UN in 1977. Engagement with the UN or other IOs prior to then was quite limited. 
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 This would see ‘the deconcentration and decentralisation of institutional power and the creation of a 
pluralistic system of institutions and organizations’ (Bello 2004: 115). This new system would be 
dedicated to create and protect the authority of nations and communities in trade and economic decision-
making. It would be ‘more fluid, less structured, more pluralistic world, with multiple checks and 
balances’ and create opportunities to develop for the ‘nations and communities of the South – and the 




4.3. A brief introduction to International Organisations in Vietnam 
4.3.1. Vietnam and the United Nations 
Vietnam was admitted to membership in the UN on 20 September 1977. Since this 
admission, the relationship between Vietnam and the UN has grown and improved. 
Right after admission, Vietnam gained the support of UN’s members for General 
Assembly Resolution 32/2 (1977) to appeal to nations and international organisations 
for assistance and reconstruction support after the war. Over time, Vietnam has taken 
increasing advantage of the capital, intellectual and technical assistance provided by the 
UN for the sake of its socio-economic development. The UN also became a forum for 
Vietnam’s exercise of its external relation policies. The role and the status of Vietnam 
in the UN have increased over time. The development of relations between Vietnam and 
the UN can be divided into two periods, 1977-1991 and post 1991 (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2013). Each period is discussed below. 
1977-1991: Under the influence of the Cold War, relations between Vietnam and the 
UN were restricted. In terms of socio-economic cooperation, despite the challenges 
caused by the embargo, Vietnam received direct non-refundable aid from the 
development system of the UN, with a total amount of US $500 million (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2007). This contributed to helping Vietnam recover from socio-
economic difficulties, war, and natural disaster, and sought to address social problems 
in health, education, maternal and children protection and family planning. They also 
helped Vietnam improve science and technology, contributing to recovering and 
constructing some production facilities and increasing development capacity. Thus, the 
UN was one of the earliest IOs present in Vietnam, with the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), in particular, playing a key role. There was a limited 
relationship between Vietnamese government and other non-communist donors in the 
period to 1993, limited to some international advisers and mainly coordinated through 
UNDP (Engel 2010: 90). 
From 1991 on: Since 1991, Vietnam has increased its active participation in many 
aspects of the UN related to security, peace, disarmament, socio-economic 
development, population and environmental protection. Vietnam’s participation in the 




external relations policies, which aim for independence, autonomy, openness and a 
readiness to be a reliable friend to other countries.
20
  
The priorities in the relations between Vietnam and the UN over the 2000s and into the 
2010s were reaching the three targets stated in the UN Development Assistance 
Framework (UNDAF). These are: developing economic policies to support growth in an 
equal, integrated and sustainable manner; improving the quality of social services and 
social security and the equality in accessing these services; and policies, law and 
national governance mechanism to effectively support right-based development in order 
to implement the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
In Vietnam itself, UN bodies operate many assistance projects and programs. The 
UNDP agencies are present in a wide range of assistance areas including poverty 
reduction, democratic governance, environment, climate change and disasters, and 
women’s empowerment. Regarding the national government, their program has focused 
on interventions to support the ‘public service system, law-making and law-enforcement 
institutions as well as civil society development, anti-corruption and human rights’(UN 
in Vietnam 2013). Their projects have been built on three main pillars: parliamentary 
development; the rule of law and access to justice; and public administration reform.  
UNDP projects use ‘in-house governance policy advisors’, in other words technical 
advisers. They argue strongly that ‘the clear identification of UNDP as a provider of 
policy advice is particularly important in a middle-income country context, with 
traditional large-scale capacity development projects to become less relevant and 
affordable’ (UNDP in Viet Nam 2013/2014). Just looking at the incomplete list of 
projects (see Table 4.1) funded and implemented by UNDP in Vietnam. This 
indicates its role and influence as a professional policy advisor for Vietnamese 
administrative system. 
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 Vietnam was Vice President of the UN General Assembly in 1997, 2000 and 2003, a member of the 
Economic and Social Council (1997-2000), and Vice President of the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation. It was a member of the Human Right Committee (2001-2003), the Executive Council the 
Development Program of UNFPA (2000-2002) and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (1991-1993, 1997-1999 and 2003-2005). Notably, in the 62
nd
 session of the United 
Nations General Assembly, Vietnam was elected as a non-standing member of the United Nations 
Security Council for the period of 2008-2009 with a high rate of votes (183/190 eligible votes). The UN 
involves Vietnam in frequent high-ranking leader meetings Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). 
"International Organisation/Các tổ chức quốc tế."   Retrieved 14 August, 2013, from 
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/ctc_quocte/.. Vietnam is still actively involved in the Nonaligned Movement 




Table 4.1 Selected UNDP projects in the area of democratic governance  





Strengthening the impact of 
Public Administration Reform 
in Vietnam in Da Nang city 
Nov 2012 2012-2016 Da Nang USD 1,320,000 
Strengthening the impact of 
Public Administration Reform 
in Bac Giang province 






Strengthening the Capacity of 
Vietnamese Government’s 
Agencies in Accelerating and 
Improving PAR Efficiency and 
Effectiveness 
April 2009 April 
2009- 
April 2012 
Ha Noi US$ 3.800.000 
Strengthening the capacities for 
budgetary decision and 
oversight of people’s elected 
bodies in Viet Nam 






Legal Empowerment through 







Viet Nam 2012: USD 
206,471 
USD  2013: 
513,792 
Source: (UNDP in Viet Nam 2013/2014) 
This list of projects does still very much suggest an agenda based on Western 
democracy and rule of law. For example, in the area of judicial reform, UNDP work 
supported ‘the independence of the judicial adjudication’ and they argued that this 
process has been ‘slow and lags behind’ other changes (UNDP in Viet Nam 2010) 




political system and, to some extent, challenge state autonomy. On the issue of civil 
society for example, Vietnamese leaders still find this ‘a sensitive issue’ (Waibel, Ehlert 
et al. 2013: 175; Tran 2015). They are concerned that many people and organisations 
may take advantage of nominated activities to work against the state and threat the 
survival of regime (Noichinh 2015). Overall, much of the UNDP’s work in Vietnam can 
been seen as promoting a Western approach to rule of law, which can close the space 
for developmental state thinking.  
In the area of human rights, the UNDP promoted ‘the Government’s follow-up on the 
Universal Periodic Review
21
 with high-level policy dialogues between State and non-
State actors on it’ (UNDP in Viet Nam 2010). The Universal Periodic Review always 
creates stress in Vietnam. There has been a debate between issues of human rights as 
opposed to political and cultural values in the context of Vietnam’s one party rule 
(Davis 1998; Koh 2001). These authors demonstrate that the approach to human rights 
by the UN follow the Western standard requirement of liberal democracy, rather than 
acknowledging broader cultural and historical values. Thus, this may be unsuited to the 
particular political culture of Vietnam which includes ‘authoritarianism, cooperation, 
harmony, and order as the predominant values’ (Davis 1998: 109).  
In the area of public administrative reform, the UNDP has focused on improving the 
quality of services by introducing ‘e-services at local one-stop shops and human 
resource reforms to improve the leadership style, quality and ethical behavior of public 
servants’ (UNDP in Viet Nam 2010). In the area of law-making process, it has mainly 
consulted with the National Assembly including on the topic of constitutional 
amendment.  It also ‘provides expertise on  the ongoing revision of key laws pertaining 
to the institutional functioning and set up of the National Assembly’ (UNDP in Viet 
Nam 2010). These activities showed the in-depth intervention of the UNDP Vietnam in 
the administrative and political system of Vietnam, an intervention that is seemingly 
more suited to a market or neoliberal developmental path than to a developmental state 
one. Nevertheless, most developing states find engagement with the UN less 
ideologically driven than with the World Bank, which accounts in part for their 
happiness to engage with them.  
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4.3.2. International Organisations in Vietnam: the case of the WTO 
Background on the WTO 
The WTO is a key IO, which has strong enforcement capacity particularly during the 
accession process. Further, as the literature review that follows demonstrates, since its 
inception the WTO has been a key proponent of a neoclassical or neoliberal 
development strategy. Evidence of its influence in Vietnam would suggest that this 
developmental approach has dominated the developmental strategy of the country. 
Thus, the central focus of this section is examining the influence of this organisation on 
its member states in general, and in the case of Vietnam in particular.  
Stiglitz has written extensively about the WTO in Fair Trade for All; how Trade can 
Promote Development (2005) and in Making Globalization Work (2006). Stiglitz refutes 
two opposing attitudes about the WTO in these works. On the one hand, he notes the 
attitude of neoclassical orthodoxy, which posits that trade is based on comparative 
advantage, so that every country will benefit, a so-called win-win analysis. On the other 
hand, he aims to refute the critics who wish to argue for ‘a world without the WTO’ 
(Irwin 1999: 352). By accepting a hypothesis that there is a positive relationship 
between ‘free trade and economic growth’ in certain conditions, Stiglitz stressed that 
globalisation is an opportunity for the least developed countries, if it is administered 
within a framework of international democratic institutions. This is a soft version of 
developmental state logic. Based on the consideration that ‘the way decisions get made 
- governance - in the international arena suffers from two flaws: the voices of 
developing countries are heard too little, and the voices of special interests are heard too 
loudly’, Stiglitz (2006: 128) wants to reform the WTO to become a fair organisation. 
Nevertheless, we see here that the developmental flaws of the institution are expressed 
even by a supporter such as Stiglitz. 
In answering its critics, the WTO has  responded that multilateral negotiations in the 
WTO are very democratic, because decision-making does not follow majority rule, 
but rather is based on the principle of consensus (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005: 35). 
Instead of a minority obeying the majority, each country must be persuaded to agree 
- if necessary countries that do not agree need to receive certain benefits in exchange 




decision, do not have any objection and that every country will benefit. However, 
Stiglitz and Charlton have also highlighted the seemingly two-faced attitude of the 
developed countries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
was the predecessor to the WTO): 
Over several rounds of agreements, the world trading system was tailored to the 
interests of the developed countries, who had, participated intensively in the 
negotiations. Protection was progressively reduced on the goods of export 
interest to developed countries, but remained on goods exported intensively by 
developing countries. It was no surprise that the GATT came to cover trade in 
all goods except agriculture and textiles — both of interest to developing 
countries — which were the subject of separate agreements whose provisions 
were far less liberal than those of the GATT (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005: 44).  
On the other hand, such discrimination has been reduced in parallel with the increasing 
roles of developing countries in recent decades. Stiglitz and Charlton optimistically 
view these improvements, but they also pointed out that, in practice, the WTO system 
has still not been successful in reducing unfair trade activities between developed and 
small developing countries, and that developed countries still impose higher tariffs on 
the developing countries than on fellow rich states (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005: 77). 
In terms of reform, Stiglitz and Charlton emphasised the importance of the WTO’s 
principles in trade policies, especially the so-called ‘special and differential treatment’ 
(SDT) provisions, ‘which give developing countries special rights and allow developed 
countries to treat developing countries more favourably than other WTO members’ 
(Stiglitz and Charlton 2005: 88). Despite the 2001 Doha Declaration promising a 
strengthened, effective and operational SDT, the opposite occurred and SDT effectively 
disappeared from Doha (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005: 91). With Doha now effectively 
abandoned, Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) are correct in their view that the WTO rules 
and game were established for developed countries, while developing countries had 
only ‘a weak voice in the negotiations and little power with which to assert their 
interests’ (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005: 93).  
Walden Bello offers a different analysis of the history of the WTO.  Bello argued 
that ‘GATT was, in fact, functioning reasonably well as a framework for liberalising 




1995, he says: ‘it was not global necessity... It was the United States’ assessment’ 
that the interests of its corporations in GATT were no longer served and it then 
wanted ‘an all-powerful and wide-ranging WTO’ (Bello 2004: 54). Bello analysed 
the rules and regulations of WTO and concluded that ‘the WTO was regarded even 
by many Europeans and Japanese as a blueprint for the global hegemony of 
corporate America. It sought to institutionalise the accumulated advantages of US 
corporations’ (Bello 2004: 54). 
Bello et al. carefully investigated three areas: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPs], the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures [TRIMs], and trade in services. For TRIPs, they argued that the developed 
countries own advanced technology, and that they have restricted its diffusion to the 
Third World ‘by strengthening the international regime governing patents, trademarks, 
and royalties favouring Northern multinational corporations’ (Bello, Cunningham et al. 
1999: 82). In the area of TRIMs, they argued that developed countries have exaggerated 
the contribution of foreign investment to national development. On the one hand, these 
regulations specified ‘a maximum percentage of foreign equity ownership’, while 
mandating ‘minimum levels of local material to be used in a product’. On the other 
hand, the agreement did not mention ‘the trade-distorting activities of multinational 
investors, such as transfer pricing, or artificially depressing export prices to subsidiaries, 
and tying purchases to selected external suppliers’ (Bello, Cunningham et al. 1999: 83-
84). For the service sector, they criticised the principle of ‘national treatment’ because it 
aims to give ‘foreign investors the same treatment accorded to domestic providers of 
services’. For all the above reasons, Bello et al. considered ‘GATT as a weapon’ (Bello, 
Cunningham et al. 1999: 82). The WTO system they portrayed as a ‘monolithic system’ 
devised by its centralised institutions and which presented mostly the ‘interests of 
corporations – US corporations’ (Bello 2004: 115).  
Thus, the key lesson from these authors about the WTO has been that this IO limits the 
space for their development, and that developing countries need to struggle for a fair 
system in which their interests and voices are heard and respected. If we see the WTO 
as a playground, where the rules of play were already set up by developed countries, the 
developing countries are clearly disadvantaged. This explains why many analysts have 




Vietnam. However, equally not joining the organisation would so severely limit the 
trade options for a country, that it is a necessity. The question is as much how much 
joining the WTO has impacted the developmental mindset in Vietnam. This is a 
question that can only be partly answered in this thesis because the WTO is not the sole 
focus, although, some areas for research are identified. 
 
Vietnam and the WTO 
Accession to the WTO in 2007 was a significant event for Vietnam. It marked the 
further integration of the country into the global economy. In the section on the social-
economic improvements after Doi Moi in Chapter 2 of the thesis, I briefly introduced 
the process around Vietnam’s membership of the WTO. Here, I focus on reviewing 
Vietnam’s status after joining in the WTO, given the perceptions that it may weaken the 
country and the possible impacts WTO membership could have had on the country’s 
developmental mindset. 
In the negotiations for admission, Vietnam was aware of many of the challenges and 
benefits of becoming a WTO member. One of the biggest challenges was that 
Vietnamese enterprises were forced into international competition, especially through 
the lowering of tariffs and the removal of those allowances which were not WTO 
compliant. Those supporting WTO integration argued that such changes would generate 
a boost in Vietnam’s adjustment of the domestic law system resulting in a more 
complete system, and one which was in line with general international rules. They also 
argued it would create a fair and advantageous business environment for all the 
economic sectors in the country, state and non-state.  
Meanwhile, some sections of the Vietnamese business community, state governance 
officers and other civilians were nervous, concerned and even suspicious as to whether 
the country’s economic capacity could effectively deal with the great changes in the 
business environment.  In particular, they questioned the reactive capacity to the multi-
faceted challenges of international economic integration. Further, many foreign partners 
did not have real confidence in Vietnam’s capacity and determination to fulfil 
completely and seriously the integration commitments, which were new to Vietnam 




It is notable that during the period of negotiation for entry into the WTO, Walden 
Bello, a critic of the WTO, was invited to Vietnam three times by the government to 
talk about the organisation. He warned that the WTO accession would bring 
negative consequences (Vietnamnet 2004). Bello said that the experience of 
developing countries which were WTO members highlighted the WTO’s lack of 
fairness which in turn, caused terrible disturbances in agriculture for example. 
Further, he argued that the WTO had very strict rules on intellectual property rights, 
rules that were prejudiced against poor countries and, exacerbated by the process of 
decision-making, which was dominated by rich countries like the US and European 
countries. Bello affirmed strongly that ‘if asked, I want to answer honestly by my 
personal point of view, I'm afraid, in addition to the benefits gained, you will lose a 
lot. The experience of developing countries showed that since 1995 (when the WTO 
was established on the basis of GATT) they have lost more’ (Vietnamnet 2004). 
Bello suggested that without the WTO, Vietnam still had other ways to build 
national wealth, such as consolidating and leading ASEAN based on Vietnam’s 
capacity for ‘political leadership’ (Vietnamnet 2004). 
Another reputed expert, Joseph Stiglitz was also invited to Vietnam in this period. In his 
fourth visit to the country, Stiglitz argued that the most worrisome aspects were the impact 
on financing and banking operations While also noting that WTO rules (and bilateral 
agreements) would require Vietnam to open its financial markets and banks to foreign 
companies. Stiglitz noted that when these arenas are opened quickly and without careful 
measures, there would be a high degree of risk to national financial stability. In fact, many 
countries have had to pay dearly for the liberalisation of capital markets,  as was the case in 
Brazil and Argentina (Vietnamnet 2004). Stiglitz also raised concerns about intellectual 
property rights especially in relation to pharmaceuticals. He said that these provisions 
limited access to high-technology and knowledge in developing countries. In the 
pharmaceutical sector, people in poor countries would, for example, find it difficult to get 
access to the best medicines (Vietnamnet 2004). Finally, Stiglitz raised concerns about 
increasing inequality that was an inevitable outcome of rapid trade liberalisation. He 
recommended that Vietnam prepare a social safety net to redress inequality. Stiglitz 
assessed that ‘I do not deny that Vietnam has achieved tremendous success in poverty 
reduction, but the government still needs to have an overarching policy, with particular 




The fact that these two well-known critics of the WTO were invited during the 
period in the leadup to joining the WTO, indicates that the government wanted to 
maintain a sense of caution around free market prescriptions, and also wanted to be 
ready for their impacts, which in turn signifies a social developmental mindset. 
Overcoming nervousness and worries, and after listening to advice from the experts, 
the Vietnamese government applied for accession to the WTO in January 1995. The 
WTO General Council approved Vietnam's membership agreement on 7 November 
2006 and then Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung emphasised both opportunities and 
challenges when Vietnam joined (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). The 
opportunities were seen in the process of joining the international market; improving 
Vietnam’s business environment by following WTO’s regulations; and increasing 
Vietnam’s position in making global commercial policies. The challenges were seen 
as: the increased competition; the weakness of the country’s economic potential; the 
unfinished legal system; and the limited experience in economic market 
management. The Prime Minister concluded that: 
With the great achievement after 20 years of Doi Moi, looking at the positive 
changes in competition and economic integration in several years and at the 
experiences and results from other countries joining in the WTO, all of this 
provides a strong belief that we can take the advantages from opportunities and 
pass the challenges. Some enterprises may get into difficulties, even face 
bankruptcy, but many enterprises will keep stable and develop, many new 
enterprises will join in the market and the national economy will develop by our 
targets and directions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). 
Five years after the accession to the WTO,  the Ministry of Planning and Investment 
(2013), provided an overall assessment on Vietnam’s socio-economic performance. It 
was based on preparatory reports by the Central Institute for Economic Management 
(CIEM 2013). According to this report, Vietnam had adapted well to the WTO 
accession commitments in tariffs, services liberalisation, and the trading rights (the right 
to export and right to import). The report found that: 
Except for IT and textiles products, WTO tariff commitments for other products 
have no big impact since the extent of reduction is insignificant and the roadmap 




(trading rights, distribution rights, investment) and on the services sector. These 
commitments induce the shift of investment structure and commercial activities. 
Consequences may include: (i) the upgrading process of production capacity and 
new export capacity may be restrained if domestic production costs are still 
high; and (ii) greater possibility of import expansion (Ministry of Planning and 
Investment 2013: 6-7). 
Thus, Vietnam implemented seriously the WTO commitments but via a roadmap and 
over an adjustment period, suggesting a developmental state mindset. For example, in 
the binding tariff commitments, which cover some 10,600 lines and will produce a 
smaller final rate, the period for implementing tariff reduction is from five to seven 
years. Specifically: 
The average ad valorem tariff rate of 17.5% was to be reduced to 11.4% by 
2019. For agricultural products, the tariff reductions had to be made from 22.4% 
to 20.9%, and for non-agricultural products tariff the reductions will result in 
average tariff being brought down from 13.1% to 12.6% within the 
implementation period (WTO 2013: 13). 
Vietnam also developed and completed many important legal adjustments to make the 
economic and commercial law system more in line with international practices and 
WTO regulations. Evidently, just one year after accession to the WTO, the adjustment 
and issuance of the law and ordinance were completed, although some sub-law 
documents were still being completed. Vietnam actively changed about thirty laws and 
ordinances to be in accordance with WTO regulations (Pham 2008). A report on 
Vietnam carried by the WTO (2013) confirmed that the Vietnamese state authorities had 
passed ‘368 laws and ordinances’ since the 1992 constitution. Based on these legal 
reforms, the ‘key institutions of the market economy have been established’ and it has 
contributed to ‘creating a good legal environment for business by protecting the right to 
do business and prohibiting unfair competition in conformity with the WTO rules’ 
(WTO 2013: 5). These requirements for changes demonstrate the notable effect of the 
WTO on Vietnamese legislative autonomy.  
An interview with Dr Ngo Huy Duc, Director of the Institute of Political Science, Ho 
Chi Minh National Political Academy, demonstrated that the perception of benefits 




Regarding the WTO, the most positive challenge is that the state has to 
change the way the system operates. We must remove the way of thinking of 
the centrally planned economy, consequently, policymaking has been fairer, 
not like the example, Hanam received five per cent and Hanoi received ten 
per cent [demand-supply decision in the command economy]. Under these 
impacts, the Vietnamese state has to adjust behaviours, institutionalism, and 
even regular practices.  
 
Facing the Challenges after Accession to the WTO   
Along with these positive outcomes and perceptions, the Vietnamese economy still 
faces challenges, such as a high consumer price indicator, an excess of imports over 
exports, the the lack of sustainability in the quality of growth in some industries, and 
weak capacity at various levels (Thanh Luan 2012). Certaonly, WTO access has seen 
the economy more and more sensitive to the regional and world economy. As a result, 
Vietnam has had to cope with many challenges, the biggest of which has been 
increasing pressure around competitiveness, even in the domestic market as it is opened 
to foreign enterprises. At the same time, due to linkages with the international market, 
the impacts of changes international have been quicker and stronger than before. 
Perceptions are also important is understanding the impact of WTO accession. 
Newspapers, for example reveal that many Vietnamese businesspeople have questioned 
the state’s positive narrative about the WTO adjustment. As one journalist put it, in 
‘swimming from brooks to rivers and ocean’ it is inevitable that shortcomings or 
disadvantages for Vietnamese enterprises will occur (Thanh Luan 2012). For instance, 
Dr Dinh Thi My Loan, Vice President cum General Secretary of the Association of 
Vietnamese Retailers, stated that while the retail market has developed spectacularly 
after five years, it is still weak due to its small scale, slow pace, scattered nature and to 
weakness in purchasing power (Cited in Thanh Luan 2012). This is because the market 
is mainly traditional retailers whereas the modern retail section accounts for only 20 per 
cent nationwide, so that the sector will continue to struggle to compete with 
multinational competitors. Retail enterprises are weak in many aspects, including innate 
weaknesses (such as in professionalism, long-term strategy, financial capacity and so 




disease in market development in three levels: state, industry and enterprise’ (Cited in 
Thanh Luan 2012).  
Mr. Đo Ha Nam – President of Vietnamese Pepper and a representative of INTIMEX 
Corporation has also stated that with WTO accession, one difficulty for enterprises in 
general and for exporters in particular has been high rates of interest (Cited in Thanh 
Luan 2012). Enterprises work hard but the interest rate is not appropriate. He felt that 
the state should have a policy to lower interest rates as one means to boost 
productivity.
22
 Along with other weaknesses such as management shortcomings, Mr. 
Nam was concerned that: ‘…foreign enterprises have the upper hand in the market 
while Vietnamese companies are losing this advantage’ (Cited in Thanh Luan 2012). 
Control of domestic interest rates is a key concern for developmental state approaches, 
thus the WTO has clearly weakened one major lever for the government. Along with the 
small scale of domestic enterprises and incomplete markets, WTO accession has 
exacerbated development challenges. However, equally, these challenges have also 
created strong pressure on the Vietnamese state authority to change its policies in order 
to ensure domestic enterprises can compete with the foreign one. 
In summary, it can be seen that challenges to Vietnamese developmental mindset might 
have arisen after the accession to the WTO in two ways. The first challenge was in how 
the Vietnamese government adjusted the domestic law system to be more appropriate to 
the WTO rules and provisions compared with how this would influence domestic well-
being, and state capacity to regulate business and shape socio-economic development. 
Although the government report confirmed many laws had been changed, some sub-law 
documents are still being altered, and a further issue is whether these changes are 
brought into practice in a timely fashion, especially as Vietnam has a history of 
implementing the requirements of IOs, at a minimum, and at its own pace (Engel 2010). 
Still given the strong enforcement capacity of the WTO and its commitment to rules, 
Vietnam does not have the manoeuvring room that it has found with other IOs. Over 
time, this is likely to influence the views of legislators and businesses as the new free 
trade rules are increasingly normalised. The second challenge to the developmental 
midset of Vietnam following accession to the WTO is apparent in  the state capacity to 
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manage the domestic economy.  This was reduced with WTO membership as Vietnam 
was required to move to a more market based system, with concomitantly less room for 
government engagement and more pressure from international competition. This 
competition has produced some backlash with calls for renewed support for domestic 
enterprises but again the new environment is likely to change thinking about 
development over the longer term.  
  
4.4. Conclusion 
The expansion of IOs and their influence on national development across the world is 
an undoubted reality. There have been extensive discussions of different aspects of the 
influence of IOs on national development such as trade, business, culture, or policy. 
Some analysts see IOs contribute to improving nation state capacity, others claim IOs 
are a cause of declining state autonomy thus limiting developmental state capacity. 
However, it is widely accepted that although IOs are created from states, they still have 
independent power and influence on many aspects of states. From the perspective of 
Stiglitz and Bello, the IMF, WTO, and World Bank have an unfair set of rules and 
operations. These often bring benefits to only to rich countries, represent the power of 
Western corporations, control globalisation and spread the political hegemony of the 
developed states. These outcomes have created a range of challenges to developing 
countries, in particular limiting their macroeconomic management options, in other 
words their developmental options.  
Regarding the UN system, Vietnam has taken advantage of its capital and intellectual 
and technical assistance for socio-economic development. The UN can enhance state 
capacity, as was the case with Vietnam, because it can be a forum for the exercise of its 
external relations policies. However, the UN’s work supporting ‘the independence of 
the judicial adjudication’, civil society actors and human right are ‘sensitive issues’ in 
Vietnam, and not surprisingly create tensions not just for political and cultural values 
but around the developmental outlook. A typical example of that situation is UNDP 
focus on national governance. Their projects were built on three main pillars of 
‘parliamentary development, rule of law and access to justice, and public administration 
reform’ (UN in Vietnam 2013). UNDP Vietnam is a provider of policy advice in the 




wide spectrum of policy making in Vietnam. This has created pressure on the state and 
that can be also seen as a challenge to state autonomy and vision. At the end of the day, 
the government has to consistently endeavour to implement policy reform suggested by 
the organisation, demonstrating its influence over the development trajectory. 
In terms of accession to the WTO, Vietnam was aware of the challenges and benefits of 
becoming a WTO member well before its application for membership. One of the 
biggest challenges in joining the WTO was increased international competition for 
Vietnamese enterprises. The chapter has shown that Vietnamese business community, 
state governance officers and other civilians were, and still are, nervous, concerned and 
even suspicious as to whether the country can effectively deal with the changes in the 
business environment. They question state capacity to react to the multi-faceted 
challenges of economic integration from entering the WTO, which in turn may become 
a challenge to its developmental outlook. Changes to the law represent another area of 
perceived challenge to the country.  
The above brief case studies of the UN and the WTO aimed to develop a sketch of the 
impact of international organisations on Vietnamese policy makers and their 
developmental ideas. In order to provide more in-depth investigation, the next chapter 
focuses on the World Bank in Vietnam, critically evaluating the evidence of what and 





International Organisations in Vietnam and their Influence 
on the Developmental Mindset: a case study of  
the World Bank 
 
This chapter explores first the history of the lending relationship between the World Bank 
and Vietnam. This is largely a descriptive section outlining the focus and volume of Bank 
lending. The second section of the chapter provides a more critical perspective on the 
relationship through an exploration of three main arenas of Bank activity: Country 
Assistance or Partnership Strategies; leading donor coordination; and the Bank’s 
activities in advice and consultation. The aim of this chapter is to shed light on 
perceptions of Bank lending and its impact on the Vietnamese party-state role in 
thinking about and leading the course of development. 
 
5.1. A brief history of the lending relationship between Vietnam and the World Bank 
This section provides an overview of the Bank’s lending operations in Vietnam from 
1976 through to 2011, which is the end date for this study. The aim is to highlight the 
volume and target areas of Bank lending and thus indirectly give a sense of the extent of 
the relationship between Vietnam and the Bank. This section draws predominantly on 
official documents provided by the Bank, in particular the World Bank (2012) and (2012), 
thus all material is from these documents unless cited otherwise.  
 
1976-1985: A false dawn 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) assumed Vietnam’s membership at the World 
Bank in 1976 when it was declared a state. The first delegation from the SRV visited 
Washington in October 1976 and met with then President of the Bank, Robert 
McNamara (previously US Secretary of Defence). The first economic mission of the 
Bank visited Vietnam in January-February 1977. This paved the way for an 
International Development Association (IDA) credit, which was approved in August 
1978 for the Dau Tieng Irrigation Project – $60 million for dam construction on the 




After Vietnam’s involvement in Cambodia began in December 1978, many Western 
European and Asian nations supported the US-led embargo. The World Bank also 
warned that tensions with Cambodia could affect Vietnam’s relations with it. Vietnam 
intervened in Cambodia anyway and the Bank suspended high-level missions and new 
operations in Vietnam for a decade. In addition, at that time, the country could not 
afford to pay off loans to the IMF, the World Bank and a number of bilateral creditors 
and commercial banks. Thus the IMF and other international financial institutions 
suspended the Vietnam’s borrowing rights. Moreover, US’s political intervention 





1986-1996: A new beginning 
Vietnam re-established contact with the World Bank in 1987, so thatfollowing a request 
from the Vietnamese to resume lending, the Bank sent a small economic mission to 
Vietnam in 1988 to learn about Doi Moi. In addition, the end of Vietnam’s involvement 
with Cambodia in September 1989 opened the door to new lending from the Bank.  
The first round of new lending was approved in October 1993 and was directed at 
Primary Education ($70 million) and Highway Rehabilitation ($158.5 million) (World 
Bank 2012: 15). Total lending in the Financial Year (FY) of 1994 was $325 million. 
The Bank quickly took the lead on donor coordination in Vietnam, leading the 
Consultative Group (CG) meeting. They opened a resident mission in Hanoi in May 
1994 and then created a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for FY95-97 in September 
1994. This CAS included five key elements: macroeconomic stabilisation and structural 
reforms in fiscal management, state enterprises, financial sector and trade policy. These 
were the base of the International Development Association (IDA) lending program of 
$330-420 million per year, with project lending focused on infrastructure, rural 
development and human resource development. In October 1994, the first Structural 
Adjustment Credit (SAC) was approved for $150 million.  
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1997-2002: A new partnership 
The new CAS for FY97-99 proposed an expanded lending program, specifically, 
IDA lending was to increase to $400-500 million per year based on good progress on 
macroeconomic performance, economic reforms and project implementation, and 
fair burden sharing with other donors (who were expanding their programs in 
Vietnam). In fact, project lending continued to grow rapidly exceeding the CAS 
goals, with $502 million in FY 1996 and major new credits for power development 
($180 million), rural finance ($122 million) and national health support ($101 
million) (World Bank 2012: 19). 
The Country Director for Vietnam moved to Hanoi in September 1997. This was the 
first Country Director decentralised to the field as part of the 1997 Bank reforms 
(World Bank 2012: 20). In August 1998, the CAS for FY99-02 proposed three 
lending scenarios based on progress on policy agenda; ranging from $300 million 
per annum (low case) to slightly more than $800 million per annum (high case), with 
a base case of $580 per annum. The low case lending ‘happened in two years FY99 
($308 million) and FY00 ($286 million)’ (World Bank 2000: 13). The central 
development in this period was preparation of a Comprehensive Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Strategy (CPRGS). This was Vietnam’s version of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and a Bank requirement for continued policy 
lending (Engel 2010). The process started in mid-2000, and produced an interim -
PRSP (I-PRSP) in March 2001 and a full PRSP in May 2002.  
The Bank’s poverty work in Vietnam was considered ‘best practice’ by the  Bank 
though it did not always include adequate consultation with the poor, nor a focus on 
their empowerment. Rather this was a technocratic approach to providing a 
benchmark for monitoring the impact on poverty. The Bank also claims that the 
CPRGS provided a framework for stronger donor coordination as well as the 
resumption of policy-based lending. This saw the overall CG commitments to 
Vietnam averaged around $2.5 billion per annum from 1996 to 2002 (World Bank 
2012: 22). Unlike most other low-income countries, aid to Vietnam in this period 
was still dominated by project loans (80 per cent of commitments) rather than 




into the First Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC I) (of $250 million plus $48 
million in co-financing) to support implementation of the I-PRSP.  
2003-2006: A stronger program 
In September 2002, the new CAS for FY03-06 was built on the CPRGS framework and 
it supported continuing strong poverty reduction and economic growth with the private 
sector as the engine of the growth, and remittances and FDI inflows to help finance the 
widened trade deficit. The CAS was organised around the three themes of CPRGS: ‘(1) 
supporting the transition to a market-oriented economy; (2) enhancing equitable, 
socially inclusive and sustainable development; and (3) promoting good 
governance’(World Bank 2012: 23). The lending program was similar to previous CAS, 
with an annual average of $290 million in low case, $580 million in base case and $760 
million in high case. In reality new project lending reached $593 million in FY02, but 
this was achieved, in part, by running down the project pipeline (World Bank 2012: 26). 
New lending was also delayed by the impact of SARS (which delayed preparation of 
two road projects). Therefore, project lending fell sharply to a record low ($193 million) 
in FY03. However, project lending expanded from a low of $193 million in FY03 to an 
average of $590 million per annum over the next four years. Together with the PRSCs, 
this put total lending around $700 million per annum (World Bank 2004).  
 
2007-2010: Instability and transition 
The CPRGS changed its name to the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for 2007-2011 but 
it was still organised around the same four pillars (Business Development; Strengthen Social 
Inclusion; More sustainable management of natural resources and reduced environmental 
degradation; Strengthened governance systems). A common theme, over the period, was the 
need to complete remaining structural reforms while moving ahead with a set of supposedly 
ambitious second-generation reforms. The CPS also envisaged an opportunity to blend IDA 
and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
24
 resources as 
Vietnam approached middle-income status towards the end of the plan period. 
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For Vietnam, rapid economic growth, sustained over two decades, supported a 
remarkable record of rising incomes and falling poverty, but the Bank argued that 
economic progress was threatened by macroeconomic instability in 2007 and 2008. 
Initial problems were compounded by a series of external shocks, including the 
surge in world commodity prices in 2007-2008 and the impact of the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) on export orders in late 2008 and early 2009. As a result, 
GDP growth fell to 6.3 per cent, inflation rose to 20 per cent in 2008, external 
reserves fell and the budget deficit rose sharply (World Bank 2012: 32). Year later, 
Vietnam is still coping with many fundamental development challenges, these 
shocks were significant for the country. 
The Bank was also going through a transition and there were three Country Directors 
appointed between 2007 and 2009. These frequent management changes and gaps 
affected the leadership at a time when Vietnam was facing major economic challenges 
and the Bank was transitioning towards IBRD support. The Bank claims that policy 
dialogue and policy-based lending continued to be strong, but there was less attention to 
the details of project work and donor coordination. 
For these reasons, most of activities in this period were based on two main reports - the 
CPS Progress Reports and the Vietnam Development Reports (VDR). The CPS 
Progress Report (World Bank 2007) confirmed Vietnam’s transition to IBRD/IDA 
blend status. The Bank declared Vietnam IBRD-eligible in October 2007 and the first 
operations were planned for FY 2010. To ensure a phase-in of IBRD lending, it was 
decided that Vietnam’s shift to blend status would not affect its IDA allocations through 
to FY 2011. The World Bank supplemented the annual PRSC series with a $500 million 
Public Investment Reform Development Policy Loan in November 2009. This was the 
first IBRD operation for Vietnam and supported actions to strengthen the public 
investment project cycle (project selection, implementation, financial management and 
oversight). The Vietnam Development Reports, VDR 2010 on “Modern Institutions” 
and VDR 2011 on “Natural Resources Management” contributed to analysing numerous 
emerging issues in Vietnam such as the challenges of devolution and accountability, and 
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the implications for government reform, and the increase pollution and the extraction of 
natural resources. 
 
2011: Looking forward 
While Vietnam avoided a full-blown economic crisis, the Bank not surprisingly saw 
continued progress on macroeconomic reform as a prerequisite for sustainable growth. 
Vietnam’s new Socioeconomic Development Strategy (SEDS) for 2011-2020 lays out 
the country’s medium-term objectives and priorities, to which the Bank responded that 
this strategy provided a good starting point for the next Country Partnership Strategy 
(FY12-16). Interestingly, the Bank says its role in providing access to knowledge on 
development is consistently raised by Vietnamese officials as its most important 
contribution (World Bank 2012: 37). They argue that with the middle-income status 
access to IBRD resources has to be managed carefully. In July 2014, the World Bank 
President Kim Yong Jim, on his visit to Vietnam affirmed that ‘the Bank has decided to 
continue funding commitments to Vietnam of nearly $4 billion in IDA 17 period [2014-
2017]. We committed to mobilize maximum resources possible to support Vietnam, Kim 
said’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). Thereby, ‘continuously for 9 year period from 
2008 to 2017, Vietnam is one of two countries receiving the biggest IDA loans in the 
world, the Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung emphasised’ (Nguyen 2014). 
Looking back at the history of the Bank’s operation in Vietnam, this review 
demonstrates that Vietnam quickly became a very significant lender for the Bank, 
which has a very high level and detailed engagement with the country. The World 
Bank is one of the IOs with the most presence and engagement with the country and 
thus its influence on the state’s development mindset and strategy has been 
potentially significant. Notably, the Bank has been engaged with the GoV in 
addressing issues from both theory and practice in the transition from centrally 
planned economy to a market economy. It has worked in areas such as privatisation, 
state sector reform, democratic governance enhancement, financial sector and trade 
policy,  all of which are vital to the state’s developmental trajectory. Through the 
expansion and depth of these programs, the Bank has influenced Vietnam’s 




some significant programs of the Bank in Vietnam and analyse the impact of these 
programmes on the Vietnamese development programs and the perceptions of policy 
makers and academics about the Bank’s developmental approach.  
 
5.2. The World Bank’s influence on Vietnam’s transition 
As illustrated in the above section, the Bank has been running a range of programmes 
and increasing its interventional activities in Vietnam. The impact of the World Bank on 
Vietnam’s development can be seen in various fields and at different levels such as 
economic structural reform, poverty reduction, enhancing competitive capacity and 
environmental investment. Thus, it is necessary to generalise the main areas of the 
Bank’s activities in order to have a comprehensive consideration of its influences. 
Therefore, this section will measure the impacts on Vietnamese developmental state 
mindset and policy by examining three main arenas of Bank activity: Country 
Assistance or Partnership Strategies; leading donor coordination; and the Bank’s 
activities in advice and consultation.  
 
The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)/ Country Partnership Strategy (CPS)  
The CAS is considered as the central pillar and tool of the Bank’s operations and 
through these strategies, we can find out its vision for development, which the Bank 
says is focused on poverty reduction (World Bank 2011).
25
 The key instrument 
supporting the CAS is Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) from the IDA. 
The CAS changes to a CPS for middle-income countries and is accompanied by 
loans from the IBRD. 
Looking back the various CASs/CPSs in Vietnam, it can be seen clearly that the amount 
of IDA lending increased over the years. The first CAS 1995-1997 said IDA lending 
would range from $330 to $420 million per year, in fact the outcome was $415 million 
(World Bank 2001: 6). The proposed lending in FY 96-98 was $1,000 to $1,260 million 
whereas actual lending was 1,247 million (World Bank 2001: 6). The CAS 1999-2002 
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approved $308m in FY 1999, $286m in 2000 and $629 million in 2001 (World Bank 
2001: 17). The CAS 2003-2006 approved IDA loan of $700 million per year and the CPS 
2007-2011 approved annual IBRD loans of around $900 million (World Bank 2012). 
According to the CPS progress report 2009, the IDA allocated ‘$900 million for FY08 
(the last year of IDA 14)’, and during FY07-FY09 ‘IDA commitments totalled more than 
US$3 billion, 11 percent higher than envisioned in the CPS’ (World Bank 2009: 1, 5). 
The 1995-1997 CAS, through a structural adjustment credit (credit No. 2657-VN 1994), 
five specific objectives were pursued: 
(1) to work closely with the IMF to strengthen the institutions of 
macroeconomic management; (2) to support the transition to a market economy 
and the expansion of the private sector through development of key policies and 
institutions; (3) to take the lead among donors in assisting the Government to 
plan and finance infrastructure development; (4) to help the Government to 
develop and implement a strategy for alleviation of poverty; and (5) to help the 
Government to develop and implement a strategy for sustainable use of natural 
resources (World Bank 1995: 13). 
Regarding the objective of supporting the ‘transition to a market economy and the 
expansion of the private sector’, the Bank pressured and challenged the Vietnamese on 
the process of transition to the market economy, in particular pushing for a faster pace 
for reform. The transition to a market economy and the expansion of the private sector 
involved shifts at the policy level. However, Doi Moi did not radically shift the 
government’s stance on deregulation and privatisation. The 1992 Constitution alluded to 
a policy that ‘promotes a multi-component commodity economy, functioning in 
accordance with market mechanism under the management of the state’ (Article 15). It 
was not until Resolution 51/QH10 by the National Assembly (2001) that policies 
promoting a market economy, though still following a socialist orientation, were 
embraced. Note that ‘under the management of the state’ and ‘following a socialist 
orientation’ give slightly different connotations of the way ‘market economy’ should be 
perceived and understood. A market economy with socialist orientation means that the 
state-owned economic sector still plays a significant role in the national economy, 
which is opposite to the Bank’s expectations of promoting privatisation and 
equitisation. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Bank has regularly pushed for faster 




There has been successful privatisation of a few firms on a pilot basis. The 
Government is preparing to open a stock market within one to two years, which 
would facilitate privatisation through the sale of shares. While the State Enterprise 
Law creates a framework, progress toward reform of strategic and divestiture of 
non-strategic firms has been slow. This is an important area in which the Bank is 
recommending more rapid reform (World Bank 1995: 10). 
The theme is clear again in the 2000 CAS progress report, when the Bank stated that 
‘the Authorities [the government and Party] have not been willing to take the perceived 
risks of rapid banking, state-owned enterprises and trade reform, and private sector 
deregulation’ (World Bank 2000: 5). The Bank has consistently wanted the Vietnamese 
government to engage in more, and more rapid, deregulation and to give up more power 
over resources than Vietnam has been willing to do (see also Engel 2010). Here is a 
clear conflict over the developmental vision for the country writ large. Thus the Bank 
has exerted pressure on, and trained the Vietnamese government and its officials into, 
its worldview.  For example, jointly with the IMF, the Bank organised seminars and 
workshops to bring ‘lessons of international experience in banking, state-enterprise and 
trade reform to Vietnamese policymakers’(World Bank 2000: 5-6).  
One of the central focuses of the Bank in the early 2000s was to support the creation of a 
better environment for private economic development. As a result, a Private Sector Forum 
was established, managed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Vietnamese 
Government and the World Bank. It supposedly became a place of ‘genuine dialogue’ for 
the private sector, something that the Bank claimed had never been available before in 
Vietnam (Operations Evaluation Department 2001: 12). Furthermore, the Bank carried out 
other projects with the private sector that focussed on promoting small and medium 
domestic enterprises in particular such as the Mekong Project Development Facility (World 
Bank 2003: 1).
26
 Here we see the Bank trying to create a particular view of Vietnam’s 
development vision through engagement with the private sector. 
Besides implementing projects and loans with the private sector and reforming state-owned 
enterprises, the Bank has also focused on providing policy advisory services. This emphasis 
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was clear in the 1995-1997 CAS and it has been a consistent focus since. The Bank argued 
that changing policy is an important milestone in the reform process as it lays the 
foundation for a market in practice. However, in Vietnam, the Bank considered that 
bureaucratic management caused institutional weaknesses. The Bank warned that:  
The main risk that may interfere with Viet Nam's achieving its ambitious 
development objectives comes from policy inconsistencies. This CAS has noted 
the Government's achievements, but has also pointed out important areas in which 
policy reform lags. Inconsistent messages about trade policy or land use rights or 
the role of the private sector in the economy will create uncertainties that deter 
saving and investment (World Bank 1995: 12).  
Through these above warnings, the Bank pushed Vietnam toward more liberal policies 
on trade, private property and markets, in other words towards a neoclassical 
development model. The Bank did note that the combination of ‘commercial borrowing, 
state enterprise reform, and trade liberalisation’ could produce a down-side (World 
Bank 1995: 13). This seems to be a vague acknowledgement of the problems that arose 
from big bang privatisations in Russia in particular. Yet it continued to push its 
neoliberal development model. 
To promote policy reform, the Bank implemented various advisory activities. The CAS 
Progress Report (2000) showed that the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS)
27
 
had provided ‘advisory services on foreign investment promotion’, and that the Bank 
had completed ‘a major review of obstacles to the Private Provision of Infrastructure…’ 
(World Bank 2000: 6). Specifically, with the strategic objective of improving the 
investment climate for both foreign and domestic private sectors, the Bank argued that 
the foreign investment law needed to change. Therefore, a report on ‘Foreign 
Investment Policy and Implementation’ was completed by FIAS (World Bank 2000: 
annex 1), which ‘suggested’ policy changes to the Government (World Bank 2000: 
annex 1). These activities demonstrate how the Bank has used technical advice to train 
Vietnamese officials in a neoliberal approach to investment policy, and in this process, 
clearly aim to shift the mindset about development away from developmentalism and 
towards market mechanisms. 
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One question that follows is whether the Bank has succeeded with these efforts, which 
can in part be judged by the perceptions of the GoV about the World Bank and its role 
in the country. It is difficult to get the views of key GoV figures though the Bank itself 
has reported on the perceptions of its influence. They argued that Vietnam positively 
acknowledges the Bank’s promotion and advisory services in its transition to a socialist 
market economy (Operations Evaluation Department 2001). The Operations Evaluation 
Department (OED) review of the country program in 2001 argued that the Bank had 
struck an appropriate balance by providing consistent policy advice covering a wide 
range of issues, including the importance of market forces and a larger role for the 
private sector. The OED said of the Bank’s influence on Vietnam’s reform that they had 
‘a positive impact on decision-makers to maintain fiscal discipline and carry out further 
tax and trade reforms, devaluations of the exchange rate, interest rate reforms, and some 
pilot SOE reforms’ (Operations Evaluation Department 2001: 19).Thus clearly the Bank 
perceives it has had a strong influence on the GoV. 
Yet, not all the Bank’s activities achieve consensus with the Vietnamese state. At times, 
progress has not been as rapid as they would have liked, although in some cases the 
Bank perceived that their ideas would have won out in the long-run. For example, in 
term of private participation in the energy sector: 
Although it has taken some years for Government to conclude negotiations 
for private participation in the energy sector, the Bank’s involvement, 
through lending, technical assistance, and facilitation of grant facilities, has 
paved the way for private participation in the sector (Operations Evaluation 
Department 2001: 20). 
Would the Bank have been more successful had it pushed more for transition, taken a 
stronger role in process of reform, or been more zealous advocating for increasing role 
of the private sector? An evaluation by the OED of the Vietnam Country Assistance 
Strategy in 2001 found that: 
If the Bank had been more proactive within its own projects, for example, in 
trying to remove obstacles to local private contractors, the domestic private 
sector might be more vibrant today. But as experience has shown in other 
countries, pushing hard on reforms when the Government is not willing to 




decision-makers hold differing views, such an approach could have been 
counterproductive… A more aggressive or intrusive approach is unlikely to have 
caused Vietnam to move farther or faster in its reforms (Operations Evaluation 
Department 2001: 21). 
Thus, we see an acknowledgement here by the Bank that too much pressure can 
backfire in terms of their influence on the state.   Nevertheless, the quote also confirms 
that the Bank does try to drive Vietnamese development thinking and that it sees things 
are progressing in the pro-market direction that it desires.  
Turning to the CPS 2007-2011, the Bank perceived that this was an important milestone 
in their influence on Vietnam’s transition. Overall, the broad objective of this CPS was ‘to 
support the Government’s program of strengthening and establishing institutions to 
sustain a modern, equitable market economy, in preparation for middle-income country 
status’ (World Bank 2009: 1). The CPS was focused on four key pillars; ‘(1) Improve the 
business environment; (2) Strengthen social inclusion; (3) Strengthen natural resource and 
environment management; and (4) Improve governance’ (World Bank 2007: vi).  
The CPS progress report by the World Bank (2009), provided a specific assessment of 
the ‘development impact of CPS program’ by its four pillars. The focus here is on the 
policy changes and influences of this CPS across pillars (1) and (4), the two that most 
relate to developmental state issues. In pillar one, business improving the business 
climate and strengthening competitiveness, the report assessed the implementation in a 
range of sectors: finance, transport, energy, urban water supply, and higher education. 
The Bank claimed that integration into the world economy has been a main driver of 
economic reform in Vietnam and that they would seek to assist Vietnam in ‘further 
liberalisation’, ‘an improved analytical base for implementing the WTO obligations’ 
and ‘model privatisation of large SOEs’ (World Bank 2007: 26). The Bank’s 
perceptions were supported by an index from the World Economic Forum (WEF), 
which said that ‘Vietnam improved its score of overall competitiveness from 3.9 in 
2006-07 to 4.2 in 2011-12’ (Independent Evaluation Group 2011: 5). That is a general 
index of the country’s competitive capacity, but to an extent, it also reflects 
improvements in the business environment and competitiveness. This material, from 
what is effectively a business lobby group, is uncritically presented as support for the 




The second objective was to foster a financial system that was more efficient, stable and 
responsive to the needs of business and households. Specifically, the program aimed to 
strengthen the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), have it create a ‘modern’ and 
‘independent’ monetary policy, and increase the share of infrastructure financed by the 
private sector. An independent central bank has long been a core part of neoliberal 
development strategy, as this takes a key tool for economic management out of the 
hands of government and places it with economic technocrats. If this were achieved, it 
would be a strong sign of Vietnam moving to a more neoliberal development mindset. 
However, as of the completion of this thesis, the Bank had not yet achieved this.  
Neoliberal economics is also hostile to state control of banking. Thus it is  not 
surprising that the Bank was pleased to report that, over the CPS period, ‘credit to the 
economy (government excluded) rose from 71 to 120 percent of GDP between 
December 2006 and December 2010, and the share of non-state banks in it increased 
from 32 to 47 percent between 2006 and 2009’ (Independent Evaluation Group 2011: 
5). The Bank also achieved  revision of the SBV and Credit Institution Laws in mid-
2010 (Independent Evaluation Group 2011: 5). The Bank has emphasised its 
contribution saying: 
Two important banking laws (Law on Credit Institutions and State Bank of 
Vietnam Law) were redrafted, albeit later than planned. They have been 
submitted to Government and are scheduled for final approval in 2nd quarter of 
2009. The Bank has been actively supporting the process with an IDF grant as 
well as through direct advisory technical assistance services on the revision of 
the drafts laws and related regulation (World Bank 2009: Annex 2 p.1). 
Beside these above legal frameworks, the Bank funded a project to the SBV entitled 
‘Financial Sector Modernisation and Information Management System’ (FSMIMS) with 
total amount of $71.83 million. The project was approved on April 2009 and was to be 
implemented in five years. The project had three parts: modernising the SBV; 
strengthening the Credit Information Center; and enhancing the capacity of the deposit 
insurance scheme for Vietnam (State Bank of Vietnam 2009: 6). Thus, with the central 
focus on revising the heart of financial system, the SBV, the Bank expected to change this 
institution to become more independent and then use this key tool to improve the business 




Independent Evaluation Group’s (IEG) assessment was that ‘SBV, though, is not 





provided an overall evaluation of this pillar in their Country Partnership Strategy 
Completion Report (CPSCR) Review (Independent Evaluation Group 2011: 1). They rate 
this pillar outcome just as moderately satisfactory. Although the business environment and 
its competitiveness were improved, the IEG considered it fell ‘short in many instances from 
the targets set by the WBG strategy, and, in some cases, had important shortcomings’. 
Specifically, the IEG defined that ‘improvements in the financial sector are not entirely 
satisfactory’ and there was a weakness in the link between business environmental 
improvements and competitiveness (Independent Evaluation Group 2011: 7). 
By contrast, Vietnam prefers to undertake slow step-by-step, economic structural 
reform. In the banking and finance areas, Vietnam has been very strict and its 
regulations state that ‘the state shall undertake the unified management over all banking 
activities; ... ensure the leading and driving role of state-owned credit institutions in 
monetary and banking activities; [and] maintain socialist orientation and the national 
sovereignty’ (National Assembly 1997: Article 2). The Bank seems in a hurry to see the 
GoV race ahead on further liberal reforms, opening up the states’ financial management. 
Here we see the battle over the vision for Vietnam’s developmental approach being 
played out and the way that the World Bank has clearly taken an active stance in what is 
ultimately a political decision about the development trajectory. Further, these differences 
created difficulties for the GoV in implementing projects/programmes in line with the 
Bank’s provisions. 
In pillar four on ‘strengthened governance systems’, a key area for Bank action is 
changing public procurement procedures towards a market-based and competitive 
process. This is supposedly the most efficient approach but it is also about removing 
government from service delivery in favour of the private sector. In this respect, the 
Bank said that:  
Although, the Government regularly seeks inputs from the Six Banks
29
 on public 
procurement, extensive comments provided on drafts of legislation, decrees, and 
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standard procurement documents have not been adopted by Government. The Bank 
has, nevertheless, continued to provide technical and financial support to the Public 
Procurement Administration of the Ministry of Planning and Investment in (i) 
drafting legal instruments, (ii) preparing standard procurement documents, (iii) 
establishing a web-based e-procurement bulletin, (iv) establishing an M&E system 
for assessing the quality of the system and measuring compliance and performance; 
(v) increasing awareness of the importance of public procurement, and (vi) 
implementing the public procurement law (World Bank 2009: annex 2 p.11). 
The Bank claim that its efforts have resulted in some progress in execution of budgets 
and in term of process of budgetary policy making, in particular launching a ‘medium 
term fiscal and expenditure frameworks in six ministries’ and piloting it in four 
provinces (Independent Evaluation Group 2011: 10). However, despite the country’s 
progress against Bank criteria, it is interesting to note that the overall fiscal policy and 
budget plan in Vietnam were assessed as ‘lower “red” range of “Scant or No 
Information” by the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index (OBI)’. 
Similarly, another evaluation of an international think tank asserted that ‘Vietnam’s 
budget processes and the public’s access to information are both very weak, having 
deteriorated between 2006 and 2009’ (Independent Evaluation Group 2011: 10). Again, 
we see the Bank turning to the weight of external (but not independent) organisations to 
attempt to reinforce its developmental vision. The IEG rated outcome of this pillar as 
‘moderately unsatisfactory’, the only one unsatisfactory of four pillars, see Table 5.1 
 
Table 5.1. World Bank’s Assessment of Achievement of CPS Objectives 
Objectives IEG Rating 
 Pillar 1: Business Development   Moderately Satisfactory  
 Pillar 2: Strengthen Social Inclusion   Moderately Satisfactory  
 Pillar 3: More sustainable management of natural 
resources and reduced environmental degradation  
 Moderately Satisfactory  
 Pillar 4: Strengthened governance systems   Moderately Unsatisfactory  
Source: (Independent Evaluation Group 2011: 11) 
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It is clear that strengthened governance systems play an important role in the process of 
efficient transition to a market economy in Vietnam. Yet, the Bank has a very particular 
model of what such system should look like and how it would be run.  These include 
objectives which give a very strong emphasis to the tendering out of services and the use of 
standardised budgetary systems that they can monitor. These are all very standard liberal 
capitalist procedures, and in contrast somewhat not only with the idea of a socialist market 
economy, but also with the power-centric habits of the GoV, linked to the history of 
centrally planned economic management. Reform needs time and that is still a big challenge 
to GoV in its transition. Thus, here we see quite different perceptions about development 
and the time that should be taken to develop policy between the GoV and the World Bank. 
Overall, the cases above demonstrate the CAS/CPS’s neoliberal developmental ideas and 
their attempts to influence Vietnamese government policy. The Bank certainly has some 
influence because its policy advice is supported by direct projects/programs, technical 
assistance, human resource training, etc. Casting a critical glance at the CASs/CPSs, 
though the claim is that poverty reduction is the central focus of these strategies, it seems 
that policies to increase the role of markets are actually their first port of call. There is an 
implicit logic here that is based on the assumption that markets are the only source of 
development and poverty reduction.  This was emphasised by Engel (2010) who exposed 
the actual outcome of the CAS, which ‘is not linked to performance on poverty 
outcomes’, but rather the actual outcome was ‘linked only to the “pace of progress on the 
Government’s policy and institutional agenda”’ (Engel 2010: 97). She showed the 
evidence from investigating the central focus of the CPRGS as being ‘the design of key 
laws of a “market-driven economy”’. In this respect, Engel raised an important argument, 
namely that: 
So, although the Bank needs and wants to be more “organic” in the PWC
30
,its 
structures as a Bank and commitment to hegemonic principles of pax Americana 
expressed in the Washington Consensus, ultimately prevented it from moving 
beyond superficial interventions and issues (Engel 2010: 97). 
Overall, the free market economy ideas that the Bank tries to impose in the various 
CAS/CPS seem not fit with a socialist-oriented market economy that the GoV aim 
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for. Although the features of a socialist-oriented market economy are still evolving, 
a popular understanding of it is that the socialist state and SOE continue to play a 
significant role in the economy. However, with its strong effort to race ahead on 
equitisation and privatisation, to open up public financial management and budget 
execution, and the like,  the Bank seems to skip that ‘peculiarity’ of Vietnam, or, in 
other words, ‘the Bank’s version ignored the socialist orientation of the market 
economy’ (Engel 2010: 96).  
 
Leading donor coordination 
Organising the Consultative Group (CG) meeting has been one of the key activities of 
the World Bank in Vietnam. The first CG for Vietnam, chaired by the Bank, was held in 
Paris in 1994, but it moved to Hanoi in 1997, and all the next CGs were held in 
Vietnam. The CG meetings, as the Bank puts it: 
…bring together participants from the Government of Vietnam, representatives 
of about 50 bilateral and multilateral donors to Vietnam, representatives of the 
Vietnam Business Forum and International NGOs. Vietnamese NGOs 
representatives participate as observers. Consultative Group meetings provide a 
forum for discussions between the Government of Vietnam and its development 
partners on economic policy issues, strategies for reducing poverty, and ODA 
effectiveness (World Bank 2010). 
According to the Bank, these ‘meetings are viewed as the apex venue for sharing 
policy perspectives, learning about and discussing new GoV policy directions, and 
for dialogue focused on emerging policy challenges besetting Vietnam’ (World 
Bank 2012: 1). Interestingly this statement is in accordance with GoV’s  self-
assessment and perceptions of the CG. For example, ending the mid-term CG 
meeting 2011, the GoV’s representative, Minister of Planning and Investment Vo 
Hoang Phuc, affirmed that the meeting had been successful with frank and open 
discussion between Vietnam government agencies and donor representatives to find 
solutions to help Vietnam continue to respond to the unstable macroeconomic 
situation and high rate inflation. He emphasised that the ‘GoV recognises and 




sustainable economic development and create a healthy and effective investment 
climate in Vietnam’ (Tung Linh 2011). 
For the Bank, CGs are considered as an important instrument and remain ‘the primary 
vehicle for donor coordination’. The Bank still always takes the lead on donor 
coordination, though there was some debate in 2003 when ‘the UNDP was making a 
case to take the lead on donor coordination’, further: ‘Japan and France were also 
unhappy with the Bank’s CPRGS’, and the ‘Nordics always wanted to raise contentious 
issues (such as human rights). However, the situation soon settled down, as donor 
concerns were addressed. And the regular pattern of working groups, mid-year updates 
and end-year CGs continued’ (World Bank 2012: 29).  
In Indonesia, the government took over the leadership of the CG in year 2005. They 
emphasised that ‘only with Indonesia itself as chair would the country “be able to make 
their own choices about the type and model of development that would be adopted. And 
this would mean that Indonesia could be fully responsible for its implementation and for 
the loans it borrows”’ (International NGO Forum on Indonesia Development 2004 Cited 
in Engel 2010: 142). Yet it is clear in the Vietnamese case, that donors still seem to 
presume they should lead the CGs, despite the focus since the late 1990s in donor policy 
on country ownership and the inclusion of this in the ‘Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness’ (OECD 2005). This suggests they want to shape the country’s 
developmental strategy and vision. 
The chronology of CG meetings showed that the emphasis was different at each 
negotiation, both in terms of the content and number of agenda items discussed. To some 
extent, the success of the CGs can be seen by the increases in financial pledge from donors 
after each meeting (see table 5.1). Actually, the pledges do not always translate to funds 





Table 5.2 Chronology of Consultative Group Meetings 
Chronology of Consultative Group Meetings 
Host places/years Annual financial 
pledge (US 
billion) 
Host places/years Annual 
financial pledge 
(US billion) 
Paris, France/1993 1.86 Ha Noi, Vietnam/2003 2.839 
Paris, France/1994 1.958 Ha Noi, Vietnam/2004 3.440 
Paris, France/1995 2.311 Ha Noi, Vietnam/2005 3.748 
Paris, France/1996 2.43 Ha Noi, Vietnam/2006 4.445 
Tokyo, Japan/1997 2.377 Ha Noi, Vietnam/2007 5.426 
Paris, France/1998 2.192 Ha Noi, Vietnam/2008 5.914 
Ha Noi, Vietnam/1999 2.146 Ha Noi, Vietnam/2009 8.063 
Ha Noi, Vietnam/2000 2.4 Ha Noi, Vietnam/2010 7.88 
Ha Noi, Vietnam/2001 2.399 Ha Noi, Vietnam/2011 7.39 
Ha Noi, Vietnam/2002 2.462   
Source: World Bank (2012) 
 
Judging the success and impact of CG Meetings should not only look at the result of the 
financial pledges. The more important issue at the ‘heart’ of the CGs meetings is the 
policy dialogue forum. As noted earlier, the CGs were perceived by GoV as the highest-
level apex body in Vietnam for ‘exchanging views’ with its international partners on 
important policy issues facing the country (Tung Linh 2011). The GoV envisaged the 
CG meetings as a means to facilitate high-level open dialogue on policy issues of cross-
sectoral nature, to share relevant experiences and possible remedial measures on policy 
challenges, and to serve as a platform by GoV for the mobilisation of development 
assistance. At the meetings, the GoV representatives often raise key issues for the next 
period and the donors/ partners contribute their experiences in specific issues/ policies.  
At the CG meeting in 2011, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, stated that 




efforts, speeding up economic restructuring and poverty reduction’ and he noted that 
they ‘will focus on restructuring three key areas - public investment, state owned 
enterprises and banking sector’ (World Bank 2011). The Minister of Planning and 
Investment, Bui Quang Vinh, assured Partners that ‘ODA resources would be used 
efficiently in support of Vietnam’s development and stressed the Government’s 
appreciation for Development Partner policy advice’. He also gave a promise that ‘the 
Government’s desire to continue regular dialogue with Partners on Vietnam’s 
development challenges’ (World Bank 2011). This and the size of support to Vietnam 
suggest that the perceptions of donors are important to the GoV and thus the are likely 
to influence the state development strategy. 
An interview with Ms Bo Thi Hong Mai, Partnership Specialist, Country Director's 
Office, World Bank, provided additional significant insight about CG meetings. On the 
effectiveness of the CG meetings, Mai noted: 
The CG meetings provided many recommendations to GoV’s policies. The 
meetings contributed an important measure for building understanding together 
between GoV and DPs [development partners]. The GoV will know more 
about the expectations, demands, and activities of the DPs. Turning to the DPs, 
they also get a comprehensive understanding of the GoV. This is a two-way 
relationship. To date, Vietnam is a country that shares its success with other 
countries, it is not only coming to listen and receive experiences from 
international partners. Any forum needs enhancement, until now, it can be 
assessed that the CG meetings are very successful. 
When asked how the meetings influence on the GoV, Mai noted: 
Actually, this is our expectation. In this year [2013], we look forward to the 
achievement as ‘action oriented’. In the previous meetings, the main activities 
were the DPs raising comments and then the representation from GoV will 
confirm their appreciation and consideration on these recommendations. 
However, they did not have any plan of specific actions to show their 
implementation. I know policy reform needs a long time to measure its results 
and demonstrate whether the DPs comments are right or not, but the GoV needs 
at least to provide their action plan and report in order to see how they followed 




This suggests that the Bank is demanding that the GoV change its policies and approaches 
at a faster rate than in the past. A further example of the impact of DP’s comments on GoV 
policies and its responses, can be seen in this interview by Anh Huyen of Voice of Vietnam 
(VOV) with Director General Do Nhat Hoang, Foreign Investment Agency, Ministry of 
Planning and Investment about CG meeting in 2012. 
Reporter Anh Huyen: at CG meeting, the donors requested Vietnam foster the 
process of economic restructuring, with a special focus on SOE and banks. In 
addition, donors also worried about the faults / mismanagement in the big state-
owned corporations such as Vinashin and Vinalines.
31
 As for you, how does the 
GoV response on these issues? 
Mr Do Nhat Hoang: recently, the government, ministries, branches, and localities 
have implemented a review to restructure the economy, especially in the SOE and 
banking areas. It is necessary work and timely. In that process we have reviewed 
and detected certain irregularities at Vinashin and Vinalines. This review showed 
a very strong commitment, both in words and actions of the Government as well 
as the different levels of the Government apparatus. Through the realities of 
practice, after the faults in Vinalines, the Government has directed restructuring 
and mass deployment to adjust and recover… Thus, the review was effective 
initially. Doing this, in our point of view, created a positive impact on foreign 
investment. For example, after this review, the projects that Vinashin cannot 
afford to finance will be available for other economic sectors such as the private 
sector or foreign invested sector. Foreign investors have the financial ability, they 
see such projects, and where, before they were  inaccessible, now have access to, 
which can be deployed (VOV 2012). 
This shows a notable example of the GoV under pressure to address SOE corruption 
issues discussed by the CG. This response was actually caused by a range of reasons 
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(such as companies being losing propositions, corruption, and loose management, in 
SOEs and Vinashin, Vinalines in particular), but when faced with the claim and press of 
donors, the GoV took a bigger picture response to restructuring, opening new sectors to 
private actors.  
For the World Bank, leading donor coordination through the CG meetings gives it a 
strong influence. The Bank’s influence on donors and the Bank’s position in the CG 
meetings, ‘gives it influence broadly over the geographical spread and sectors of a 
donor’s ODA’ (Engel 2010: 93). If GoV wants to increase the ODA from donors, they 
cannot ignore the Bank’s role.  
How does the GoV respond to the Bank’s position? Engel (2010: 93) argued that 
‘the response from the GoV and others to the role of the Bank was generally positive 
as it was seen as having a “very open attitude in Vietnam”’. An interview I 
conducted with Dr Ngo Huy Duc, Director of the Institute of Political Science, Ho 
Chi Minh National Political Academy, Dr Duc argued that the Bank leads donor 
coordination, while in other countries, the IMF leads. He said that up to now, the 
Bank had helped Vietnam greatly and given Vietnam many priorities, and that some 
of Vietnam’s policies were definitely inappropriate, unstable and sometimes harmful 
for the country, and that the Bank had helped Vietnam to deal with these problems. 
Dr Duc also noted that any donation programs were accompanied by conditions and 
requirements, but these requirements help consolidate institutional regime change 
such as increasing transparency, enhancing accountability and so on. Thus, we see 
that a very positive perception of the Bank’s role in the highest levels of Vietnamese 
academia regarding Vietnam’s development trajectory, which may see it increase its 
influence over time. 
 
Advisement / consultation activities 
Besides chairing CG Meetings, the Bank carries out independent consultative programs 
- directly participating as corresponding member in the GoV’s Socio-Economic 
Development Strategy (SEDS) and five year Socio-Economic Development Plan 
(SEDP). Further, the Bank publishes an annual Vietnam Development Report (VDR) 




Table 5.3 Vietnam Development Reports 
Year Title 
2000 Attacking Poverty 
2001 Vietnam 2010: Entering the 21st Century 
2002 Implementing Reforms for Faster Growth and Poverty Reduction 




2007 Aiming High 
2008 Social Protection 
2009 Capital Matters 
2010 Modern Institutions 
2011 Natural Resources Management 
2012 Market economy for a middle-income Vietnam 
2014 Skilling up Vietnam: preparing the work force for a modern market 
economy 
2016 Transforming Vietnamese Agriculture: Gaining More from Less 
Source: World Bank 
The Vietnam Development Reports were often designed around the themes of the 
GoV’s SEDS, SEDP and the Bank’s CAS, CPS again showing the closeness of the 
relationship between the two organisations. Some reports discussed whole theme of the 
Bank’s CAS/CPS, while other reports focused only particular pillars. There was a strict 
process for publishing the reports, as the Bank explained: 
The VDRs formed part of agenda at the end-of-year CGs. While the World Bank 
took the lead, other donors contributed substantially to the writing and review of 
the reports (from 2004). And a Vietnamese Reviewing Committee ensured that 
the ideas in the reports were widely discussed with government officials, 
researchers and development practitioners (from 2005) (World Bank 2012: 27).  
The Bank affirmed that ‘VDRs provided a vehicle for developing a common 
understanding of the policy agenda with GoV and donor community’ (World Bank 
2012: 27). Again we see the Bank attempting to shape Vietnam’s developmental 




Exploring further the Bank’s programs in the field of knowledge assistance, including 
development reports, a useful interview was carried out with Dr Dinh Tuan Viet, Senior 
Economist, World Bank Vietnam. Dr Viet provided general information about the 
knowledge assistance activities of the Bank. He also asserted:  
The knowledge assistance activities of the Bank are the policy consultation 
activities… This is a wide area including a range of programs and specific 
activities. For me, I track and monitor the macroeconomic area, specifically, 
through evaluation of the annual economic reports of Vietnam, we add 
recommendations as well as evaluating policies which have been done to see the 
degree of its relevancies, how that impacts on the development of Vietnam.  
At the times I came to work for the Bank, the nineties period, Vietnam was 
focusing on reforms in three key areas; SOEs, banks, and trade. For 
example, in reforming SOEs, the World Bank made very specific 
recommendations to the relevant authorities. The Bank contributed 
dynamically in advising the government in the transition from a single-
ownership economy to a multi-ownership economy. Or another example, in 
the early 2000s, the World Bank helped the GoV to calculate the benefits, 
opportunities and challenges of Vietnam’s further integration into the 
global economy, in the process of negotiations for the Vietnam-US bilateral 
trade agreement in particular. We invited experts from the countries that 
have succeeded in negotiating such agreements so that they share the 
experience with us.  
Of course, these consultative/assistant progresses are irreplaceable. The features 
such as state ownership and the state as a driving force are the key 
characteristics of Vietnam. The policy-making processes in Vietnam are not by 
one or two people /bodies, from small to big policies, it needs a consensus from 
various bodies - from government’s bodies, parliament’s bodies to the Party’s 
bodies. It is very difficult to say clearly that there is an expert group, which can 
influence the policy-making process of Vietnam. This is not understood as a 
negative, it is based on the fact that policy-making processes in Vietnam operate 
on different levels, places, and have to gain a strong consensus. Many 




and costly, but this is the process for building consensus, despite the fact that it 
may slow down the policy process. 
Thus Dr Viet perceived that the World Bank’s influence of Vietnam was not as important as 
the country’s own policy-making processes. Still he emphasised the value and contribution 
of the annual Vietnam Development Reports for GoV. He explained that:   
The annual Vietnam Development Reports are our work. It has a part for policy 
recommendations. Besides, we also have sector reports. Furthermore, in order to 
support CG Meetings, we also provide short reports for donors. Our competitive 
advantage is that the World Bank is present in a wide range of countries in the 
world, and owns the qualified and experienced experts and uses huge database 
resources. Specially, our research has a strong advantage, because supporting 
this research are huge projects, research is based on results of these projects. 
Notably, our research does not tend to change the policy of GoV, we only 
provide additional information, experiences. Properly, the GoV used and 
believed in these. Looking at what the GoV say and does, it can be seen how the 
GoV rely on and respect the World Bank, the bad debt settlement for example. 
Here again Dr Viet plays down the influence of the Bank at the same time as he 
expresses a very high degree of confidence in the World Bank’s research.  
What then are the perceptions of GoV staff? An in-depth interview with Associate 
Professor Dr Nguyen Viet Thong, a Secretary General of the Central Theoretical Council, 
Vietnamese Communist Party, highlighted some of these. Dr Thong affirmed that: 
The Bank’s staff are very professional on the matter of policy advice and policy 
advocacy. Our government is willing to use their advice. We select what is the 
essence of humankind. We admit our weakness and we are willing to learn, but 
they cannot force us. We are willing to learn and absorb, because our guideline 
is independent autonomy. 
Regarding the World Bank’s research, Dr Thong explained that  
The World Bank puts many pressures on us. They have their own research 
agencies. They make surveillance and conclusion. When Vietnam government 
reports with higher statistics than they do, they blame us to tell lies, resulting in 




This is a telling comment about how the Bank aims to change the developmental 
mindset in Vietnam and the importance of data in that. 
The various consultative activities of the World Bank in the policy process of GoV 
shows both direct participation of the Bank in GoV’s Socio-Economic Development 
Strategies and programs and indirect participation through VDRs. These activities, 
while they may be positive in a number of respects, also reflect the Bank’s 
intervention in the developmental mindset. ’ Thus, we can see that these activities  of 
the Bank, create at the very least the perception if not the reality of pressure on the 
policy-making, legal framework and strategic directions of Vietnam, that is to say on 
state’s development trajectories.  
 
5.3. Conclusion  
The World Bank achieved its successes in influencing GoV policy thanks to its 
multifaceted way of influencing thinking, processes and practices in Vietnam. The 
activities of the Bank in Vietnam cover a wide range with many different fields, but 
three key fields are institutional and governance reform, leading donor coordination 
and advisory activities (World Bank 2012: 14). It is notable that the Bank’s approach 
in Vietnam quickly turned away from simply applying structural adjustment lending 
measures with given policy conditions, as it perceived that ‘the attempt to force 
reforms will never succeed’ (World Bank 2012: 17). In other words, they saw clearly 
that they needed to change the GoV’s development mindset to bring it in line with 
their own and to promote this at both a national and grassroots levels, in order to 
achieve success. The Bank concluded that ‘this is a lesson from Vietnam that 
assistance could positively promote its role on policy encouragement instead of policy 
imposition’ (World Bank 2012: 39).  
Policy development in Vietnam has had significant contributions from the Bank. 
However, consideration should be  given to the fit between the Bank’s expectations 
such quick privatisation, absolute market economy, strong democratic governance, etc. 
and the peculiarities of Vietnam such as the aim to keep a key role for the SOE sector, 
autonomic decision making, and a stable political system. At one level, the GoV has 
enhanced their capacities and development trajectories thanks to the pressures from the 




neoliberal developmental approach in the country. Thus, they a key factor in the current 
clash between neoliberal and developmental state mindsets in Vietnam. 
From the literature on international organisations in combination with the case study of 
the UN, the WTO, and the World Bank in Vietnam the conclusion can be reached that 
there is a strong perception that the policy and economic development of Vietnam has 
seen significant contributions from the IOs.  However, we have also seen that this is in 
tension with Vietnam’s tradition of slow, consensus-based policy-making. Such tension 
fits with the literature on IOs and states, suggesting that IOs influence ‘can be used to 
resolve competing demands within and between states and other global actors’ 
(Anderson 1996: 12). IOs have deliberately set out to influence Vietnam’s 
developmental mindset in market-based and neoliberal directions and they have had 
some success in this. They have done this through lending programs; supporting policy 
and institutional reform; policy analysis and advisor activities. As Stiglitz (2002) and 
Bello (1999; 2004) argued, the directions of the influence of these IOs are now often 
negative for developing countries in term of their rules, priorities, and mechanisms. 
Vietnam has not as yet accepted fully neoliberal prescriptions and thus the influence of 
IOs has not been as significant as compared to some other developing countries. As 
Victoria Kwakwa, World Bank Country Director for Vietnam, stated ‘Vietnam has 
sought ideas, knowledge and even advice from development partners and then found 
ways to contextualise and adapt it to fit Vietnam’s own context. This means 
development partner ideas have not been taken on “hook line and sinker”’ (Kwakwa 
2013). Yet, IOs have had an undoubted influence, and they are certainly a key factor in 
the current fracture in the country between neoliberal and developmental state ideas. 
Developmental state literature in general highlights a key role for government 
financial management and their management of the finance sector. Thurbon (2016) 
highlights in her study of the developmental mindset in South Korea, the role of 
financial sector reform is vital. The case study demonstrates the World Bank’s 
strong focus on government financial management and on finance sector reform. 
The interviews with Vietnamese officials showed the generally positive views of IOs 
in the country, despite some reservations. Reforms may not have gone as far as the 
Bank would like but they have created some shifts and debates about future 





International Non-Governmental Organisation in Vietnam and Their 
Influence on the Party-State’s Developmental Mindset and Policies 
 
6.1. Introduction 
NGOs are generally understood as independent organisations that are neither an official 
part of government nor an organisation for-profit purpose. There are varied types of 
NGOs, hence, they play different roles and take very different functions within and 
across nations. The two main forms of NGO activities are ‘the delivery of basic services 
to people in need, and organising policy advocacy and public campaigns for change’ 
(Lewis and Kanji 2009: 1). Many NGO activities relate to the conventional state though 
they can operate somewhat independently to it. Relations between NGOs and the state 
are often considered as complicated, tense and involving multiple interactions. There 
are two main views of these relations. The first views see NGOs as replacing 
institutions operating in response to the failure of the state and supporting what 
government agencies are unable to deliver.  Thus for some, they represent ‘the most 
serious challenge to the imperatives of statehood in the realms of territorial integrity, 
security, autonomy, and revenue’ (Fernando and Heston 1997: 8; see also Lewis and 
Kanji 2009; Sending and Neumann 2006). This analysis of NGOs is often seen as 
particularly pertinent in developing countries, especially  where international and/or 
domestic NGOs have become substitutes for states. The second view is that, by having a 
range of professional staff, producing extensive, well-researched policy papers, and 
strengthening their networks into the community, NGOs bring participation to ‘the 
advantage of states’ and contribute to improving the state’s abilities (Raustiala 1997: 720; 
Duffy 2006). This debate then somewhat parallels the broader debate about the impact of 
globalisation on the state.  
There has been limited analysis of the role of NGOs in developmental states because 
developmental state theorising pre-dated the explosion of NGOs of the 1980s, and 
research also focused on relatively authoritarian states that limited the space for civil 
society organisations of various kinds. However, for today’s developmental states, even 
those regarded as authoritarian, limiting engagement with NGOs is difficult. INGOs, in 




Thus, this chapter explores how INGOs have influenced thinking about development, in 
particular its social dimensions, in Vietnam. 
 This is an important case study because INGOs have grown from just a handful of 
organisations operating in early 1970s to 1,000 by 2014, with headquarters operating in 
most provinces and cities of Vietnam (Don 2015). INGOs in Vietnam initially mainly 
focused their activities on humanitarian assistance and relief, poverty reduction and 
sustainable development, but nowadays, many INGOs have begun to operate in new 
areas such as human rights, grassroots democracy, governance, civil society development 
and policy advocacy. INGOs in Vietnam have a special characteristic in that they tend to 
build a strong relationship with state and local government and consider such 
relationships as key points and lessons for their successful projects and programs, whereas 
generally INGOs seek to separate themselves from the state. Through analysing the 
historical context, and through case studies of two major INGOs, CARE International and 
World Vision International in Vietnam, these above matters are explored in this chapter. 
This chapter commences with a literature review about NGOs and their relations 
with nation states and developmental ideas. Following this is an overview of INGOs 
in Vietnam. Next, a general picture of INGOs in Vietnam and their main 
characteristics is provided. The case studies of CARE and World Vision show 
different perspectives on Vietnamese developmental state mindset and policies 
under the impacts of these organisations.  
 
6.2. Literature Review 
The term NGO is best known from the expression in the United Nations Charter in 
1945. Before that time the term NGO hardly existed. Instead several different term were 
used, such as ‘international associations’ and ‘specialised agencies’ (Willetts 2011: 6-
7). These private, non-profit organisations were independent of government. Therefore, 
the UN listed these organisations as nongovernmental organisations to distinguish them 
from governments. NGOs were described by the UN as: 
Any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group which is organised on a local, 
national or international level. Task-oriented and driven by people with a 




functions, bring citizens’ concerns to Governments, monitor policies and 
encourage political participation at the community level. They provide 
analysis and expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms and help monitor 
and implement international agreements. Some are organised around specific 
issues, such as human rights, the environment or health (United Nations 
1998: Cited in Yaziji and Doh 2009: 2004). 
Despite this comprehensive definition, there is also some debate in academic literature 
about what an NGO is. The simple definitions by Lewis and Kanji (2009: 2) and Yaziji 
and Doh (2009: 4) expressed that NGOs are independent organisations that are neither 
‘run by government’ nor ‘driven by the profit motive’. In generalising about the main 
characteristics of NGOs, it is also common to note that they are voluntarily and 
established under state legal frameworks (Dang 2009: 16-17) . Other authors have 
provided different definitions, but Peter Willetts, who studied NGOs for 30 years is an 
authoritative source (Willetts 2011: xviii). Willetts listed definitions of NGO from the 
UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and analysed historical understandings of NGO, and from 
this created a broad definition that ‘NGOs are any organised groups of people that are 
not direct agents of individual governments, not pursuing criminal activities, not 
engaged in violent activities, and not primarily established for profit-making purposes’ 
(Willetts 2011: 31). Overall, most scholars emphasise that NGOs must have two main 
characteristics, namely they are non-governmental and non-profit. 
Nevertheless, there are also different ways of classifying NGOs. For example, 
categorisation could be based on the working areas of NGOs.  Farrington et al. (1993: 6) 
divided NGOs into three main types: 
first, the notion that NGOs represent a force towards democratic and pluralist 
civil society, second, a view that NGOs have particular strengths in poverty 
alleviation and sustainable development, and third, that they offer the prospect 
of enhancing the efficiency of public sector service delivery. 
In another approach, based on the scope of NGO activities, Collingwood (2006: 441) 
used term ‘transnational NGOs’ to distinguish them from the ‘domestic public, private 






 This thesis refers to transnational NGOs as INGOs, an abbreviation of 
International Non-Government Organisations.  In recent years this term has become 
more widely accepted and still draws on Collingwood’s distinction between the 
domestic and transnational. 
Regarding the role and function of INGOs, there are many ‘different types, 
characteristics and purposes of NGOs’ (Yaziji and Doh 2009: 4), hence, NGOs play 
‘different roles’ and take very different functions ‘within and across different country 
contexts’ (Lewis and Kanji 2009: 2). However, these functions can be narrowed into 
two main forms of activity: ‘the delivery of basic services to people in need, and 
organising policy advocacy and public campaigns for change’ (Lewis and Kanji 2009: 
1). These two main functions are discussed in Yaziji and Doh (2009: 8-9) as ‘service 
NGOs’ and ‘advocacy NGOs’. In terms of service-oriented NGOs, similar to other 
private organisations or companies, NGOs provide ‘goods and services to clients with 
unmet needs’ (Yaziji and Doh 2009: 9). Yaziji and Doh (2009) claim this is because 
NGOs usually operate in areas ‘where politically challenged, indebted or corrupt states 
are unable or unwilling to provide for societal needs, and where global problems defy 
the conception of nation-state responsibilities’ (Yaziji and Doh 2009: 9). However, that 
is a problematic claim because NGOs provides such services across a range of states 
with different levels of social engagement. Overall, the role of NGOs in the social sector 
is very relevant to this thesis as they can play a major role in social developmental states 
such as Vietnam  
In term of advocacy activities, NGOs usually: 
engage in lobbying, serve as representatives and advisory experts to decision-
makers, conduct research, hold conferences… monitor and expose actions (and 
inactions) of others, disseminate information to key constituencies, set/define 
agendas, develop and promote codes of conduct and organise boycotts or 
investor actions (Yaziji and Doh 2009: 8).  
These advocacy activities create pressure on governments and contribute to policy 
changes.  This chapter seeks to explore such changes in the specific circumstance of 
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Vietnam. It is also notable that NGOs have played a wide range of roles such as 
‘emergency response, democracy building, conflict resolution, human rights work, 
cultural preservation, environmental activism, policy analysis, research, and information 
provision’ (Lewis and Kanji 2009: 1). Thus, it can be seen that the more roles that 
NGOs play, the more responsibility they share with the state in social management. This 
will be investigated for Vietnam. 
 
NGOs and the Nation-State 
Relations between NGOs and the state involve complicated and multiple interactions. 
Lewis and Kanji considers these relations ‘are often tense and unstable’ (Lewis and 
Kanji 2009: 27). While, different scholars have different conclusions about the 
influence of NGOs on states, the two main approaches to understanding the impact of 
NGOs on the nation-state are ‘an orthodox state-centric power-based approach’ and an 
‘issue-based approach’ (Willetts 2011: 144).  
In the state-centric power-based approach, the state is treated as the central authority in 
social management. This is often based on recognition of the state’s ‘military forces and 
economic capabilities’ (Willetts 2011: 128). States impose rules and penetrate society 
across their territory. Any social forces or organisations that tend to share, or to transfer 
state power are considered as challenges or threats to state authority, thus NGOs are not 
an exclusive situation. Thus, when considering successful NGO work, government 
agencies are generally unable to deliver a strong assessment because ‘in many contexts, 
NGOs implicitly or explicitly challenge the state’ (Lewis and Kanji 2009: 27).  
Alternatively, when considering the growth of NGOs and their success in specific 
works, NGOs have ‘been seen by some to be a response to the failure of the state and 
the market economy’ and they are ‘considered to be more reliable and authentic 
representatives of the people than governments are’ (Fernando and Heston 1997: 14, 
18). In so doing, some scholars conclude that ‘NGO activity presents the most serious 
challenge to the imperatives of statehood in the realms of territorial integrity, security, 
autonomy, and revenue’ (Fernando and Heston 1997: 8). Other similar arguments are 
found in some theories of global governance, when scholars claim that ‘the state has lost 




world politics, thus challenging the power and authority of sovereign states’ (Sending 
and Neumann 2006: 651, 654). These arguments have a common assessment about the 
impact of NGOs on nation-state that is, as negative impacts or as creating challenges to 
state authority. This would also suggest that NGOs have a negative impact on the 
developmental capacity of states.  
Unlike the state-centric approach, proponents of the issue-based approach do not agree 
with the premise that the relationship between states and NGOs is demonstrated as 
‘inherently oppositional’ and ‘even zero-sum in nature/ zero-sum conception of power’ 
and that hence that an ‘increase in the power and influence of non-state actors’ is 
defined a ‘reduction in/ expense of state power and authority’ (Raustiala 1997: 724; 
Sending and Neumann 2006: 652). Specifically, focusing on international 
environmental NGOs, Raustiala (1997: 720) concluded that ‘NGO inclusion does not 
come at the expense of state centrality; rather it is to the advantage of states.’ The author 
showed that NGO participation contributes to enhancing ‘the abilities of states to 
regulate globally’, specifically enhancing state capacity in solving global environmental 
problems (Raustiala 1997: 719).  
According to Raustiala, the cooperation between states and NGOs benefits states 
because the participation of NGOs brings varied advantages to states from providing 
‘policy advice’, helping ‘monitor commitments and delegations’, minimizing 
‘ratification risk’, and facilitating ‘signalling between governments and constituents’ 
(Raustiala 1997: 720). For instance, the state may lack information on or have little 
experience in solving global environmental issues and that may become a major barrier 
to their policy development. By contrast, NGOs may have a range of ‘professional staff 
and produce extensive, well-researched policy papers’, that they can freely provide to 
‘government policy makers’ (Raustiala 1997: 727). The result is that the state gains 
efficacious sources with no cost. Thus Raustiala  concludes that in utilising NGOs 
expertise, ‘states can maximise policy information and research while minimising 
expenditures’ (Raustiala 1997: 727).  
Through a case study of Madagascar, Duffy (2006) showed that ‘NGOs have been 
involved in directly running national parks, arranging debt for nature swaps and 
lobbying the national government for particular environmental policy directions’, and 




2006: 746). Thus, these arguments find that taking on governmental roles can have a 
positive impact on state capacity. These positive impacts on state governance and on 
welfare have been found in varied areas of states’ policy processes and governance.  
Overall, the literature suggests that NGOs can have some negative impacts on 
governance, in particular in cases where they take over or replace the state. However, in 
the cases where they work alongside a functioning state, either working with it or 
challenging it, a range of studies have demonstrated how NGOs can complement or 
even improve state capacity. This chapter investigates the impact of international NGOs 
on the ideas and practice of social development in Vietnam. 
 
6.3. International NGOs in Vietnam: An Overview 
INGOs have been working in Vietnam for many decades. This section traces their 
evolution from the early 1970s when the INGOs that came to work in Vietnam were 
related to religious (Christian) affiliations, humanitarian support, and relief and support 
for people suffering from the war, including shipping goods such as medicine and 
equipment. A range of Western INGOs kept in contact with the South Vietnamese 
government, while the North received support from varied Friendship Associations of 
socialist countries. When the Vietnam War ended in 1975 with the collapse of Southern 
government, most INGOs operating in South Vietnam closed their offices and withdrew 
their staff as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam took control.  
From 1975 to 1985, Vietnam applied the centrally planned economic model from the 
USSR nationwide and established close relationships with socialist countries. In 
addition, the US-led embargo against Vietnam prevented INGOs from undertaking 
assistance in the country. Therefore, this period was marked by a decreased number of 
INGOs operating in Vietnam. The opportunities for INGOs at that time to give support 
were limited, however, the support given was well-remembered and meaningful - a 
Vietnamese saying is that ‘we remember best the mouthful of rice given when we were 
hungry’ (Nguyen 2001: 13).  
1986 was a nodal point as this was when Vietnam implemented Doi Moi 
(renovation/open-door policy) and there was a decline in support from the socialist 




to support Vietnam and renewed efforts to have representatives in the country’ (Nguyen 
2001: 13). The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989 in particular 
broke ‘the fence’ and paved the way for donors to work in Vietnam, Western donors in 
particular. As a result, the number of INGOs increased quickly in Vietnam and the 
government established a special agency in 1989: 
The People's Aid Co-ordinating Committee (PACCOM) of the Vietnam Union of 
Friendship Organisations (VUFO) was established to “work as a focal agency for 
international non-governmental organisations”. PACCOM’s main functions are to: 
work as a bridge between INGOs and Vietnamese partners and localities; facilitate 
INGO activities and assist local partners in their relations with INGOs; gather and 
share information concerning INGO activities in Vietnam; and recommend to the 
Government proper policies for INGOs in Vietnam. PACCOM is also responsible 
for processing permits for INGOs, who are requested to register with the Committee 
for Foreign NGO Affairs through PACCOM (Nguyen 2001: 13).  
Of course, PACCOM does have some monitoring role too – Vietnam Union of Friendship 
Organisations (VUFO) is linked to the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and there are 
concerns about the need to ensure that INGOs respect the CPV ideology and framework. 
Nevertheless, by the 1990s INGOs were blossoming in Vietnam. In 1991, the government 
issued 'regulations in its relations with foreign organisations in Vietnam’ (Don Tuan Phong, 
interview). This legal framework was considered as the foundation for INGOs operating in 
Vietnam. From 1991 to 1996, PACCOM and other authorities advised the government and 
recommended to issue ‘regulations on the activities of foreign organisations in Vietnam' in 
1996. Thereafter, a wave of INGOs flooded into Vietnam, ‘from 200 organisations before 
1996, they then increased to 400 organisation, and now [2013] we have reached over 900 
INGOs’ (Don Tuan Phong, interview). Other reports of Vietnamese government agencies 
and researchers such Nguyen (2001) and Payne (2004) also affirm that this period saw a 
dramatic increase of INGOs in Vietnam. Graph 6.1 and the numbers below show the steady 
increase. In terms of their origins: 
Roughly 35% of the organizations listed in the NGO Directory come from North 
America (United States and Canada), 35% from Europe, approximately 8% from 
Asia (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand), and 7% 




When investigating the development of civil society in Vietnam more broadly, Thayer 
emphasised that: ‘By the early 1990s it quickly became evident that there was an 
explosion of organizational activity at all levels in Vietnam’ (Thayer 2009: 4). Thus, the 
growth of INGOs reflected and was associated with broader societal changes. 
Graph 6.1 Number of INGOs in Vietnam 
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Writing a report on ten years of partnership between Vietnam and INGOs (1994-2004), 
Payne (2004: 1) showed that ‘by 2002, the number of INGOs having relations with 
Vietnam had reached more than 500, with an annual disbursement of $85 million 
dollars’. According to this report, the central focus of INGOs works in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s had been ‘humanitarian assistance and relief’. However, after that, its 
target changed to focus on ‘poverty eradication, sustainable development and capacity 
building’ over the past ten years. In addition, many INGOs have expanded their focus to 
emerging issue such as ‘environment, gender, and advocacy’ (Payne 2004: 4).  
In the period from 2005 to 2010, the number of INGOs in Vietnam continued to 
increase rapidly. According to PACCOM’s report (2010), ‘there were about 900 INGOs 
and project headquarters operating in various areas to almost all provinces and cities of 
Vietnam’. Regarding the fields of INGO work, a report undertaken by the Institute for 
Studies of Society, Economics and Environment (ISEE) (2010) reviewed the previous 
five-year partnership between Vietnam and INGOs and noted that many INGOs began 
operating in new areas such as human rights, grassroots democracy, governance and 
civil society development. In many INGOs’ views, the demand for poverty reduction 
was not as urgent as before and the GoV had more resources to invest in disadvantaged 
areas through the achievement of accelerated economic growth for over two decades. 
These changes demonstrate a clear developmental mindset of INGOs in the social, 
political and economic context of contemporary of Vietnam. 
In addition to the issues of human rights, the ISEE Report also noted that the 
development of civil society and the responsibilities of the state were becoming more 
important for the sustainable and overall development of Vietnam (ISEE 2010: 7). 
However, according to this report, discussions with local authorities showed different 
views regarding this trend. Many officials insisted that although Vietnam had moved to 
the low middle-income grouping, the need for infrastructure development and poverty 
reduction were still essential, especially in remote areas with ethnic minority people. 
Therefore, they thought that INGOs should not shift their resources into new fields of 
activity. Some local partners (local leaders) also said they were afraid of INGOs 
working on grassroots democracy, governance and human rights as these were 
considered sensitive issues that were the responsibilities of the state government rather 




with INGOs expanding their operations into the capacity building, grassroots 
democracy, and sustainable development models. According to them, the involvement 
of people contributed to increased responsibility for local authorities (ISEE 2010: 7). 
This was seen not only to ensure quality projects but also to increase the 
implementation of grassroots democracy and accountability. Further, they felt that the 
experiences of INGOs in specific fields provided good lessons for Vietnam in applying 
their programs and projects. Here it is important to note how the different perceptions of 
the impact of INGOs in Vietnam strongly reflect the broader debate about NGOs and 
the state outlined in the literature review. In other words they are seen both as a 
complement and as a threat when their activities extend into particular areas. 
By 2013, Vietnam had relationships with nearly 1,000 INGOs coming from over 30 
countries and territories, Mr Don Tuan Phong confirmed.
33
 In the past 15 years, INGOs 
had disbursed over US $3 billion for tens of thousands of programs/projects for poverty 
reduction, community health care, recovering from the effects of war and building 
capacity for organisations (Don 2015). Nowadays, INGOs are moving from purely 
humanitarian aid to development aid. They focus increasingly on ‘soft’ activities rather 
than just infrastructural construction and equipment provision as in earlier times. 
Therefore, in addition to the traditional sectors, INGOs focus more on the environment, 
climate change, capacity building and policy advocacy.  
Evaluating the effectiveness of INGOs, Mr Phong explained that INGOs have 
contributed to social development, such as reducing poverty and improving the living 
standard of people in the areas where their projects are based. Along with social 
development, where INGOs were involved, hunger elimination and poverty reduction 
were seen to be faster and more stable than elsewhere. In other words, INGOs are seen 
to contribute to social development and to the thinking around it, Specifically, INGOs 
introduced several new models, methods and approaches to development. In addition, 
they positively impacted on the capacity of cadres and people. Through INGO projects, 
thousands of grassroots officials and hundreds of thousands of people were trained to 
enhance their capacities. Thus, this assessment shows a relatively positive perspective 
on the impact of INGOs on the Vietnamese developmental state thinking and capacity. 
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This view implies that they have increased the capacities of state as the capacity of both 
officials and civil society has been improved. 
Returning to the issue of the special characteristic of INGOs in Vietnam – their 
relationship to Vietnamese government - INGOs in Vietnam have tended to build a strong 
relationship with state and local governments, and consider such relationships as a key 
point and lesson for their successful projects and programs. As Odile Ruijs wrote in a 
Resource Centre Briefing Paper in 1996: 
INGOs have almost exclusively worked through the government, or through 
mass organizations [in Vietnam]. This is different from INGOs’ work in many 
other developing countries, where INGOs normally work outside government 
structures. What may be seen by some as a weakness of INGOs’ activities in 
Vietnam – a lack of independence, a layer between the INGOs and the 
beneficiaries – has in fact turned out to be a major strength... [INGOs] have an 
almost ready-made channel for discussion results with the government. This is 
of great significance, as the government of Vietnam, contrary to those in some 
other developing countries, is sincerely interested in improving the position of 
the poorest, and in replicating successful projects (Cited in Payne 2004: 3). 
This close relationship between INGOs and the state is likely to increase INGOs’ 
capacity to influence the state’s thinking about social development. This was visible in 
the discussion above of the views of Vietnamese actors, although the concerns emerged 
when INGOs were involved in more sensitive areas, this may impact their capacity to 
influence development thinking in Vietnam.  
 
6.4. Case studies of INGOs in Vietnam 
6.4.1. CARE International 
CARE International in Vietnam (CARE Vietnam) is one of the biggest INGOs in the 
world, and has had a long historical relationship with the Vietnamese government. 
CARE worked in the south of Vietnam from 1954 in the context of Vietnam War when 
they established a relationship with the southern Vietnamese government under support 
of the US government (Dang 2009: 47). After 1975, at the end of the war, CARE 




register their work with the GoV in 1990. CARE concentrates their work on three main 
areas: agriculture and rural development (poverty reduction), medical and community 
health and emergencies (preventing and mitigating floods and storm damage). 
Currently, CARE Vietnam is also working on new areas such as climate change and 
policy advocacy, but their central focus is still on poverty reduction. 
An interview with Mr Nguyen Van Anh, Program Director for Agriculture and Rural 
Development, CARE Vietnam, provided significant information related to the field of 
poverty reduction in agricultural and rural areas. Although running its projects in 53 
provinces, CARE has focussed mainly in the mountainous north and the Mekong Delta 
because the number of poor people is highest in these areas. In CARE’s vision, their 
short-term goal is poverty reduction, but for the long-term it is social justice. CARE 
expects people, especially poor people and vulnerable groups, to be more involved in 
decision-making processes over time. CARE saw that poor and vulnerable groups have 
not been involved in policy process because their voices were not strong and were not 
listened to. 
All the activities of CARE focus on how to improve the capacity of the people to enable 
them to participate in decision-making processes and to ensure that their voices are 
recognised. Mr Anh explained: poverty reduction is not the ultimate goal of CARE. 
Vietnam currently has 15 million poor people, of which 13 million are from ethnic 
minorities. One of CARE’s biggest projects cost around USD $1 million, but the total 
number of supported is only about 2,000 people of which 1,000 are out of poverty but 
only about 800 people out of poverty sustainably. Thus, CARE’s projects for poverty 
reduction are too small for 15 million people. The more important thing here, from the 
point of view of CARE, is the need for enhanced capacity building for poor people to 
help them stand on their own two feet to come out of poverty sustainably and helping 
them to access the benefits from the 135 and 30A programs of the government.
34
 These 
state-based programs are 25-30 times larger than CARE’s project count for each district. 
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Therefore, before 2001 CARE was interested in helping poor people by delivering items 
such as plants and animals, but after this time, CARE was more interested in helping the 
people improve their capacities and guiding them in the effective use of government 
programs. Now, CARE has a strong interest in building typical models for replication. 
CARE recognised that government agencies need efficient models for replication. It is 
clear that CARE want to bring their particular social developmental mindset to Vietnam 
by applying their philosophy in operating projects and programs.  
Assessing the success of CARE’s activities, Mr Anh affirmed that CARE’s programs 
and projects were cited as examples of effective projects in Vietnam. Both local 
authorities and people have been found to appreciate these programs and projects. For 
instance, models from Que Phong district, Nghe An province were rolled out across the 
province. The Nghe An People’s Council ran the closing ceremony of the CARE’s 
project, ‘Improving the Participation and Voice of Ethnic Minorities’ in December 
2012, and they confirmed that: 
The project provided seven models. These models showed a high economic 
efficiency, opened up sustainable knowledge and skills for ethnic minority 
people in the alleviation of poverty, helping them get rich. The project also 
contributed to the affirmation, proof of the autonomous and dynamic 
characteristics of the minorities in economic development. They did not just rely 
on and wait for others any more. 
The project has made significant contribution to capacity building for the 
officials and People's Council deputies at all levels. This helped Councils to 
have good enough capacity to monitor the poverty reduction projects and to 
better represent the interests of the people in general, ethnic minorities in 
particular (Thanh Ha 2012). 
Further successful projects of CARE can be seen in a specific case of Ba Tuoc 
commune, in the Hau Loc district in Thanh Hoa province. In Hau Loc district
35
, CARE 
conducted a model using a ‘visioning method’ of ‘future painting'. People plan a 
strategy for 15 years. The district officials participated as part of this project. After 
attending this project, the district committee made a decision to replicate this model 
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throughout 26 communes of the district. They used the districts’ funds for that program 
and did not use any more money from CARE. Thus, through these cases, to some extent, 
it can be seen that CARE has been successful in providing models of capacity building 
for both people and authorities. And by extension, they bring their skills to the advantage 
of the state and contribute to enhance its abilities.  
Mr Anh provided an interesting comparison - that CARE is seen as very strong at the 
community level, unlike Oxfam, who are seen as strong in policy advocacy at the 
central level. In running their projects, Oxfam often give money to community-based 
organisations (Women’s Union, Farmers’ Union, etc.) or other organisations doing 
projects. Anh said that Oxfam staffs just have meetings with their partners in Hanoi, 
developing programs and projects, and then checking and monitoring only. In contrast, 
CARE comes to each village and sits in the meeting with the village people. CARE’s 
philosophy is that people make their own decisions and they do not specify directions 
rather offer ideas and discussion. This also stands in contrast with the role of 
government officials. The latter are technical experts who are interested in a place only 
for what kind of planting or feeding can be done, but they do not care whether people 
like their specified plants, animals or not. CARE does what people like and need, rather 
than just taking a technical approach to making decisions.  
Most state officials do receive training in community consultation, although they can 
only apply a part of this training, because the mechanisms of the state do not allow 
them to implement some aspects.   For example, the 30A or 135 programs have no 
regulations or funds for village meetings and management costs, so the government 
officials have not been able to spend money to do these activities.  Indeed, they would 
not be paid for any expenditure associated with such projects. Thus, the fact that 
CARE workers are active in villages and present a model that may undermine the 
approach of government management.  
Nevertheless, the government has been affected by the methods of INGOs and they do 
apply such methods at times. Mr Anh provided an example of village development 
plans.  Previously, the Government did not do this or even say anything about the 
INGOS doing them, they did not even protest when INGOs were doing them. After 
recognising the success of INGOs through this technique, the Government began to use 




involved in the INGO project. Through such involvement, they see the need to change 
and they make a decision to change by themselves. Mr Anh affirmed that, CARE has 
never sent a letter or written a request to local governments to persuade them to change 
to the way of CARE. CARE conducts policy advocacy using ‘soft’ methods, which is 
how government officials involved in their projects found that letting poor people be 
involved in the decision-making processes is important. This differs from Oxfam, who 
they claim for example, would write letters to ask the government to change articles of 
law. Thus, it is clear that INGOs bring different methods to affect the developmental 
state mindset and policy. CARE thinks that the better way to change government 
officials’ developmental mindset and approaches is by involving them in CARE’s 
projects and demonstrating them their effectiveness. 
This assessment can be seen better through an investigation of CARE’s projects on 
‘climate vulnerability and capacity of ethnic minorities in the northern mountainous 
region of Vietnam’ (CARE International in Vietnam 2013). This project is ‘a long-term 
program to support poverty reduction and sustainable development among ethnic 
minority groups of Vietnam’ (CARE International in Vietnam 2013: 7). The central 
focus of this program is Civil Action for Socio-economic Inclusion (CASI) in working 
towards sustainable development for northern ethnic minorities. CASI has the overall 
goal that ‘marginalised ethnic minorities in northern Vietnam are enabled to determine 
and realise their own equitable and sustainable development, with dignity’ (CARE 
International in Vietnam 2013: 7). 
A report on CASI III (2013) provided illustration and assessment of the project, such as 
its funding, the project’s framework, strategies, process and achievements, and the 
project’s recommendations. Here, I focus on the report’s assessments related to 
Vietnamese development capacity. In terms of local capacity to address climate change, 
this report explained: 
At the Provincial level, the departments interviewed reported they were still 
waiting on guidelines on what their role with respect to climate change is in 
practice. The Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DONRE) 
report that their staff are aware of climate change but do not have the capacity, 
in terms of time, resources or guidance, to take action on climate change. The 




levels heard about climate change quite frequently but they did not have specific 
understanding about it and its likely impacts. The mainstreaming of climate 
change into different sector development plans at the different local levels is still 
a challenge. 
Local staff at provincial and district levels reported that they lack skills in 
facilitating participatory planning and implementation. This lack of local 
participation in planning may result in inappropriate interventions or ineffective 
local risk management (CARE International in Vietnam 2013: 17). 
CASI III has provided an array of knowledge, skills and support to vulnerable ethnic 
minority communities in adapting to climate change. The project raised 
recommendations such as ‘conducting further training for project staff and 
communities’, ‘advocating to relevant agencies on key infrastructure needs’, 
‘facilitating voice of ethnic minority groups in planning and policy-making at all 
levels’, ‘strengthening existing livelihood strategies and ensure climate resilience’, 
‘strengthening disaster risk management structure and capacities, including for adaption 
planning’. (CARE International in Vietnam 2013: 24-25). These recommendations 
reflected CARE’s role in helping vulnerable ethnic minority communities respond to 
climate change. However, in considering the relationship between this project and 
developmental state capacity, a central point is its activities to enhance ‘knowledge 
sharing and capacity building’ as follow: 
Improving sharing of knowledge and models, effectiveness and good 
practices with government and other stake-holders through workshops, 
meetings, dialogues. 
Workshops at a local level, for example to communicate the importance of 
indigenous species in afforestation and agriculture, and to share some models of 
nurseries and plantations that use indigenous species in afforestation. 
Training in gender and sustainable community-based natural resource 
governance should be provided to the key officials at commune and village level 
as a first step to addressing gender inequality. 
Raise awareness of local people about climate change and potential adaptation 




Explore ways to increase participation of local people in adaptation and DRR 
planning at relevant levels (CARE International in Vietnam 2013: 24). 
Government officials also gained certain advantages from these projects. In particular 
the project’s activities on knowledge sharing and capacity building filled gaps for 
officials in key areas. In other words, the Vietnamese state enhanced its capacity in 
managing disaster risk and climate change. 
Overall, through the above interviews and project investigation, the following key 
points can be raised. CARE is perceived to have made a contribution to help poor 
people overcome poverty sustainably. Using a community-based approach, CARE’s 
programs and projects had a range of successes and were appreciated by both local 
authorities and people. Their typical models were replicated in various areas by local 
governments. As befits their usual approach, CARE claims to have created a very 
good relationship with local government in their project’s implementation. Many 
local government officials participated as part of CARE’s projects and were trained 
in CARE’s methodologies. The interviews confirmed the generally positive 
perception of CARE. Thus, in this case of CARE international in Vietnam there is 
certainly currently the perception that the INGO contributes to enhanced 
developmental state capacity in social development, although there may be some 
emerging concerns about their movement into more controversial areas such as 
human rights.  
 
6.4.2. World Vison International in Vietnam 
World Vision International in Vietnam (hereafter World Vision) started working in the 
country from 1988, but they registered their license to operate officially with the 
government in 1996. World Vision works for the well-being of children and their 
protection. Besides implementing projects and programs for sustainable development 
and change for children of poor communities, they also work in emergency relief, 
disaster mitigation and policy advocacy. Any World Vision project must contain three 
elements – sustainable development, disaster reduction, and policy advocacy. Currently, 
World Vision is operating in 15 provinces of Vietnam with disbursement average US 




An in-depth interview with Mrs Khong Huong Lan who is in charge of external 
relations and policy advocacy for World Vision Vietnam, provided significant 
information related to this organisation’s projects and its relations with Vietnamese 
government authorities. Mrs Lan said that World Vision Vietnam was best known for 
its special regional development model that is different from other organisations. This 
model involves a comprehensive and long-term development program, which has at 
least three to five projects integrated into it. Such programs are often implemented 
initially in one district and use the district’s name as the program name. Each program 
has a project on areas such as education, agriculture, health, food security, and disaster 
reduction, and all elements are integrated to make a comprehensive and long-term 
impact on whole region. In one province, World Vision Vietnam could implement 
programs in many regions like this. 
In discussion with Mrs Lan and from the view of local governments (ISEE 2010), these 
models are rated as successful. There are three sorts of evidence that World Vision offer 
to support this claim. First, many former partners and collaborators of the program, 
have become local leaders and they perform well when they become local leaders. This 
has been attributed to the success of the program in the provision of training, and also 
from actual project participation. Capacities for planning for development, economic 
household development planning, and the like, are said to have been learned from the 
program. Thus, the key success of program is a development of partner capacity before 
and after the program. Partners here are local authorities, such as departments and mass 
organisations. The second sort of evidence attesting to the efficacy of World Vision 
programs in building skills, capacities and social capital is the awareness of the 
community about issues of nutrition and health, which are seen to have changed 
significantly as a result of their work. Thirdly, local governments are said to have 
replicated many of the models of World Vision but instead of receiving funding from 
World Vision, they have used their own budget to implement those models in their own 
programs. Thus, it is clear that World Vision has a strong influence on the Vietnamese 
developmental state mindset and policy. 
A typical example is the ‘nutrition club’ model. In the mid-2010s there were about 200 
nutrition clubs in 14 provinces and cities that had World Vision projects. The National 




presented in two major conferences in northern and southern Vietnam to share 
experiences of provinces that have a high number of malnourished children. They saw 
the advantages of those models and then applied the models to their hometown. A 
further example is in Yen Bai province, where World Vision had several projects in 
some districts. When they organised training courses, cadres in other districts that were 
not covered by World Vision projects also attended. World Vision provided documents 
and toolkits, and cadres then went back to their district to establish those models 
themselves using their own budget. This is evidence of the model developmental 
strategies that the Vietnamese government taken from INGOs. 
There are several reasons that World Vision’s programs are perceived as successes.   
First, they have an appropriate approach, namely making plans through a participatory 
approach with the direct contribution of local people. World Vision’s staffs stay in 
communities, living together with the people and listening to people. They directly do 
monitoring, supervision and evaluation of projects. They claim to be not seen as other 
less-involved donors who simply come to a district, donate money and leave. By being 
involved in community, World Vision’s staffs claim they can listen to the needs of 
people from the community and provide appropriate services. In so doing, they build 
practical models that are relevant to the people’s demands rather than being a subjective 
model imposed from the top down. As assessments by the ISEE showed: 
Both local authorities and people perceived positively the way of running 
projects with the participation of the people. A partner of World Vision in Van 
Yen district, Yen Bai province said ‘everything is investigated by the people, if 
something does not fit, the meeting and discussion will be rearranged to find a 
consensus. It is important that the chosen criteria must be raised and decided by 
the people’. This opinion was sympathised by Thanh Hoa provincial leaders and 
they fully agreed and supported the INGO’s programs. Because some INGOs 
directly work with people, they listen and care about the social security and life 
of people... 
…Perhaps, this is one of the important differences that the local government and 
people have acknowledged about INGOs… To some extent, it can be said that 
this approach gained such success, because many national programs as well as 




In addition, because it is an international organisation, World Vision have quality staff 
and each field always has an international expert called the National Coordinator for 
example, in fields like nutrition, health, agriculture, etc. 
The second reason that World Vision’s programs are perceived as successful are 
because of the nature of the links between the INGO and governments. World Vision 
Vietnam has very close relations with the government, from central to local levels. Mrs 
Lan illustrated that all projects implemented by World Vision have involvement from 
the authorities. When their program comes to a province, there must be a written 
agreement with the provincial authorities and they then work directly with provincial 
coordinating agencies and the district authorities. At the district level, there is a district 
committee for program management. In this committee, the Vice President of District 
People’s Committee is the chief, while representatives of the relevant departments such 
as health, education, and agriculture, and representatives of social organisations such as 
farmers, women, youth, unions, are also members of the management committee. World 
Vision staffs are also members of this committee. At the commune or village level, 
there are communal organisations and groups. They have monthly working mechanisms 
for the planning, monitoring and supervision of projects called reflection meetings. 
Planning is done from the beginning of the year, but each month or every three months 
they have to reflect back whether modifications are needed, what has worked well or 
not well, and so on.  
At the central level, World Vision undertakes policy advocacy. They have worked with 
the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of 
Public Security and others on matters relating to children's rights. They focus on 
accelerating the implementation of laws and policies that have been enacted and 
mobilising local government to implement and enforce those laws strictly.  
Furthermore, World Vision gathers evidence from local areas so that policy makers do 
not lack information. They organise fieldwork and then contribute to modifying laws on 
children’s rights. For example, they contacted the Department of Children’s Care and 
Protection in order to propose amendments to laws and policies. In particular, while the 
law had specified categories for children with special or difficult circumstances, it lacks 
policies for trafficked children, so World Vision petitioned to include this group. This 




Thus, policy influence and citizen empowerment are two main activities of World 
Vision's policy advocacy. Putting in the lens of a developmental state mindset and 
policy, this organisation contributed to enhancing state capacity in policy-making 
because the policy-makers, for different reasons, often lack information and real data in 
the policy-making process. With the advantage of community engagement to supply 
information and evidence-based recommendations to policy makers, INGOs fill in this 
gap to an extent. Thus, the state can benefit from these advocacy activities if they 
provide quality data and input. However, there is a danger of reliance on those 
organisations and at times, their views may contrast with national or community goals, 
for example related to Care and World Vision’s basis in Christianity. In such cases, 
their advocacy activities will create pressure for the state to issue polices. 
 
6.5. Some Key Findings 
Through the above overview of INGOs in Vietnam and the two case studies, some key 
findings about INGOs in Vietnam and their influences on Vietnamese developmental state 
mindset can be drawn out as follows: 
First, there have been different approaches to policy and decision-making between 
INGOs and the Government of Vietnam. The Government implements aid to vulnerable 
and poor people based on set criteria and divided assistance packages. Government 
policies are often treated as voluntarist and subjective projects based on top-down 
policy making. This is because government programs are often carried out by executive 
order and the range of those programs is generally nation-wide. They generally do not 
have enough resources to operate a full suite of participatory policies and programs. In 
contrast, many INGOs emphasise bottom-up decision making. They focus on 
communities’ needs and use a participatory approach with direct contribution from the 
people in their planning. In parallel with giving money and goods or providing services 
to vulnerable and poor people, they concentrate on capacity building such as training 
skills and sharing experiences to help the poor use aid effectively and move out of 
poverty sustainably. In brief, they are concerned with the sustainable development of 
communities as well as effectiveness of their projects and programs. 
Second, local governments appear to have benefited from many INGOs’ projects and 




successful, those models appear to have been replicated by local governments. They 
have used their own budgets to implement those models. Through involvement and 
cooperation with INGOs, 'some models, approaches, skills, methods and technologies in 
development were really helpful for Vietnam. For example, the micro-credit model, 
community development with the participation of the people and grassroots democracy’ 
(Don Tuan Phong). This is a notable point, that the Vietnamese developmental state 
mindset has been influenced by INGOs’ developmental strategies but in ways to 
reinforce the importance of social elements in the model. 
Third, local government staff were trained and enhanced their capacities through INGO 
projects and programs. Through involvement and cooperation with INGOs, staff had 
their capacity built through training during project activities as well as by learning from 
the project. For example: 
For agricultural, forestry and fishery extension projects, those projects have 
trained thousands, even tens of thousands of cadres and peasants. Each year, 
there have been about 2,500 projects, over 20 years there were about 50,000 
projects, so a lot of officials and farmers gained enhanced capacities from these 
projects’ (Don Tuan Phong – interviewee). 
Indeed, many former partners that were collaborators in programs became local leaders 
later on. It is claimed that many have performed well when they become local leaders. 
Thus, it is clear in those specific cases that INGOs made strong contribution to enhance 
the Vietnamese developmental mindset. 
Fourth, in Vietnam it is perceived that INGOs tend to build a strong relationship with 
the government, from the central to the local levels. In order to take advantage of 
available channels that could help their projects be implemented effectively, almost all 
INGO projects involved signed agreements with local authorities and had participation 
by local government cadres. These activities did not occur in the past when INGOs 
work focused on humanitarian assistance and relief and their partnership mechanism 
was more like ‘giving party-receiving party’ (Nguyen and Nguyen 2014: 53). The 
strong relationship with the state has been considered as a key point and lesson in the 
success of INGO projects and programs. This characteristic, in Odile Ruijs’s opinion, 
‘is different from INGOs’ work in many other developing countries, where INGOs 




weakness of INGOs’ activities in Vietnam – a lack of independence, a layer between the 
INGOs and the beneficiaries – has in fact turned out to be a major strength’ (Cited in 
Payne 2004: 3). The two case studies of CARE and World Vision showed this closed 
relationship as essential to the perceived effectiveness of INGO project implementation 
in Vietnam.  
Research by Nguyen Thi Que and Nguyen Thi Tu Hoa (2014: 53) demonstrated that 
‘a tripartite partnership mechanism between local authorities, INGOs and people is 
considered as the basic partnership that almost all INGOs in Vietnam appreciated’. 
According to these authors, because INGOs now target sustainable development, 
‘almost all INGOs recognised that the participations and supports of local 
government play an important role for the success of their programs/projects’ 
(Nguyen and Nguyen 2014: 53). Local and provincial governments play a key role 
in providing the orientation in the field, area priorities and relevance to national 
programs as well as the local social-economic development plan. Therefore, 
perceiving the close relationship with government, INGOs took advantage of 
available channels to help their projects be implemented effectively and also 
improve their capacity for discussions with central government.  
Thus, these realities, on the one hand, indicate strong state authority in Vietnam that 
INGOs cannot ignore. On the other hand, all INGOs working in Vietnam are oriented to 
sustainable growth and creating changes for vulnerable groups and poor people. They 
came with a purpose of humanitarian assistance and sustainable development. Different 
INGOs have different approaches, objects and areas of project operations, but their goals 
are similar in helping people in disadvantaged areas to develop. Therefore, these purposes 
help to ensure that the GoV retains a strong focus on local community development in its 
thinking about the developmental state. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
The literature is divided into two main streams of thought about the relationship 
between NGOs and the state. The first school argues that NGOs are a replacement 
institutions in response to the failure of the state, providing what government agencies 
are unable to deliver, and at the same time, presenting ‘the most serious challenge to the 




revenue’ (Fernando and Heston 1997: 8; see also Lewis and Kanji 2009; and Sending 
and Neumann 2006). In contrast, the second school sees that, by having strong 
professional staff, producing effective programs and extensive, well-researched policy 
papers. NGOs can bring their skills to help the state and contribute to enhancing its 
capacities (Raustiala 1997; Duffy 2006). From the above analysis of INGOs in Vietnam 
and case studies, the second argument seems to be more relevant in this circumstance 
but the equally interesting issue, and less researched one, is their influence on the 
developmental thinking of states. 
The case studies showed that INGOs in Vietnam bring a sustainable development 
approach, ensure the voices of people are genuinely heard, and encourage the 
participation of people in policy-making process.  In so doing, they develop grassroots 
democracy processes, enable effective capacity building and the long-term effectiveness 
of programs and policies. Many of the programs implement humanitarian assistance and 
sustainable development for vulnerable groups and poor people. In these ways, INGOs 
actually bring their capacities to the advantage of the developmental state and can 
contribute to enhancing the state’s abilities. It is clear that INGOs in Vietnam supplied 
useful resources to the GoV. Yet this is only the case because the GoV has taken a 
proactive approach to ensuring that they are aware of, and engaged in, the work of 
INGOs in the country, which is not often the case elsewhere. Among other gains, this 
engagement has meant that the GoV has been able to replicate efficient INGO models. 
Moreover, the influence of INGOs’ developmental strategies on the developmental state 
mindset and policies in Vietnam are clearly evident in this circumstance. 
Yet, the case studies also showed that after successes in building models, INGOs 
usually share their experiences with, or transfer these models to, local governments. 
Local governments do replicate these models using their own budgets.  Once more, this 
suggests that INGOs in Vietnam can be developmental state enhancing. 
 Further, INGOs are not permanent. They can and do withdraw their programs and 
projects and move in other areas - or indeed countries, though Vietnam has been a 
popular with both INGOs, bilateral and multilateral donors for around two decades. 
More research on the perceptions of communities in remote areas regarding INGOs and 
the government would be needed to develop firmer conclusions on the impact in 




INGOs and developmental state capacity is clearly complex and multidimensional but 
that there is no simple undermining of state autonomy. Thus, the idea of the 
developmental mindset seems to be the best explanation for the situation in which the 
Vietnamese state still keeps a leading role, but allows INGOs to work in some areas of 











There has long been controversy in the research literature over the traditional model of a 
developmental state and a new debate about the components, or indeed model, of 
contemporary developmental states, in light of globalisation. A traditional 
developmental state is normally demonstrated by a strong interventional state leading 
the course of national economic development, with its key features of strong and 
influential leadership, effective political-economic institutions and key developmental 
policy choices. Scholars have debated whether traditional developmental states have 
been changing and becoming more neoliberal since the Asian financial crisis in 
particular. They note the influence of the global context and debate whether 
international actors have been forces for improvement of developmental state capacity 
or contributed to a move away from developmentalist directions.  
This thesis utilised Elizabeth Thurbon’s idea of the developmental mindset that focuses 
on ideational aspects rather than institutions and policies that have been the basis for  
traditional developmental state theorists in order to explore the extent to which Vietnam 
is a developmental state. According to Thurbon, the rootedness of institutional or policy 
changes is fundamentally influenced by the mindset of the policymaking elite. 
Therefore, the mindset informs ‘the institutions and policies’ and thus the ideas need to 
be returned ‘to the center of developmental state theorising’ (Thurbon 2016: 17). 
Thurbon’s mindset-strategy framework provides a new, insightful way to analyse the 
case of Vietnam. One of the key questions about its path in contemporary times is the 
extent to which it has been following a developmental state approach (Gainsborough 
2010; Pham 2012; Masina 2012) or whether it is now more strongly influenced by a 
market-oriented (Nguyen 2012; Le 2013; Vu 2013; Nguyen 2015) or even neoliberal 
(Bui 2015) approach to development. The concept of the developmental mindset offers 
a new, more dynamic, future-oriented way to investigate this debate, focusing on the 
perceptions of a range of developmental actors. 
In light of these debates, the objective of this thesis has been to investigate and evaluate 
the impact of three crucial actors in Vietnam on the developmental mindset in the 




explored the perceptions of the influence of these actors and the ways they influence the 
Vietnamese developmental state mindset and related policy domains. In so doing, the 
thesis has provided specific evidence from Vietnam on the battle for the developmental 
mindset of this transition economy and the role played by foreign economic actions, 
notably IOs and NGOs in that battle. It has, more generally, revealed some of the 
contemporary and emerging fault lines around developmental states and globalisation. 
This conclusion summarises what the thesis found starting with the historical analysis of 
the impact of Doi Moi. 
 
The historical and political evolution of the Vietnamese state 
Vietnam launched a major renovation called Doi Moi from 1986 to shift the principles 
of state management from bureaucratically centralised mechanisms to market-based 
mechanisms. The state apparatus before Doi Moi was designed as a socialist state like 
the USSR, Eastern European states during their socialist period or the Chinese state. 
Two important points for socialist models are the role of the Communist Party in the 
state and the features of economic regime. The leadership role of the Communist Party 
was institutionalised in Vietnam; all state agencies, social organisations and sectors at 
all levels were required to legally comply with the Party’s leadership. The economic 
regime was based on consolidated socialist ownership of production including two 
elements: a stated-owned element, which was owned by all people and a cooperative 
element. These principles changed after Doi Moi.  
The Vietnamese state apparatus was reorganised and this transformation was influenced 
by market and developmental state ideas. The principles of socialist centralism were 
reconsidered and applied more appropriately. The operation of state apparatus changed 
from a centralisation-principle to a decentralisation-principle. Regulation of the 
economic regime also underwent crucial changes from being centrally planned with 
extensive state monopolies to a multi-component commodity economy and now to what 
the Government calls a ‘socialist-oriented market economy’, though the exact 
organisation and meaning of this latter organisational form is still a work in progress.  
These major renovations of institutions paved the way for Vietnam to start international 




ASEAN in 1997 and the WTO in 2007. In this process, the Vietnamese state’s 
developmental strategies were significantly influenced by newly emerging actors, in 
particular foreign economic actors, IOs, and INGOs. What is not clear, in the wake of 
the major reforms that have been ongoing, is whether Vietnam has instituted a strong 
developmentalist approach or whether it has moved towards a more market-based 
approach to development. The case study chapters of the thesis set out to evaluate this 
through the concept of a developmental mindset. 
 
FDI and its influence on the Vietnamese state’s developmental mindset 
Foreign economic actors emerged in Vietnam after the implementation the ‘open 
door’ policy in 1986, and expanded rapidly in 1990s. These actors have contributed 
greatly to the political economic restructuring and development of the country. FDI 
has spread into a range of economic sectors including domestic invested sectors, 
which has created competitive pressures and promoted renovation and technology 
transformation. FDI is perceived to have contributed substantially to enhancing 
economic management capacity in the country, improving the business environment, 
and promoting international integration. However, along with some achievements, 
FDI inflows have also posed major challenges to Vietnamese state managerial 
capacity in a number of areas.  In particular, there have been such challenges as how 
can Vietnam effectively attract modern technology, develop modern professional 
management skills in the workforce and build other workforce skills. These are 
needed to not just attract FDI in mid to high technology sectors, but also more broadly 
across the economy. FDI operations also pose developmental challenges around the 
need for reform of the legal framework to fit with international regimes and 
expectations; budget dependence on FDI; increasing the gaps between the rich and 
poor regions of the country; and the need for effective ways to manage industrial 
zones.  Challenges have also become evident in the debates over the need to support 
local enterprises against the competitiveness of foreign ones, in providing 
employment for farmers whose lands have been lost to industrial zones and in 
managing environmental pollution. Responding to these difficulties and problems has, 
to some extent, contributed to enhancing Vietnamese state capacity on the one hand 




In order to develop a more fine-grained analysis of these issues, a case study of Vinh 
Phuc province in northern Vietnam was undertaken. The case study demonstrated that 
the local leaders recognised that the province’s economy in general, and the province’s 
budget, in particular, had significantly benefitted from FDI, and indeed, ‘if Vinh Phuc 
was not the recipient of FDI, it would not have developed like it has’ (Cong, 
interviewee). The main contribution of FDI sector was not just the increase in the 
province’s budget, FDI has also played an important role in motivating and encouraging 
the local economic sector to compete nationally and beyond. In this sense, FDI has 
contributed to creating a competitive (developmental) mindset amongst local businesses 
and provincial government managers to attract investment. 
At the same time, there have been challenges to provincial governance in terms of 
policy-making and implementation that have arisen in part because of a loose and not 
sufficiently comprehensive legislative regime for the new political-economic regime. 
This created loopholes that some enterprises took advantage of, leading to a series of 
problems that still do not have solutions, such as transfer pricing, false investment and 
tax evasion. Relatedly, the management capacity of provincial cadres is perceived to not 
yet meet the requirement of the sector, which also contributed to the success of foreign 
enterprises in exploiting loopholes.  
Further, pressures on local government have arisen in attracting and managing the FDI 
sector, such as managing environmental pollution, planning and filling up industrial 
zones and ensuring social-economic security related to foreign investment. These 
pressures were important not only in relation to the changing mechanisms of local 
governance policy making, but also influenced local government’s developmental 
strategies and policy implementation. Thus, promulgating effective strategic directions 
and policies in order to ensure there is effective management of the foreign investment 
sector is an essential requirement for local government. What is clear here is the 
provincial officials have a strong grasp of, and concern with, such issues.  In turn, this 
demonstrates that provincial governments have a developmental mindset – in this case 
about maximising the benefits of FDI to the local economy and mitigating the costs. 
Linking the analysis of the FDI in Vietnam and the case study of Vinh Phuc province to 
some of the key literature on the effects of FDI on the developmental state highlights a 




MNCs (especially through investment liberalisation) and the state can, in some cases, 
assist the state’s goals (Chang 2003; Block and Keller 2011). For this to be a strategic 
relationship, nation states need to retain their important role in political and economic 
development, and in building or augmenting state capacity. Indeed, for Weiss (1998: 212) 
this is ‘the lesson of dynamic integration’. Further, she highlighted that ‘strategic 
alliances’ of MNCs and national governments in which the nation state still operates as ‘a 
pillar of so-called policy autonomy’ can promote the state, increasing capacity 
enhancement (Weiss 1999: 60). For this to be the case, MNC operations need to 
effectively promote the state, not undermine it, as well as increase capacity enhancement 
in a range of ways, and enhance infrastructural capacity (Mann 1997: 487, 488). Looking 
at FDI in Vietnam, the thesis demonstrated that the country has a number of the 
characteristics of a strong developmental state.  At a minimum, the state’s management of 
FDI has not undermined state power, rather perceptions of its capacity have overall been 
enhanced by the attraction and operation of FDI. Yet, my interviews highlighted that local 
actors in Vietnam are nevertheless concerned about the robustness of the alliances with 
various FDI interests. It seems, then that FDI as ‘strategic alliance’ will continue to be a 
challenge for Vietnam in order to maintain its developmental credentials. 
As the interviews in Chapter Three highlighted, FDI poses a range of challenges for 
Vietnam. The interviews highlighted concerns about cadres’ abilities, macroeconomic 
management and policy-making capacities, environmental pollution and social 
economic security. While up to now, Vietnam has been able to attract and manage FDI, 
so demonstrating its capacity as a developmental state, as FDI presence matures in the 
country, these managerial challenges will become more important and the country’s 
ability to manage them will be seen as a key marker of its developmental state capacity. 
Thus, the Vietnamese government has to focus on enhancing their capacities in these 
areas to ensure it obtains the maximum benefits from FDI.  
Vietnam has not reached many of its planned targets in luring foreign investment (Do 
2016; Son, interviewee). Vietnam is also interested in moving up the value chain 
through FDI investment toward higher technology production. While the goal is there, 
the fact that Vietnamese national technology networks have not been strong enough or 
had enough prominence in policy in order to compete with the foreign branches of 
MNCs in Vietnam (Do 2016), demonstrates a key limitations in the developmental 




IOs and their influence on Vietnam’s developmental mindset 
Turning to the expansion of international organisations outlined in Chapters Four and 
Five, these actors also grew in Vietnam after Doi Moi, particularly during the 1990s. 
Now a range of IOs work in the country and they continue to expand their operations. 
Beside the benefits these organisations bring, their growth also poses a range of 
challenges to the Vietnamese state regarding ideological, economic and political 
independence, and also in terms of how they have influenced thinking about what 
development is and how it should occur.  
In the case of the UN system, Vietnam has taken advantage of their capital, and 
intellectual and technical assistance to benefit the country’s socio-economic 
development. However, the UN’s work on things like the independence of the judiciary 
and civil society actors usually involves the inclusions of human rights. UNDP projects 
normally support building a democratic administration and developing civil society and 
they support values such as: political-religious freedom, transparency, and 
accountability.  Despite the importance of some of these values, much of the UNDP’s 
work in Vietnam does promote a fairly Western approach to the rule of law and 
governance. This creates two issues for Vietnam, first in the tension between UNDP 
values and the country’s socialist, one-party system and secondly, whether this closes 
the space for thinking about developmental approaches.  
Regarding the WTO, the case study identified a consensus among Vietnamese 
politicians, scientists, and businesses about the significant influence of this 
organisation’s rules and norms on Vietnamese policy and developmental approaches. 
They were nervous and concerned about whether the country could effectively deal with 
the changes in the business environment demanded by WTO accession. A key concern 
was around the required adjustments to the domestic law system to meet WTO rules. In 
addition, local entrepreneurs perceived domestic enterprises would be forced into 
international competition, especially through the lowering of tariffs and the removal of 
allowances that were not WTO compliant. Certainly, accession to the WTO has shaped 
state governance capacity in areas such as law-making capacity, trade and industrial 
regulation and advancement. Still, the case study demonstrated that the Vietnamese 
government was conscious of many of the challenges that WTO accession would bring 




Bello to try to ensure that they had understood the implications. This activist approach 
suggests an ongoing strong concern with developmental state concerns. 
In the case of the World Bank, the organisation is perceived to have made significant 
contributions to solving difficulties and motivating institutional reform in Vietnam in its 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one. Each arena of Bank 
activity, such as country assistance or partnership strategies (CAS/CPS), leading donor 
coordination, or the Bank’s activities in advice and consultation, is seen to influence 
different aspects of Vietnamese developmental state trajectories and policies. However, 
when viewed through the lens of the developmental state mindset, there is a gap 
between the GoV in its ‘peculiar’ goal of a socialist-oriented market economy, and the 
Bank’s expectations, which are an absolute market economy or perhaps a neoliberal 
economy, strong democratic governance and more transparent policy-making.  
Chapter Five not only showed the influence of the Bank on Vietnam’s transition but 
also provided perceptions about its impact on the developmental state mindset in 
Vietnam. Some analysts see that the GoV, despite the Bank’s influence, has kept a 
notable degree of autonomy in policy implementation. The Government has been able 
to use suggestions from the Bank in their own ways to develop their policy-making 
capacity and apply this to fit Vietnam’s context. This is a lesson from Vietnam that the 
Bank itself noted as they argued that, in order to achieve success, they needed to change 
the GoV’s development mindset to bring it in line with their own, and to promote this at 
both a national and grassroots levels (Kwakwa 2013). Therefore, as Engel (2010: 198) 
concluded ‘the Bank has been part of the changing ideological terrain in Vietnam 
regarding the role of states and markets but neither the level of change nor the influence 
of the World Bank or other donors should be exaggerated.’ Further the continuation of 
Vietnam’s ‘peculiar’ goals such as a socialist-oriented market economy, socialist rule of 
law, and socialist culture, show that Vietnam is likely to take more a developmental 
state approach rather than a neoliberal one, which is the Bank’s expectation. 
Different IOs have different ways and forms of influencing the state. As international 
actors, the UN, the WTO and the World Bank with their trade commitments; lending 
programs; support for policy and institutional reform; policy analysis and advisor 
activities, have influenced the GoV and often in market-based directions, challenging a 




reinforce and augment aspects of Vietnamese state capacity such as policy 
implementation, law making and adjustment, and state competitive capacity. This fits 
with the work of scholars who have argued IOs as effective instruments to help improve 
nation state capacity (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Iriye 2002; Barkin 2013). However, 
in the view of scholars like Stiglitz and Bello, IOs such as the IMF, WTO, and World 
Bank, often promote damaging rules and operations. Their regulations often 
discriminate against, and create difficulties for, developing countries. They spread the 
political hegemony of the developed states and that activity has caused a negative 
spillover in poor countries. Further, their view of good governance and democracy is 
one that actually limits democracy by defining a whole range of areas as economic, and 
hence outside of the role of politics. This analysis also has resonance with the 
developmental trajectory of contemporary Vietnam, as they demand institutional 
‘reform’, require greater transparency, press for the improvement of human rights, and, 
significantly, put a market centred view development at the centre of their approach. 
What is interesting here is that generally, these organisations have been relatively 
positively perceived in Vietnam.  Such perception suggests that they may to be able to 
further push the country’s developmental mindset towards a market-based approach and 
away from a developmental state one. 
 
INGOs and their influence on Vietnam’s developmental mindset and policies 
By 2014, there were appropriately 1,000 INGOs in Vietnam coming from over 30 
countries and territories, and operating in almost all provinces and cities of Vietnam. 
The research in this thesis demonstrated that there is a strong perception that these 
organisations have successfully and effectively contributed to social development in 
many ways, including reducing poverty and improving the living standards of people 
in the areas where their projects are. While some scholars and analysts have raised 
concerns about the potential of INGOs to undermine the role of the state, which has 
been the case in a range of developing states, that has not been apparent in Vietnam. 
INGOs have introduced several new models, methods, and approaches to development 
in Vietnam, and these have been generally well regarded. In the perception of 
government officials, INGOs have positively impacted not only on the capacity of 




projects, thousands of grassroots officials and hundreds of thousands of people were 
trained to enhance their capacities.  
The case studies of Care International and World Vision International in Vietnam 
demonstrated the ways that local governments and people are perceived to have 
benefited from INGO projects and programs. Many typical program models developed 
by these organisations have been replicated in other areas by local governments. 
Government officials have also benefitted from these projects, in other ways, especially 
in the training and resultant enhanced capacity. Many INGOs in Vietnam have 
presumed that the right way to change government officials’ developmental mindset is 
by involving them in their projects and demonstrating them their effectiveness. In so 
doing, INGOs have actually brought their resources to the advantage of the Vietnamese 
state and contributed to enhancing developmental state capacity in social development. 
In Vietnam, many INGOs are perceived to have built strong relationships with 
government, which was considered, in perceptions of INGOs and GoV staff, as a key 
point and lesson in the success of their activities. Local governments provided 
orientation to field projects and linked to national programs, area priorities, and the 
local social-economic development plan. Taking advantages of these channels, INGOs 
enhanced the success of their programs and seems to have positively contributed to the 
Vietnamese developmental mindset regarding the benefits of local participation and 
poverty reduction activities in contributing to the overall developmental framework. 
Due to these characteristics, some scholars argue that INGOs in Vietnam have lost or 
compromised their independence (Payne 2004: 3; Dang 2009: 26). Equally, it could be 
argued that the Vietnamese state has made concessions allowing INGOs to function 
and becoming a channel for their work. Nevertheless, some local authorities remain 
afraid of INGOs working on issues such as grassroots democracy, governance and 
human rights, because these are considered sensitive issues that are deemed to be the 
responsibilities of the state government rather than of foreign organisations. Such 
tensions demonstrate the limits of the INGO impact on the social and political 
development paradigm in the country. Thus, this is an important issue in term of 
thinking about the relationship between the Vietnamese government and INGOs into 
the future. Overall though, Vietnam’s views of INGOs fits with the theoretical 




improving the state’s abilities (Raustiala 1997: 720; Duffy 2006). Furthermore, through 
the lens of developmental state theorists, it can be said that INGOs have contributed to, 
reinforced, and augmented the Vietnamese developmental state mindset. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the investigations of the three types of international actors above showed their 
effects on Vietnamese developmental state mindset and policies. These international 
actors contribute to enhancing state capacity and to enriching the developmental 
mindset in general. Each actor has different ways of affecting different aspects of the 
developmental state mindset and capacity. FDI has had more of an impact on economic 
management, in the process challenging developmental state capacity in sustainable 
economic development and highlighting the need for policy reform as well as cadres’ 
capacities enhancement in FDI management. Thus, FDI has influenced but has not 
undermined local government’s developmental mindset, local government’s 
developmental capacity and the Vietnamese developmental state mindset. In Vietnam, 
IOs have concentrated on institutional reform and brought international rules and 
Western norms to Vietnam, often requiring adjustments to domestic laws and changes 
of political ideology as well. Thus, the main contribution of IOs has been at the level of 
national developmental strategy and institutional capacity enhancement. Overall, the 
thesis demonstrated that IOs challenge the institutionalisation of an activist 
developmental mindset in Vietnam, through their tendency to define a range of issues as 
in the remit of markets and thus outside that of states. INGOs mainly focus on the 
grassroots level, including vulnerable and poor people in undeveloped rural and remote 
areas, and in so doing, influence local government, particularly through introducing 
their new models, methods, and approaches to development as well as training people. 
Thus, INGOs central contribution has been at the level of grassroots democracy, local 
governance and social development, although the support of central government for 
their involvement suggests Vietnam retains a developmental mindset with an interest in 
grassroots development.  
Overall, the thesis has demonstrated the depth of engagement of international actors on 
Vietnam’s developmental mindset at the national, provincial and local levels. All these 




state in economic management, and the direction of reform of political-economic 
institutions and of promoting social development. Of course, the effectiveness and 
extent of those influences depends on how their directions fit and interact with the 
strategy and plans of the GoV. As a Vietnamese officer said in an interview, ‘Vietnam 
is willing to use advice from the foreign partners. We select what is the essence of 
humankind. We admit our weakness and we are willing to learn, but they cannot force 
us.’ Or as an IO in Vietnam said: ‘the attempt to force reforms will never succeed’ and 
‘this is a lesson from Vietnam that assistance could positively promote its role on policy 
encouragement instead of policy imposition’ (World Bank 2012: 17; 39). This is why a 
representative of the World Bank stated: 
Vietnam has sought ideas, knowledge and even advice from development 
partners and then found ways to contextualise and adapt it to fit Vietnam’s own 
context. This means development partner ideas have not been taken on “hook 
line and sinker” (Kwakwa 2013).  
Thus, identifying and analysing these various elements and perspectives above 
demonstrates the strong perception that a Vietnamese developmental state mindset still 
operates, and that there is a degree of policy autonomy although their developmental 
strategies have been influenced by international actors. Specifically, with the ‘peculiar’ 
goals of Vietnam, such as its socialist-oriented market economy, socialist rule of law, 
socialist culture, or in particular, ‘the central mechanism of state intervention (SOE 
reform, financial tool renew, state budget control, etc.), transforming agriculture, the 
course of industrialisation’ (Pham 2012), the conclusion is that Vietnam is still more of 
a developmental state than it is a liberal or neoliberal one. 
To conclude, it is useful to reflect on contemporary issues. The international 
environment has become even more complex in the past couple of years with the 
election of Trump in the US, Brexit and China’s rising power and influence. We have 
seen the re-emergence of populism and extreme nationalism all in the midst of a 
challenge to the hegemony of the existing superpower, the US. Failed states are a 
growing concern and levels of global immigration and refugees are at an all-time high. 
The fourth industrial revolution (IR 4.0) linked to information technology is emerging 
as central concern around the world. Further, global issues such climate change; 




international challenges are also influencing the developmental strategies of nation-
states across the world. Different states have different strategies of addressing the 
influences. But, these important issues only highlight the importance of thinking 
strategically about development and the importance of a developmental mindset, as 
developing states like in Vietnam will need to address these challenges proactively 




Appendix 1:  List of interviewees 
 
Provincial leaders: 
 Mr Nguyen Binh Khuong, Head of Division, the Foreign-Economic Office, 
Planning and Investment Department, Vinh Phuc People’s Committee; 
 Mr Khong Thanh Cong, Vice Director of the Industrial Zones Management 
Board, Vinh Phuc People’s Committee; 
 Mr Nguyen Manh Doan, expert of the Foreign-Economic Office, Planning and 
Investment Department, Vinh Phuc People’s Committee; 
 Mr Phan Tien Dung, official of Foreign Economic Division, Planning and 
Investment Department Vinh Phuc  People’s Committee; 
 Mr Nguyen Duy Hieu, Head of Division, the Labour, Employment and Social 
Insurance Office, Department of Labour, Invalids and Social affairs, Vinh Phuc 
People’s Committee; and 
 Mr Do Minh Duc, Senior Officer of Vinh Phuc Committee’s Office, and 
consultant for the Chair and Vice-Chair of Vinh Phuc People Committee. 
Experts: 
 Dr Ngo Huy Duc, Director of the Institute of Political Science, Ho Chi Minh 
National Political Academy. 
 Associate Professor, Dr Nguyen Viet Thong, a Secretary General of the Central 
Theoretical Council, Vietnamese Communist Party. 
 Prof. Dr Phan Xuan Son, member of the Central Theoretical Council, 
Vietnamese Communist Party member of the National Scientific Council. 
World Bank’s officers: 
 Nguyen Hong Ngan, in charge of external and communicated division, WB 
Vietnam. 
 Dinh Tuan Viet, Senior Economics, WB Vietnam 





 Mr. Nguyen Van Anh, Director of agriculture and rural development programs, 
CARE Vietnam. 
 Mrs, Khong Huong Lan, in charge of external relation and policy advocacy, 
World Vision Vietnam. 
 Mr. Luu Quang Dai, in charge of the North programmes Management, PLAN 
Vietnam. 
PACCOM’s officers: 
 Mr. Le Trung Hieu, Vice director, the people aid coordination, PACCOM. 




Appendix 2:  List of interview questions 
 
The research questions focused on: 
 What are the key influences of the Vietnamese developmental state mindset and 
policy as well as on state power by the rise of Foreign Economic Actors? 
 What does the development and empowerment of International Organisations 
mean to Vietnam? 
 What does the development and empowerment of Non-Governmental 
Organisations mean in Vietnam? 
 How do these organisations impact on the Vietnamese developmental state 
mindset and policy as well as on state power? 
 
Questions in Vinh Phuc Province 
Foreign-funded enterprise owners 
- How much capital has been invested by your company? Has this increased or 
reduced in recent years? 
- How many workers are in your company? Where do they mostly come from? 
How about their qualification, do they meet your company’s requirements? 
Have these numbers increased or reduced in recent years? Do you have any 
special policies to attract the right labour force (priorities, bonuses, etc.)? 
- Can you tell me about your company’s main use of land? Are there any needs 
your company has had supported by local government? 
- Are the goods produced by your company used mainly for export, domestic 
consumption, or both of them? 
- What is your estimation on the competitive capacity of your company in 
comparison with local companies? 
- Can you tell me about your company’s strategy for investment/development in 
the next years? 
 
Local governmental officers 
- What are the main contributions of FDI to the development of the province? 
- What are the difficulties encountered in managing the foreign investment sector? 
- What challenges does the local government face in governing the local area in 
the context of high levels of foreign investment and industrial development? 
- Does the local government make concessions (give priorities, enhancements, 
etc.) to the foreign economic sector? 
 
Leaders of World Bank in Vietnam 
- How has the World Bank in Vietnam developed its strategy, approach and 
lending projects since the 1990s? 
- How have your policies changed over time and why? 
- Can you tell me about your view of the role and impact of World Bank projects 
in Vietnamese society? 
- How well do you think the World Bank coordinates with the Vietnamese 
government? 




Leaders of Non-governmental Organizations in Vietnam 
- Can you tell me about how your organisation in Vietnam jas developed in terms 
of its scale and type of operations since you were established? 
- What have been the main advantages (promotions, priorities, etc.) and 
disadvantages (fences/barriers, etc.) from Vietnam’s government policies? 
- What are the goals of your overall program in Vietnam and the outcomes? What 
have been some of the most successful project and why? 
- What are you their estimations of the role and impact of their projects in social 
development in Vietnam? 
-  Why do you think you’ve been successful in working in Vietnam? 
- If can compare the effectiveness of projects of your organisation with the 
implementations of Vietnamese government, what comparisons would you draw? 
 
Experts from the Central Party Board of Consultants 
- How do you think about the influence of emergent actors in Vietnam on state 
power and the developmental mindset in the context of globalisation? 
- Are there any projects in your Centre which study these issues? What have they 
found? 
- Are there any consultations/ recommendations on these issues for Communist 
Party of Vietnam? 
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